vulnerability-lookup: Session Persists After Password Change (CWE-613)
Summary
| CVE | CVE-2026-129706 |
|---|---|
| State | PUBLISHED |
| Assigner | CIRCL |
| Source Priority | CVE Program / NVD first with legacy fallback |
| Published | 2026-11-16 09:17:13 UTC |
| Updated | 2026-11-16 09:17:13 UTC |
| Description | In the vulnerability-lookup web application, the Flask-Login session identifier was set to the bare numeric user ID (User.get_id() returned self.id). Because the session ID contained no component derived from the user's credential, it remained valid indefinitely regardless of any subsequent password change, account recovery, or administrator-initiated password reset. An attacker who had obtained a valid session for a user account (for example through cross-site scripting, session hijacking, or a previously exposed feed or API key) could continue to access that user's account after the user changed their password, because the session cookie still carried the same static user ID and the user_loader accepted it without any credential-bound validation. The affected component is the session management layer of the vulnerability-lookup Flask application, specifically the User.get_id() method in website/models/user.py and the load_user callback in website/web/views/session_mgmt.py. The vulnerability required that an attacker already possessed a valid session for the target user; no additional authentication or special deployment configuration was needed beyond a standard deployment of the application. The security impact is that a user cannot effectively revoke an attacker's access by changing their password, performing an account recovery, or having an administrator reset the credential. The attacker retains full authenticated access to the user's profile, subscriptions, and any role-gated functionality for the lifetime of the session cookie. Additionally, sessions that were opened via a feed key or API key before a prior fix (commit 3605d5b6) also persisted indefinitely. |
Risk And Classification
Primary CVSS: v4.0 5.3 MEDIUM from 5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Problem Types: CWE-613 | CWE-613 CWE-613 Session Persistence After Password Change
| Version | Source | Type | Score | Severity | Vector |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 4.0 | 5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8 | Secondary | 5.3 | MEDIUM | CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/C... |
| 4.0 | CNA | CVSS | 5.3 | MEDIUM | CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N |
CVSS v4.0 Breakdown
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Vendor Declared Affected Products
| Source | Vendor | Product | Version | Platforms |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CNA | Vulnerability-lookup | Vulnerability-lookup | affected unspecified | Not specified |
References
| Reference | Source | Link | Tags |
|---|---|---|---|
| github.com/vulnerability-lookup/vulnerability-lookup/commit/d762810fb3b9... | 5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8 | github.com | |
| CVE Program record | CVE.ORG | www.cve.org | canonical |
| NVD vulnerability detail | NVD | nvd.nist.gov | canonical, analysis |
Vendor Comments And Credit
Discovery Credit
CNA: Michael Reimsbach (en)
CNA: Cédric Bonhomme (en)
CNA: Claude Opus 5.5 (en)
Additional Advisory Data
Solutions
CNA: The session identifier is now bound to the user's current password hash. User.get_id() returns a composite string of the form '<user_id>:<digest>', where the digest is an HMAC-SHA256 of the stored password hash keyed with the application SECRET_KEY. The load_user callback validates that the digest in the session matches the digest computed from the user's current password hash using a constant-time comparison (hmac.compare_digest). If the password has changed, the digest no longer matches and the session is rejected, effectively logging out all sessions that were opened under the previous credential. When a user changes their own password through the profile page, they are immediately re-authenticated via login_user() so their current session is renewed with the new digest while all other sessions are invalidated.