Remember-me sign-in guard reads a session key that is never written in ash_authentication, allowing session replacement
Summary
| CVE | CVE-2026-76949 |
|---|---|
| State | PUBLISHED |
| Assigner | EEF |
| Source Priority | CVE Program / NVD first with legacy fallback |
| Published | 2026-09-17 22:17:03 UTC |
| Updated | 2026-09-18 18:16:18 UTC |
| Description | Authentication Bypass by Spoofing vulnerability in team-alembic ash_authentication allows an attacker who can plant a remember-me cookie in a victim's browser to replace that victim's authenticated session with one for the attacker's own account. AshAuthentication.Plug.Helpers.sign_in_using_remember_me/3 skips re-authenticating an already-signed-in visitor by checking the session for "<subject_name>_token", but store_in_session/2 writes that key only when require_token_presence_for_authentication? is enabled and otherwise writes the bare subject name. At the default setting the guard therefore reads a key that is never written, its already-signed-in branch is unreachable, and the remember-me sign-in runs on every request through the per-request browser pipeline plug. A planted remember-me cookie is consequently honoured even for a visitor holding a live authenticated session, so whatever the victim enters afterwards lands in data the attacker controls. The read path in authenticate_resource_from_session/4 selects the key correctly, so the guard and the reader disagree about which key holds the session. This issue affects ash_authentication: from 4.10.0 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14. |
Risk And Classification
Primary CVSS: v4.0 9.1 CRITICAL from 6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
EPSS: 0.004910000 probability, percentile 0.411360000 (date 2026-09-21)
Problem Types: CWE-290 | CWE-290 CWE-290 Authentication Bypass by Spoofing
| Version | Source | Type | Score | Severity | Vector |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 4.0 | 6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db | Secondary | 9.1 | CRITICAL | CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/C... |
| 4.0 | CNA | CVSS | 9.1 | CRITICAL | CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N |
CVSS v4.0 Breakdown
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Vendor Declared Affected Products
| Source | Vendor | Product | Version | Platforms |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CNA | Team-alembic | Ash Authentication | affected 4.10.0 4.15.0 semver | Not specified |
| CNA | Team-alembic | Ash Authentication | affected 5.0.0-rc.0 5.0.0-rc.14 semver | Not specified |
| CNA | Team-alembic | Ash Authentication | affected 3d3de314692558d06ec13945f857f00514e95a8c * git | Not specified |
References
| Reference | Source | Link | Tags |
|---|---|---|---|
| github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/3d3de314692558d06ec139... | 6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db | github.com | |
| cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-76949.html | 6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db | cna.erlef.org | |
| github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/security/advisories/GHSA-hh34... | 6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db | github.com | |
| github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/9a34136b844abe179da107... | 6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db | github.com | |
| github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication/commit/b9568a53b438247238b1c5... | 6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db | github.com | |
| osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-76949 | 6b3ad84c-e1a6-4bf7-a703-f496b71e49db | osv.dev | |
| CVE Program record | CVE.ORG | www.cve.org | canonical |
| NVD vulnerability detail | NVD | nvd.nist.gov | canonical, analysis |
Vendor Comments And Credit
Discovery Credit
CNA: Peter Ullrich (en)
CNA: James Harton (en)
CNA: Jonatan Männchen / EEF (en)
Additional Advisory Data
Workarounds
CNA: Set require_token_presence_for_authentication? true on the authenticated resource's token configuration. store_in_session/2 then writes the key the guard reads, so the already-signed-in branch fires and the remember-me sign-in no longer runs against a live session. Note this changes session storage semantics for the whole application and requires a token resource. Otherwise remove the remember-me plug from the browser pipeline, which disables remember-me auto-login entirely.