Apache Kafka: Denial of service via unbounded memory allocation when decoding compressed record batches
Summary
| CVE | CVE-2026-114349 |
|---|---|
| State | PUBLISHED |
| Assigner | apache |
| Source Priority | CVE Program / NVD first with legacy fallback |
| Published | 2026-10-28 17:17:56 UTC |
| Updated | 2026-10-28 20:17:19 UTC |
| Description | When a broker decodes a compressed record batch, the per-record decoder reads a declared body size from the decompressed stream and allocates a buffer of that size before validating it against the bytes available or any configured limit. The size is attacker-controlled, and the batch CRC does not constrain it, so a small (around 90-byte), CRC-valid compressed produce request can declare a body size of up to about 2 GiB and force the broker to attempt that allocation, raising OutOfMemoryError. The record size limit (max.message.bytes), the request size limit, and client/broker quotas bound only the compressed wire size, not the declared decompressed size. Impact: An authenticated principal with Write on a topic can crash broker request-handler threads (reached when a batch's codec differs from the topic's compression.type and records are re-encoded) and any consumer that fetches the record, denying service. On brokers started with -XX:+ExitOnOutOfMemoryError, a common hardening, a single crafted request terminates the broker JVM. More seriously, a crafted record is accepted at ingest and written to disk; when the log-cleaner later reads it on a compacted topic, the OutOfMemoryError (an Error, not an Exception) terminates the cleaner thread, which is not restarted. With the default of a single cleaner thread, log compaction then stops for the entire broker, including the internal __consumer_offsets and __transaction_state topics, and the condition persists across restarts until the offending record is removed. The impact is availability only; no data is disclosed or altered. Mitigation: Upgrade to Apache Kafka 4.2.2, 4.3.2, or 4.4.0, and set max.decompressed.message.bytes (at the broker and/or topic level) to a bounded value appropriate for your workload. Upgrading alone is not sufficient: for backward compatibility this configuration defaults to an effectively unlimited value (about 2 GiB), so a broker remains exposed until the limit is set. Choose a value at or slightly above the largest legitimate decompressed record your applications produce, and comfortably below the broker heap divided by the number of request-handler and cleaner threads. Until you can upgrade and configure the limit, restrict Write access to trusted producers; quotas and max.message.bytes do not mitigate this issue. Resolution: From Apache Kafka 4.2.2, 4.3.2, and 4.4.0: the broker validates a record's declared decompressed body size against max.decompressed.message.bytes before allocating, on the produce-validation, log-compaction, and timestamp-lookup paths, and rejects oversized or negative sizes with InvalidRecordException. Operators must set this configuration to a bounded value to be protected, as its default is effectively unlimited. |
Risk And Classification
Problem Types: CWE-400 | CWE-789 | CWE-1284 | CWE-789 CWE-789 Memory allocation with excessive size value | CWE-400 CWE-400 Uncontrolled Resource Consumption | CWE-1284 CWE-1284 Improper validation of specified quantity in input
Vendor Declared Affected Products
| Source | Vendor | Product | Version | Platforms |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CNA | Apache Software Foundation | Apache Kafka | affected 0.11.0.0 4.1.2 semver | Not specified |
| CNA | Apache Software Foundation | Apache Kafka | affected 4.2.0 4.2.1 semver | Not specified |
| CNA | Apache Software Foundation | Apache Kafka | affected 4.3.0 4.3.1 semver | Not specified |
References
| Reference | Source | Link | Tags |
|---|---|---|---|
| www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/10/28/18 | af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108 | www.openwall.com | |
| kafka.apache.org/cve-list | [email protected] | kafka.apache.org | |
| CVE Program record | CVE.ORG | www.cve.org | canonical |
| NVD vulnerability detail | NVD | nvd.nist.gov | canonical, analysis |
Vendor Comments And Credit
Discovery Credit
CNA: Peyton Kennedy <[email protected]> (en)
CNA: Trung Nguyen <[email protected]>, CyStack (en)
CNA: Bartłomiej Dmitruk <[email protected]>, Striga (en)
CNA: 임성민 <[email protected]> (en)
CNA: Mike Read (GitHub: Michael-JRead) (en)
CNA: Salman Aljardan <[email protected]> (en)
CNA: Yuchao Zhang <[email protected]> (en)
CNA: Yu Bao <[email protected]>, PayPal Cyber Security Team (en)
CNA: Vamsi K <[email protected]> (en)
CNA: Srinivas Akhil Mallela <[email protected]> (en)
There are currently no legacy QID mappings associated with this CVE.