Processing instruction target and content emitted unescaped in Saxy encoder allows XML injection

Summary

CVECVE-2026-66295
StatePUBLISHED
AssignerEEF
Source PriorityCVE Program / NVD first with legacy fallback
Published2026-11-06 11:17:16 UTC
Updated2026-11-12 20:07:11 UTC
DescriptionSaxy's XML encoder writes the target and the content of a processing instruction into the output document verbatim, without validation or escaping. The encoder builds the construct by concatenating both fields between <? and ?>, so neither field is checked against the constraints the XML specification places on it. Because ?> terminates a processing instruction, a target or content value containing that sequence closes the construct at a position the attacker chooses. Everything the attacker writes after it is emitted as ordinary markup at document level, which allows arbitrary elements, attributes, and further processing instructions to be injected into the serialized document. Appending a matching <? keeps the encoder's own terminator well-formed, so the result still parses and the injection is silent rather than a visible corruption. The target is additionally unconstrained by the XML Name production, which permits injection before the remainder of the processing instruction. The result is XML injection into a serialized document: the tree the application asks Saxy to encode and the tree a downstream parser reads back are no longer the same. Character data, attribute values, and comments are all escaped by the encoder, so processing instructions are the one construct that passes user bytes through untouched. Since Saxy.XML.processing_instruction/2 is a documented public builder, an application inherits the flaw without misusing the API. The consequences depend on what consumes the XML: forged records in a feed or export read by another system, injected stylesheet or rendering directives, or active content where the output is served to a browser as XML or SVG. This issue affects saxy: from 0.7.0 before 1.7.0.

Risk And Classification

Primary CVSS: v4.0 2.1 LOW from 6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db

CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

EPSS: 0.001680000 probability, percentile 0.061910000 (date 2026-11-12)

Problem Types: CWE-91 | CWE-91 CWE-91 XML Injection


VersionSourceTypeScoreSeverityVector
4.06b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49dbSecondary2.1LOWCVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N/E:X/C...
4.0CNACVSS2.1LOWCVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N

CVSS v4.0 Breakdown

Attack Vector
Local
Attack Complexity
Low
Attack Requirements
Present
Privileges Required
None
User Interaction
None
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
Low
Availability
None
Sub Conf.
None
Sub Integrity
Low
Sub Availability
None

CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

Vendor Declared Affected Products

SourceVendorProductVersionPlatforms
CNA Qcam Saxy affected 0.7.0 1.7.0 semver Not specified
CNA Qcam Saxy affected 7266632e9407842f28ffac254c56dc41210a5690 4aeb80e2acc318f57bd7453ad2eafd59101a90e0 git Not specified

References

ReferenceSourceLinkTags
osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-66295 6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db osv.dev
github.com/qcam/saxy/commit/7266632e9407842f28ffac254c56dc41210a5690 6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db github.com
cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-66295.html 6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db cna.erlef.org
github.com/qcam/saxy/security/advisories/GHSA-f9r9-vrxq-g566 6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db github.com
github.com/qcam/saxy/commit/4aeb80e2acc318f57bd7453ad2eafd59101a90e0 6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db github.com
CVE Program record CVE.ORG www.cve.org canonical
NVD vulnerability detail NVD nvd.nist.gov canonical, analysis

Vendor Comments And Credit

Discovery Credit

CNA: Peter Ullrich (en)

CNA: Peter Ullrich (en)

CNA: Peter Ullrich (en)

CNA: Cẩm Huỳnh (en)

CNA: Jonatan Männchen / EEF (en)

CNA: Peter Ullrich (en)

Additional Advisory Data

Workarounds

CNA: Do not place untrusted data in processing instructions. Where a dynamic value is unavoidable, validate it before building the node: reject any content containing ?>, and reject any target that does not match the XML Name production or that equals xml case-insensitively. Alternatively, carry the value in element content or an attribute instead, both of which the encoder escapes.

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