nameConstraints DNS bypass via subject CommonName fallback in public_key hostname verification
Summary
| CVE | CVE-2026-42790 |
|---|---|
| State | PUBLISHED |
| Assigner | EEF |
| Source Priority | CVE Program / NVD first with legacy fallback |
| Published | 2026-05-27 17:16:36 UTC |
| Updated | 2026-05-27 19:38:46 UTC |
| Description | Improper Certificate Validation vulnerability in Erlang OTP public_key (pubkey_cert and public_key modules) allows a DNS nameConstraints bypass via subject CommonName fallback in TLS hostname verification. Two flaws combine to allow a subordinate CA whose DNS nameConstraints are restricted (e.g. permitted;DNS:allowed.example.com) to issue a leaf certificate that an OTP TLS client accepts as a valid identity for an out-of-scope hostname (e.g. victim.example.com): First, pubkey_cert:validate_names/6 in lib/public_key/src/pubkey_cert.erl only checks SAN DNS entries against nameConstraints. Per RFC 5280, a permitted DNS subtree only restricts certificates that contain a DNS-typed name. A leaf with no subjectAltName therefore trivially satisfies any permitted;DNS:... constraint regardless of its subject commonName. Second, public_key:pkix_verify_hostname/3 in lib/public_key/src/public_key.erl falls back to the subject commonName when no subjectAltName is present, extracting id-at-commonName attributes as presented IDs and matching them against the reference hostname. The strict pkix_verify_hostname_match_fun(https) matcher does not suppress this fallback. The result is that path validation accepts a CN-only leaf under a DNS-constrained intermediate (no SAN means the nameConstraints are not triggered), and hostname verification then accepts it via the CN fallback. The bypass is reachable from stock ssl:connect with verify_peer, a trusted CA, SNI, and the canonical strict https hostname matcher. This issue affects OTP from OTP 19.3 before OTP 26.2.5.21, 27.3.4.12, 28.5.0.1, and 29.0.1 corresponding to public_key from 1.4 before 1.15.1.7, 1.17.1.3, 1.20.3.1, and 1.21.1. |
Risk And Classification
Primary CVSS: v4.0 7.6 HIGH from 6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
EPSS: 0.000280000 probability, percentile 0.084660000 (date 2026-06-01)
Problem Types: CWE-295 | CWE-297 | CWE-295 CWE-295 Improper Certificate Validation | CWE-297 CWE-297 Improper Validation of Certificate with Host Mismatch
| Version | Source | Type | Score | Severity | Vector |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 4.0 | 6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db | Secondary | 7.6 | HIGH | CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/C... |
| 4.0 | CNA | CVSS | 7.6 | HIGH | CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N |
CVSS v4.0 Breakdown
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Vendor Declared Affected Products
References
| Reference | Source | Link | Tags |
|---|---|---|---|
| github.com/erlang/otp/commit/21abed64eb2026b5f82f432709e4e932f9be389a | 6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db | github.com | |
| cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-42790.html | 6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db | cna.erlef.org | |
| github.com/erlang/otp/security/advisories/GHSA-22cw-4ph4-6447 | 6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db | github.com | |
| github.com/erlang/otp/commit/fb67c6d1836f51105a96d8b769e71e4215a79457 | 6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db | github.com | |
| github.com/erlang/otp/commit/0769050c69d73762672b0db1347b6993a5b31759 | 6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db | github.com | |
| www.erlang.org/doc/system/versions.html | 6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db | www.erlang.org | |
| osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-42790 | 6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db | osv.dev | |
| CVE Program record | CVE.ORG | www.cve.org | canonical |
| NVD vulnerability detail | NVD | nvd.nist.gov | canonical, analysis |
Vendor Comments And Credit
Discovery Credit
CNA: John Downey (en)
CNA: Ingela Anderton Andin (en)
CNA: Dan Gudmundsson (en)
CNA: Jakub Witczak (en)
Additional Advisory Data
Workarounds
CNA: The verify_fun option in the ssl application can be used to ensure that TLS connections fail if the end-entity certificate is missing the subjectAltName extension or has no domain name. Do not use a verify_fun that accepts the name_not_permitted error.