Attacker-controlled AES-GCM authentication tag length allows tag forgery in jose
Summary
| CVE | CVE-2026-65625 |
|---|---|
| State | PUBLISHED |
| Assigner | EEF |
| Source Priority | CVE Program / NVD first with legacy fallback |
| Published | 2026-10-26 20:17:57 UTC |
| Updated | 2026-10-27 15:00:49 UTC |
| Description | The pure-Erlang AES-GCM fallback in jose_jwa_aes derives the number of verified authentication tag bits from the attacker-supplied tag itself. In the {aes_gcm, Bits} clause of block_decrypt/4, the incoming tag is guarded only by is_binary/1, with no check on its length. Verification in gcm_block_decrypt/6 then computes TBits = bit_size(T) and compares only those bits of the real 128-bit tag. An attacker who controls a JWE token can truncate the authentication tag to as little as 8 bits, so only 8 bits are ever checked. This reduces forgery resistance from 2^-128 to 2^-8, and a forged ciphertext is reliably accepted as authentic within 256 attempts without knowledge of the key (an authentication tag forgery and integrity bypass). Supplying a tag longer than 128 bits instead causes a badmatch that crashes the decrypting process. The fallback is reached through the public JWE decryption path whenever AES-GCM is not provided by a native crypto NIF, for example on FIPS or stripped or older OTP builds. This issue affects jose: from 1.2.0 before 1.11.13. |
Risk And Classification
Primary CVSS: v4.0 5.9 MEDIUM from 6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db
CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
EPSS: 0.001150000 probability, percentile 0.015390000 (date 2026-10-27)
Problem Types: CWE-354 | CWE-354 CWE-354 Improper Validation of Integrity Check Value
| Version | Source | Type | Score | Severity | Vector |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 4.0 | 6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db | Secondary | 5.9 | MEDIUM | CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/C... |
| 4.0 | CNA | CVSS | 5.9 | MEDIUM | CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N |
CVSS v4.0 Breakdown
CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Vendor Declared Affected Products
| Source | Vendor | Product | Version | Platforms |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CNA | Potatosalad | Jose | affected 1.2.0 1.11.13 semver | Not specified |
| CNA | Potatosalad | Jose | affected 8848b172575fb7d7e1e2977e8ae0a21678d2157a 3fa1f8e3efda0da5ce6f4c9984789f979dc02740 git | Not specified |
References
| Reference | Source | Link | Tags |
|---|---|---|---|
| github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose/commit/3fa1f8e3efda0da5ce6f4c9984789f... | 6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db | github.com | |
| osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-65625 | 6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db | osv.dev | |
| github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose/security/advisories/GHSA-6gxw-6f7r-cjr6 | 6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db | github.com | |
| cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-65625.html | 6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db | cna.erlef.org | |
| github.com/potatosalad/erlang-jose/commit/8848b172575fb7d7e1e2977e8ae0a2... | 6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db | github.com | |
| CVE Program record | CVE.ORG | www.cve.org | canonical |
| NVD vulnerability detail | NVD | nvd.nist.gov | canonical, analysis |
Vendor Comments And Credit
Discovery Credit
CNA: Peter Ullrich (en)
CNA: Andrew Bennett (en)
CNA: Jonatan Männchen / EEF (en)
Additional Advisory Data
Workarounds
CNA: Ensure the runtime provides a crypto provider with native AES-GCM support (a standard Erlang/OTP build linked against OpenSSL) so that JOSE dispatches AES-GCM to the native crypto NIF instead of the jose_jwa_aes fallback.