WireGuard keepalive transport-data messages accepted without Poly1305 authentication
Summary
| CVE | CVE-2026-13735 |
|---|---|
| State | PUBLISHED |
| Assigner | zephyr |
| Source Priority | CVE Program / NVD first with legacy fallback |
| Published | 2026-08-28 22:16:46 UTC |
| Updated | 2026-08-28 22:16:46 UTC |
| Description | Zephyr's WireGuard implementation in subsys/net/lib/wireguard/wg_crypto.c mishandled keepalive packets. In wg_process_data_message(), any type-4 transport-data message whose payload was exactly 16 bytes (an empty plaintext plus a bare Poly1305 tag, i.e. a keepalive) was accepted and returned immediately, before wg_decrypt_packet() was ever called. The Poly1305 authentication tag was therefore never verified; the only preceding gates were a cleartext receiver-index lookup (get_peer_keypair_for_index() on the attacker-supplied data_hdr->receiver) and a non-cryptographic keypair validity/expiry check. The path is reachable entirely from the network: inbound UDP on the WireGuard port is dispatched by wg_input() to handle_transport_data() and then wg_process_data_message(). The 32-bit receiver index is transmitted in cleartext in WireGuard handshake and data messages, so an on-path observer learns it directly and an off-path attacker can brute-force it against the UDP port. Given an active receiving-valid session for that index, an attacker could send a 16-byte garbage payload and have it accepted without possessing the session key. On acceptance the unauthenticated message caused the management layer to observe a spoofed NET_EVENT_VPN_CONNECTED signal (setting peer->first_valid and notifying any net_mgmt listener) and incremented the keepalive-RX statistic. The impact is limited to integrity of this status signal: no plaintext is decrypted or injected, no key is disclosed, and the early-return path did not update the peer endpoint or liveness timers, so there is no traffic-injection, session-takeover, or availability consequence. The fix removes the pre-decrypt early return so a 16-byte payload flows through wg_decrypt_packet(), which verifies the Poly1305 tag over the empty plaintext, followed by the existing anti-replay check; only an authenticated, non-replayed message is then recognised as a keepalive. Forged keepalives now fail the tag check and are counted as decrypt failures. |
Risk And Classification
Primary CVSS: v3.1 3.7 LOW from [email protected]
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
Problem Types: CWE-290 | CWE-290 auth
| Version | Source | Type | Score | Severity | Vector |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3.1 | [email protected] | Secondary | 3.7 | LOW | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N |
| 3.1 | CNA | CVSS | 3.7 | LOW | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N |
CVSS v3.1 Breakdown
Attack Vector
NetworkAttack Complexity
HighPrivileges Required
NoneUser Interaction
NoneScope
UnchangedConfidentiality
NoneIntegrity
LowAvailability
NoneCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
Vendor Declared Affected Products
| Source | Vendor | Product | Version | Platforms |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CNA | Zephyrproject | Zephyr | affected 4.4.0 4.4.2 semver | Not specified |
References
| Reference | Source | Link | Tags |
|---|---|---|---|
| github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/87c520a55f0f0e7cd4adf8780166... | [email protected] | github.com | |
| github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-xxrw-r78f-... | [email protected] | github.com | |
| CVE Program record | CVE.ORG | www.cve.org | canonical |
| NVD vulnerability detail | NVD | nvd.nist.gov | canonical, analysis |
No vendor comments have been submitted for this CVE.
There are currently no legacy QID mappings associated with this CVE.