MISP sachertortephp - CakeResponse::download() HTTP Response Splitting via Unsanitized Filename Enables Stored XSS
Summary
| CVE | CVE-2026-106512 |
|---|---|
| State | PUBLISHED |
| Assigner | CIRCL |
| Source Priority | CVE Program / NVD first with legacy fallback |
| Published | 2026-10-06 19:18:13 UTC |
| Updated | 2026-10-06 20:06:12 UTC |
| Description | The CakeResponse::download() method in lib/Cake/Network/CakeResponse.php constructs a Content-Disposition header by directly interpolating a caller-supplied filename into a quoted-string value without sanitization. Two distinct injection vectors exist in the unpatched code. First, if the filename contains C0 control characters (CR or LF), PHP refuses to emit the entire Content-Disposition header, silently dropping the attachment disposition. The response body is then served with its own Content-Type (for example text/html for an .html attachment) and renders inline in the browser on the application origin, creating a stored cross-site scripting condition. The commit message notes this is reachable even when the download_attachments_on_load setting is enabled, meaning a victim merely needs to view a page that triggers the download. Second, a double-quote character in the filename terminates the quoted-string value early, permitting injection of additional Content-Disposition parameters. The affected code path covers all callers of CakeResponse::download(), including attribute downloads, proposal downloads, and restSearch exports. An authenticated user who can create or upload an attachment with a crafted filename (for example through MISP attribute naming or proposal attachment naming) can store the malicious filename. When any other authenticated user views the affected page, the unsanitized filename is reflected into the HTTP response header, resulting in header manipulation and potential execution of arbitrary HTML or JavaScript in the context of the application origin. The security impact is equivalent to a stored cross-site scripting vulnerability, allowing session hijacking, data exfiltration, and unauthorized actions on behalf of the victim. |
Risk And Classification
Primary CVSS: v4.0 8.4 HIGH from 5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:L/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Problem Types: CWE-20 | CWE-79 | CWE-113 | CWE-113 CWE-113 HTTP Response Splitting | CWE-79 CWE-79 Cross-site Scripting (XSS) | CWE-20 CWE-20 Improper Input Validation
| Version | Source | Type | Score | Severity | Vector |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 4.0 | 5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8 | Secondary | 8.4 | HIGH | CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:L/SA:N/E:X/C... |
| 4.0 | CNA | CVSS | 8.4 | HIGH | CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:L/SA:N |
CVSS v4.0 Breakdown
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:L/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Vendor Declared Affected Products
| Source | Vendor | Product | Version | Platforms |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CNA | MISP | Sachertortephp | affected 1c2da20cbe3f1e2a91458fe9a017823b7273fdac semver | Not specified |
References
| Reference | Source | Link | Tags |
|---|---|---|---|
| github.com/MISP/sachertortephp/commit/afbc551aa6b8aedb87dfa1223a388e9a31... | 5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8 | github.com | |
| github.com/MISP/sachertortephp/commit/e2c80021729611922817a57d2317b2ffa7... | 5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8 | github.com | |
| CVE Program record | CVE.ORG | www.cve.org | canonical |
| NVD vulnerability detail | NVD | nvd.nist.gov | canonical, analysis |
Vendor Comments And Credit
Discovery Credit
CNA: Logan Homolka (en)
CNA: iglocska (en)
CNA: Claude Opus 4.8 (en)
CNA: Claude Opus 4.8 (en)
CNA: CCB (en)
CNA: Alexandre Dulaunoy (en)
Additional Advisory Data
Solutions
CNA: The vulnerability is remediated by sanitizing the filename before it is interpolated into the Content-Disposition header. C0 control characters (0x00-0x1F) and DEL (0x7F) are stripped to prevent HTTP response splitting and header suppression. Subsequently, double-quote and backslash characters are escaped using addcslashes per RFC 6266 quoted-string rules to prevent early termination of the quoted value and injection of additional header parameters. Together these two steps ensure the filename remains contained within the intended quoted-string token regardless of its content.