httpc leaks Authorization header to cross-origin redirect targets
Summary
| CVE | CVE-2026-48856 |
|---|---|
| State | PUBLISHED |
| Assigner | EEF |
| Source Priority | CVE Program / NVD first with legacy fallback |
| Published | 2026-06-10 16:17:10 UTC |
| Updated | 2026-06-15 18:23:43 UTC |
| Description | Sensitive Data Exposure vulnerability in Erlang OTP inets (httpc_response module) allows Retrieve Embedded Sensitive Data. The httpc client forwards the Authorization and Proxy-Authorization request headers to redirect targets without checking whether the redirect crosses an origin boundary. httpc_response:redirect/2 constructs the redirected request by updating only the host field of the header record; all other fields (including authorization and proxy_authorization) are copied verbatim. The redirect target host is never compared against the original host. autoredirect defaults to true, so this affects all httpc callers that do not explicitly disable automatic redirects. An attacker who controls a server that the victim contacts via httpc can issue a cross-origin 3xx redirect to a server they also control. The Authorization header (including Basic credentials derived from URL userinfo via httpc_request:handle_user_info/2) is forwarded to the redirect target, allowing credential theft. The same applies to the Proxy-Authorization header. This vulnerability is associated with program files lib/inets/src/http_client/httpc_response.erl. This issue affects OTP from 17.0 before 29.0.2, 28.5.0.2 and 27.3.4.13 corresponding to inets from 5.10 before 9.7.1, 9.6.2.2 and 9.3.2.6. |
Risk And Classification
Primary CVSS: v4.0 7.1 HIGH from 6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
EPSS: 0.003350000 probability, percentile 0.251330000 (date 2026-06-16)
Problem Types: CWE-601 | CWE-601 CWE-601 URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')
| Version | Source | Type | Score | Severity | Vector |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 4.0 | 6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db | Secondary | 7.1 | HIGH | CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/C... |
| 4.0 | CNA | CVSS | 7.1 | HIGH | CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N |
| 3.1 | [email protected] | Primary | 6.5 | MEDIUM | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N |
CVSS v4.0 Breakdown
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
CVSS v3.1 Breakdown
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
NVD Known Affected Configurations (CPE 2.3)
| Type | Vendor | Product | Version | Update | Edition | Language |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Application | Erlang | Erlang/inets | All | All | All | All |
Vendor Declared Affected Products
References
| Reference | Source | Link | Tags |
|---|---|---|---|
| github.com/erlang/otp/commit/688d748d6f7a6a06b13b662a1d3de8af97079612 | 6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db | github.com | Patch |
| osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-48856 | 6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db | osv.dev | Mitigation, Third Party Advisory |
| www.erlang.org/doc/system/versions.html | 6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db | www.erlang.org | Product |
| github.com/erlang/otp/security/advisories/GHSA-m75x-4vwg-ggjh | 6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db | github.com | Mitigation, Vendor Advisory |
| cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-48856.html | 6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db | cna.erlef.org | Mitigation, Third Party Advisory |
| CVE Program record | CVE.ORG | www.cve.org | canonical |
| NVD vulnerability detail | NVD | nvd.nist.gov | canonical, analysis |
Vendor Comments And Credit
Discovery Credit
CNA: Jonatan Männchen / EEF (en)
CNA: Jonatan Männchen / EEF (en)
CNA: Ingela Anderton Andin (en)
CNA: Konrad Pietrzak (en)
Additional Advisory Data
Workarounds
CNA: * Set {autoredirect, false} in the httpc:request/4 options and handle redirects manually, stripping the Authorization header when the redirect crosses an origin boundary. * Ensure that httpc is only used to contact trusted servers that will not issue cross-origin redirects.