pytorch/serve: Local privilege escalation through insecure temporary path
Summary
| CVE | CVE-2026-123974 |
|---|---|
| State | PUBLISHED |
| Assigner | Akrites |
| Source Priority | CVE Program / NVD first with legacy fallback |
| Published | 2026-11-06 20:17:20 UTC |
| Updated | 2026-11-06 21:17:08 UTC |
| Description | In all versions of PyTorch's TorchServe, a predictable extraction directory in /tmp lets a local user swap the model handler and run code as the TorchServe service account leading to local privilege escalation. |
Risk And Classification
Primary CVSS: v3.1 7.8 HIGH from 7fefd608-56a6-419f-a002-fd8543c0710a
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
EPSS: 0.001450000 probability, percentile 0.037940000 (date 2026-11-07)
Problem Types: CWE-379 | CWE-379 CWE-379 Creation of temporary file in directory with insecure permissions
| Version | Source | Type | Score | Severity | Vector |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3.1 | 7fefd608-56a6-419f-a002-fd8543c0710a | Secondary | 7.8 | HIGH | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H |
| 3.1 | CNA | CVSS | 7.8 | HIGH | CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H |
CVSS v3.1 Breakdown
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Vendor Declared Affected Products
| Source | Vendor | Product | Version | Platforms |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CNA | PyTorch | TorchServe | affected * semver | Not specified |
References
| Reference | Source | Link | Tags |
|---|---|---|---|
| christbowel.com/blog/torchserve-lpe | 7fefd608-56a6-419f-a002-fd8543c0710a | christbowel.com | |
| github.com/Christbowel/torchserve-lpe | 7fefd608-56a6-419f-a002-fd8543c0710a | github.com | |
| CVE Program record | CVE.ORG | www.cve.org | canonical |
| NVD vulnerability detail | NVD | nvd.nist.gov | canonical, analysis |
Vendor Comments And Credit
Discovery Credit
CNA: Christ Bowel (en)
Additional Advisory Data
Solutions
CNA: The project is archived and currently no permanent solution is scheduled for release. See workaround section.
Workarounds
CNA: Three independent fixes: * Set TEMP (or pass -Djava.io.tmpdir) to a directory the service account owns and that is not world-writable. * Harden the systemd unit with PrivateTmp=yes, so /tmp is namespaced per service. * At the code level, extract into a directory owned by the service account and refuse to reuse a pre-existing extraction root that the service does not own, instead of forceMkdir-ing into whatever is already there.