MLS X.509 credential not bound to the LeafNode signature key
Summary
| CVE | CVE-2026-71885 |
|---|---|
| State | PUBLISHED |
| Assigner | bcorg |
| Source Priority | CVE Program / NVD first with legacy fallback |
| Published | 2026-10-03 09:17:04 UTC |
| Updated | 2026-10-03 09:17:04 UTC |
| Description | In Bouncy Castle for Java before 1.86, the Messaging Layer Security (MLS, RFC 9420) implementation did not bind an X.509 credential to a LeafNode's signature_key. LeafNode.verify() checked a leaf's signature against the signature_key carried in the leaf itself, while the credential's X.509 certificate chain was stored but never parsed or validated, so the end-entity certificate's public key was never required to match signature_key as RFC 9420 sec. 5.3 requires. A party could therefore present another party's certificate as its credential while signing the leaf, and the enclosing KeyPackage, with an unrelated key, and be accepted under that other party's identity through KeyPackage.verify() and the Group leaf-validation path. In a deployment that admits external commits without an independent credential-admission check, an unauthenticated attacker could be admitted under a victim's X.509 identity, evict the victim (resynchronization compares whole credentials rather than signing keys), derive the current epoch, decrypt subsequent group messages, and send messages accepted as the victim. TreeKEM.LeafNode now requires the end-entity certificate's subject public key, in the cipher suite's signature encoding, to equal signature_key for an X.509 credential and rejects the leaf otherwise, including an empty chain or a certificate whose key type does not match the cipher suite; certificate-chain and identity validation to a trust anchor remain the application's responsibility per RFC 9420 sec. 5.3.1. Deployments using only basic credentials are unaffected. |
Risk And Classification
Primary CVSS: v4.0 9.2 CRITICAL from 91579145-5d7b-4cc5-b925-a0262ff19630
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:Amber
Problem Types: CWE-287 | CWE-295 | CWE-295 CWE-295 Improper Certificate Validation | CWE-287 CWE-287 Improper Authentication
| Version | Source | Type | Score | Severity | Vector |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 4.0 | 91579145-5d7b-4cc5-b925-a0262ff19630 | Secondary | 9.2 | CRITICAL | CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/C... |
| 4.0 | CNA | CVSS | 9.2 | CRITICAL | CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/U:Amber |
CVSS v4.0 Breakdown
Attack Vector
NetworkAttack Complexity
LowAttack Requirements
PresentPrivileges Required
NoneUser Interaction
NoneConfidentiality
HighIntegrity
HighAvailability
LowSub Conf.
NoneSub Integrity
NoneSub Availability
NoneCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:Amber
Vendor Declared Affected Products
| Source | Vendor | Product | Version | Platforms |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CNA | Legion Of The Bouncy Castle Inc. | BC-JAVA | affected 1.86 maven | all |
References
| Reference | Source | Link | Tags |
|---|---|---|---|
| github.com/bcgit/bc-java/commit/77632a57edf350a7b5751fca1a5052daffa8dab2 | 91579145-5d7b-4cc5-b925-a0262ff19630 | github.com | |
| github.com/bcgit/bc-java/wiki/CVE%E2%80%902026%E2%80%9071885 | 91579145-5d7b-4cc5-b925-a0262ff19630 | github.com | |
| CVE Program record | CVE.ORG | www.cve.org | canonical |
| NVD vulnerability detail | NVD | nvd.nist.gov | canonical, analysis |
Vendor Comments And Credit
Discovery Credit
CNA: Joshua Rogers and Khaled Suliman of AISLE Research (en)
There are currently no legacy QID mappings associated with this CVE.