OCSP designated-responder authorization bypass via missing signature verification
Summary
| CVE | CVE-2026-32144 |
|---|---|
| State | PUBLISHED |
| Assigner | EEF |
| Source Priority | CVE Program / NVD first with legacy fallback |
| Published | 2026-04-07 13:16:46 UTC |
| Updated | 2026-04-07 13:20:11 UTC |
| Description | Improper Certificate Validation vulnerability in Erlang OTP public_key (pubkey_ocsp module) allows OCSP designated-responder authorization bypass via missing signature verification. The OCSP response validation in public_key:pkix_ocsp_validate/5 does not verify that a CA-designated responder certificate was cryptographically signed by the issuing CA. Instead, it only checks that the responder certificate's issuer name matches the CA's subject name and that the certificate has the OCSPSigning extended key usage. An attacker who can intercept or control OCSP responses can create a self-signed certificate with a matching issuer name and the OCSPSigning EKU, and use it to forge OCSP responses that mark revoked certificates as valid. This affects SSL/TLS clients using OCSP stapling, which may accept connections to servers with revoked certificates, potentially transmitting sensitive data to compromised servers. Applications using the public_key:pkix_ocsp_validate/5 API directly are also affected, with impact depending on usage context. This vulnerability is associated with program files lib/public_key/src/pubkey_ocsp.erl and program routines pubkey_ocsp:is_authorized_responder/3. This issue affects OTP from OTP 27.0 until OTP 28.4.2 and 27.3.4.10 corresponding to public_key from 1.16 until 1.20.3 and 1.17.1.2, and ssl from 11.2 until 11.5.4 and 11.2.12.7. |
Risk And Classification
Primary CVSS: v4.0 7.6 HIGH from 6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Problem Types: CWE-295 | CWE-295 CWE-295 Improper Certificate Validation
| Version | Source | Type | Score | Severity | Vector |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 4.0 | 6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db | Secondary | 7.6 | HIGH | CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N/E:X/C... |
| 4.0 | CNA | CVSS | 7.6 | HIGH | CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N |
CVSS v4.0 Breakdown
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Vendor Declared Affected Products
References
| Reference | Source | Link | Tags |
|---|---|---|---|
| github.com/erlang/otp/commit/ac7ff528be857c5d35eb29c7f24106e3a16d4891 | 6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db | github.com | |
| github.com/erlang/otp/commit/49033a6d93a5be0ee0dce04e1fb8b4ae7de1e0c0 | 6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db | github.com | |
| www.erlang.org/doc/system/versions.html | 6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db | www.erlang.org | |
| cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-32144.html | 6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db | cna.erlef.org | |
| osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-32144 | 6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db | osv.dev | |
| github.com/erlang/otp/security/advisories/GHSA-gxrm-pf64-99xm | 6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db | github.com | |
| CVE Program record | CVE.ORG | www.cve.org | canonical |
| NVD vulnerability detail | NVD | nvd.nist.gov | canonical, analysis |
Vendor Comments And Credit
Discovery Credit
CNA: Igor Morgenstern / Aisle Research (en)
CNA: Jakub Witczak (en)
CNA: Ingela Anderton Andin (en)
Additional Advisory Data
Workarounds
CNA: For SSL users: * Do not enable OCSP validation setting (current default is {stapling, no_staple}) * Use CRL-based revocation checking by setting the {crl_check, true} SSL option instead For applications using public_key:pkix_ocsp_validate/5 directly: * Pass {is_trusted_responder_fun, Fun} option with a function that validates trusted responder certificates * Restrict OCSP responder access to trusted endpoints via network controls (only applicable if you control the OCSP infrastructure)