DVP-12SE Missing Authentication and Unauthorized Write access Vulnerability
Summary
| CVE | CVE-2026-12819 |
|---|---|
| State | PUBLISHED |
| Assigner | Deltaww |
| Source Priority | CVE Program / NVD first with legacy fallback |
| Published | 2026-06-30 07:16:32 UTC |
| Updated | 2026-06-30 14:18:42 UTC |
| Description | Delta Electronics DVP12SE PLC exposes a Modbus TCP service over a specified port without authentication or access control, permitting unauthenticated interaction with security-sensitive PLC functions. |
Risk And Classification
Primary CVSS: v4.0 9.3 CRITICAL from 759f5e80-c8e1-4224-bead-956d7b33c98b
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
EPSS: 0.003100000 probability, percentile 0.228530000 (date 2026-07-03)
Problem Types: CWE-306 | CWE-306 CWE-306 Missing Authentication for Critical Function
| Version | Source | Type | Score | Severity | Vector |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 4.0 | 759f5e80-c8e1-4224-bead-956d7b33c98b | Secondary | 9.3 | CRITICAL | CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/C... |
| 4.0 | CNA | CVSS | 9.3 | CRITICAL | CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N |
CVSS v4.0 Breakdown
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Vendor Declared Affected Products
References
| Reference | Source | Link | Tags |
|---|---|---|---|
| filecenter.deltaww.com/news/download/doc/Delta-PCSA-2026-00011_DVP12SE%20Multiple%20... | 759f5e80-c8e1-4224-bead-956d7b33c98b | filecenter.deltaww.com | |
| CVE Program record | CVE.ORG | www.cve.org | canonical |
| NVD vulnerability detail | NVD | nvd.nist.gov | canonical, analysis |
Vendor Comments And Credit
Discovery Credit
CNA: CISA (en)
CNA: Adm Bin Harbi (0xnoag) - Corvo Security (en)
Additional Advisory Data
Workarounds
CNA: Users are recommended to take the following mitigation measures: * Enable the IP Filter feature: Configure and enable the PLC's built-in IP Filter function via the programming software. Restrict access exclusively to the IP addresses of trusted devices (such as designated HMI panels or SCADA hosts) to block unauthorized network access. * Set up PLC password protection: Enable password protection for the PLC within the programming software to ensure the device's core control logic and parameters cannot be easily downloaded, overwritten, or tampered with. * Implement network isolation and firewall protection: Deploy the PLC within an independent local area network (OT control network) secured by a firewall. Never connect the device directly to the office network or the Internet. If remote access is required, enforce the use of a secure, authorized VPN tunnel.