Apache Camel: Camel-Hazelcast Managed Instances Missing Java Deserialization Filter (Incomplete Fix for CVE-2026-43865)

Summary

CVECVE-2026-78162
StatePUBLISHED
Assignerapache
Source PriorityCVE Program / NVD first with legacy fallback
Published2026-10-19 11:17:19 UTC
Updated2026-10-20 04:17:02 UTC
DescriptionDeserialization of Untrusted Data vulnerability in Apache Camel. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.18.5, from 4.19.0 before 4.22.1. The camel-hazelcast component applies a default Hazelcast JavaSerializationFilterConfig to the instances it creates from its own configuration, a protection introduced by CVE-2026-43865. That change did not reach two of the configuration paths Camel builds itself, so those paths continued to create Hazelcast instances whose Java deserialization is unrestricted. ReplicatedHazelcastAggregationRepository extends HazelcastAggregationRepository but overrides doStart() without calling super.doStart(), keeping its own copy of the bootstrap block, and therefore never received the filter: a route using it without supplying a hazelcastInstance starts a Hazelcast member that deserializes values read from the backing ReplicatedMap with no class restriction. HazelcastDefaultComponent#getOrCreateHzClientInstance() builds its own ClientConfig when hazelcastMode=client is selected and neither a referenced ClientConfig nor hazelcastConfigUri is supplied, and likewise applied no filter, so client-mode endpoints behaved differently from node-mode endpoints for an otherwise identical configuration. In both cases an attacker able to publish into the Hazelcast cluster that the affected instance is attached to can cause a serialized Java object of their choosing to be deserialized inside Hazelcast's own serialization layer, before Camel processes the exchange, resulting in remote code execution. Hazelcast clusters have neither authentication nor TLS enabled by default. Selecting client mode is a topology choice rather than a security option, so neither path required the deployment to opt in to unsafe behaviour. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.23.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.22.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.22.1. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.5. The 4.14.x releases stream and earlier reached end of life before this issue was resolved and will not receive a fix, so deployments on those lines must move to a supported release. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, supply an explicit Hazelcast configuration carrying a JavaSerializationFilterConfig, or inject a pre-built HazelcastInstance, since a user-supplied configuration is never overwritten by Camel. Alternatively set the JVM-wide filter -Djdk.serialFilter=!java.net.;java.;javax.;org.apache.camel.;!* and enable Hazelcast cluster authentication and TLS to restrict who can reach the cluster.

Risk And Classification

Primary CVSS: v4.0 10 CRITICAL from [email protected]

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

EPSS: 0.012630000 probability, percentile 0.692960000 (date 2026-10-20)

Problem Types: CWE-502 | CWE-502 CWE-502 Deserialization of Untrusted Data


VersionSourceTypeScoreSeverityVector
4.0[email protected]Secondary10CRITICALCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/C...
4.0CNACVSS10CRITICALCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H

CVSS v4.0 Breakdown

Attack Vector
Network
Attack Complexity
Low
Attack Requirements
None
Privileges Required
None
User Interaction
None
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High
Sub Conf.
High
Sub Integrity
High
Sub Availability
High

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

Vendor Declared Affected Products

SourceVendorProductVersionPlatforms
CNA Apache Software Foundation Apache Camel affected 4.0.0 4.18.5 maven Not specified
CNA Apache Software Foundation Apache Camel affected 4.19.0 4.22.1 maven Not specified
CNA Apache Software Foundation Apache Camel unaffected 4.18.5 maven Not specified
CNA Apache Software Foundation Apache Camel unaffected 4.22.1 maven Not specified
CNA Apache Software Foundation Apache Camel unaffected 4.23.0 maven Not specified

References

ReferenceSourceLinkTags
github.com/apache/camel/pull/25595 [email protected] github.com
camel.apache.org/security/CVE-2026-78162.html [email protected] camel.apache.org
issues.apache.org/jira/browse/CAMEL-24413 [email protected] issues.apache.org
issues.apache.org/jira/browse/CAMEL-24420 [email protected] issues.apache.org
github.com/apache/camel/pull/25566 [email protected] github.com
camel.apache.org/security/CVE-2026-43865.html [email protected] camel.apache.org
github.com/apache/camel/pull/25599 [email protected] github.com
github.com/apache/camel/pull/25600 [email protected] github.com
CVE Program record CVE.ORG www.cve.org canonical
NVD vulnerability detail NVD nvd.nist.gov canonical, analysis

Vendor Comments And Credit

Discovery Credit

CNA: cattier from TCBS (en)

CNA: Leon Zlobecki (en)

CNA: Andrea Cosentino (en)

Additional Advisory Data

Solutions

CNA: Upgrade to Apache Camel 4.23.0, which fixes the issue. Users on the 4.22.x releases stream should upgrade to 4.22.1. Users on the 4.18.x releases stream should upgrade to 4.18.5. The 4.14.x releases stream and earlier reached end of life before this issue was resolved and will not receive a fix, so deployments on those lines must move to a supported release. The fix adds an applyDefault(ClientConfig) overload to HazelcastSerializationFilterHelper and calls the helper on both previously uncovered paths, so every Hazelcast configuration that Camel builds itself now carries the default filter, which whitelists the class name prefixes java., javax. and org.apache.camel. and blacklists java.net. A user-supplied Config, ClientConfig or HazelcastInstance is still left untouched.

Workarounds

CNA: Supply an explicit Hazelcast configuration carrying a JavaSerializationFilterConfig, or inject a pre-built HazelcastInstance, since a user-supplied configuration is never overwritten by Camel. Alternatively set the JVM-wide filter -Djdk.serialFilter=!java.net.;java.;javax.;org.apache.camel.;!* and enable Hazelcast cluster authentication and TLS to restrict who can reach the cluster.

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