wifi: brcmfmac: drain bus_reset work on device removal
Summary
| CVE | CVE-2026-64586 |
| State | PUBLISHED |
| Assigner | Linux |
| Source Priority | CVE Program / NVD first with legacy fallback |
| Published | 2026-08-06 08:16:33 UTC |
| Updated | 2026-08-06 08:16:33 UTC |
| Description | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: brcmfmac: drain bus_reset work on device removal
brcmf_fw_crashed() and the debugfs "reset" entry both schedule
drvr->bus_reset, whose callback recovers drvr through container_of()
and dereferences it. The removal path frees drvr (brcmf_free ->
wiphy_free) without draining the work, so a bus_reset callback pending
or running during removal can outlive drvr.
Cancellation cannot live in brcmf_detach() or brcmf_free(): the work
callback reaches teardown through the bus .reset op (PCIe
brcmf_pcie_reset -> brcmf_detach; SDIO brcmf_sdio_bus_reset ->
brcmf_sdiod_remove -> brcmf_free), so cancelling there would wait for
the running work and deadlock.
Add a per-bus mutex (bus_reset_lock) and route all arming through
brcmf_bus_schedule_reset(), which under the lock skips when the bus is
marked removing. Each bus remove entry calls
brcmf_bus_cancel_reset_work(), which under the same lock sets removing
and cancels the work. Holding the mutex across cancel_work_sync() makes
the set-removing + drain step atomic. Every producer reaches the arming
path from process context -- the PCIe firmware-halt notification runs in
the threaded IRQ handler (brcmf_pcie_isr_thread) and the SDIO hostmail
path runs from the data workqueue -- so the mutex is taken only in
sleepable contexts. Where applicable the remove entry first stops the
firmware-crash producer: on PCIe mask the mailbox and synchronize_irq;
on SDIO unregister the bus interrupt and cancel the data worker, which
also reports firmware halts through brcmf_fw_crashed(). The mutex is
initialized at bus allocation. The SDIO suspend power-off path frees
drvr through the same brcmf_sdiod_remove() and takes the same lock;
resume re-allows the work only on a successful re-probe.
Also guard brcmf_fw_crashed() against a NULL bus_if/drvr: it can fire
before brcmf_attach() wires up drvr, and it dereferences drvr
(bphy_err/brcmf_dev_coredump) before reaching the arming gate.
The bus_reset work is shared across buses, so the drain is applied to
every remove path: PCIe (the .reset op introduced by the Fixes commit),
SDIO (arms the same work through brcmf_fw_crashed()), and USB (via the
debugfs "reset" entry). cancel_work_sync() drains a running or pending
bus_reset work item before removal frees drvr, and patch 1/2 makes the
scratch-buffer release safe when reset teardown has already released
those DMA buffers.
This patch fixes the lifetime of the bus_reset work item itself. It does
not attempt to address the separate, pre-existing lifetime of the
asynchronous firmware completion started by the PCIe reset path. That
callback needs its own lifetime/ownership protocol and is being tracked
separately.
This issue was found by an in-house static analysis tool. |
Vendor Declared Affected Products
| Source | Vendor | Product | Version | Platforms |
|---|
| CNA |
Linux |
Linux |
affected 4684997d9eea29380000e062755aa6d368d789a3 177a25be1195f8bdc6160ba5f1a5699f7041c985 git |
Not specified |
| CNA |
Linux |
Linux |
affected 4684997d9eea29380000e062755aa6d368d789a3 43b25879f004c98defa2776bedc6ca4763c51945 git |
Not specified |
| CNA |
Linux |
Linux |
affected 5.2 |
Not specified |
| CNA |
Linux |
Linux |
unaffected 5.2 semver |
Not specified |
| CNA |
Linux |
Linux |
unaffected 7.1.6 7.1.* semver |
Not specified |
| CNA |
Linux |
Linux |
unaffected 7.2-rc5 * original_commit_for_fix |
Not specified |
References
| Reference | Source | Link | Tags |
|---|
| git.kernel.org/stable/c/177a25be1195f8bdc6160ba5f1a5699f7041c985 |
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67 |
git.kernel.org |
|
| git.kernel.org/stable/c/43b25879f004c98defa2776bedc6ca4763c51945 |
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67 |
git.kernel.org |
|
| CVE Program record |
CVE.ORG |
www.cve.org |
canonical |
| NVD vulnerability detail |
NVD |
nvd.nist.gov |
canonical, analysis |
No vendor comments have been submitted for this CVE.
There are currently no legacy QID mappings associated with this CVE.