Rockwell Automation Micrologix 1400 Improper Input Validation
Summary
| CVE | CVE-2014-5410 |
|---|---|
| State | PUBLISHED |
| Assigner | icscert |
| Source Priority | CVE Program / NVD first with legacy fallback |
| Published | 2014-10-03 18:55:06 UTC |
| Updated | 2026-05-06 22:30:45 UTC |
| Description | The DNP3 feature on Rockwell Automation Allen-Bradley MicroLogix 1400 1766-Lxxxxx A FRN controllers 7 and earlier and 1400 1766-Lxxxxx B FRN controllers before 15.001 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (process disruption) via malformed packets over (1) an Ethernet network or (2) a serial line. |
Risk And Classification
Primary CVSS: v2.0 7.1 from [email protected]
AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C
Problem Types: CWE-20 | CWE-399 | CWE-20 CWE-20
| Version | Source | Type | Score | Severity | Vector |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2.0 | [email protected] | Primary | 7.1 | AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C | |
| 2.0 | [email protected] | Secondary | 7.1 | AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C | |
| 2.0 | CNA | CVSS | 7.1 | AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C |
CVSS v2.0 Breakdown
AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C
NVD Known Affected Configurations (CPE 2.3)
| Type | Vendor | Product | Version | Update | Edition | Language |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Hardware | Rockwellautomation | Ab Micrologix Controller | 1400 | All | All | All |
Vendor Declared Affected Products
| Source | Vendor | Product | Version | Platforms |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CNA | Rockwell Automation | Allen-Bradley MicroLogix 1400 | affected 1766-Lxxxxx Series A FRN 7 custom | Not specified |
| CNA | Rockwell Automation | Allen-Bradley MicroLogix 1400 | affected 1766-Lxxxxx Series B FRN 15.000 custom | Not specified |
| CNA | Rockwell Automation | Allen-Bradley MicroLogix 1400 | unaffected Series B FRN 15.001 or higher | Not specified |
References
| Reference | Source | Link | Tags |
|---|---|---|---|
| Rockwell Micrologix 1400 DNP3 DOS Vulnerability | ICS-CERT | af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108 | ics-cert.us-cert.gov | Third Party Advisory, US Government Resource |
| github.com/cisagov/CSAF/blob/develop/csaf_files/OT/white/2014/icsa-14-25... | [email protected] | github.com | |
| rockwellautomation.custhelp.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/620295 | [email protected] | rockwellautomation.custhelp.com | |
| www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-14-254-02 | [email protected] | www.cisa.gov | |
| CVE Program record | CVE.ORG | www.cve.org | canonical |
| NVD vulnerability detail | NVD | nvd.nist.gov | canonical, analysis |
Vendor Comments And Credit
Discovery Credit
CNA: Matthew Luallen of CYBATI (en)
Additional Advisory Data
Solutions
CNA: Rockwell Automation has released a new version of MicroLogix 1400 Series B firmware to address the vulnerability and reduce associated risk to successful exploitation. Subsequent versions of MicroLogix 1400 Series B firmware and newer will incorporate these same enhancements. Rockwell Automation recommends the following immediate mitigation strategies (when possible, multiple strategies should be employed simultaneously): * Upgrade all MicroLogix 1400 Series B controllers to Series B FRN 15.001 or higher. Current firmware for the MicroLogix 1400 Series B platform can be obtained at the following web address: http://www.rockwellautomation.com/rockwellautomation/support/pcdc.page Please refer to Rockwell Automation’s product disclosure (AID 620295) for more information on this topic available at: https://rockwellautomation.custhelp.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/620295
Workarounds
CNA: Users with Series A and Series B controllers are also recommended to apply the following risk mitigations: * Do not enable DNP3 communication in the product unless required. * Where appropriate, prohibit DNP3 communication that originates outside the perimeter of the manufacturing zone from entry into the zone by blocking communication directed at Ethernet communication Port 20000/TCP* and 20000/UDP* using appropriate security technology (e.g., a firewall, UTM devices, or other security appliance) *Note: Ports 20000/TCP and 20000/UDP are factory defaults as per the DNP3 specification but can be reconfigured by the product owner. * Employ firewalls with ingress/egress filtering, intrusion detection/prevention systems, and validate all configurations. Evaluate firewall configurations to ensure other appropriate inbound and outbound traffic is blocked. * Restrict physical and electronic access to automation products, networks, and systems to only those individuals authorized to be in contact with control system equipment. * Employ layered security, defense-in-depth methods and network segregation and segmentation practices in system design to restrict and control access to individual products and control networks. Refer to http://www.ab.com/networks/architectures.html http://www.ab.com/networks/architectures.html%20 for comprehensive information about implementing validated architectures designed to deliver these measures. Please refer to Rockwell Automation’s product disclosure (AID 620295) for more information on this topic available at: https://rockwellautomation.custhelp.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/620295