qs.stringify throws TypeError on objects with a non-callable constructor.isBuffer property
Summary
| CVE | CVE-2026-82417 |
|---|---|
| State | PUBLISHED |
| Assigner | harborist |
| Source Priority | CVE Program / NVD first with legacy fallback |
| Published | 2026-08-30 00:16:34 UTC |
| Updated | 2026-08-30 00:16:34 UTC |
| Description | ### Summary `qs.stringify` throws a `TypeError` when it serializes an object whose own `constructor` property has a truthy, non-callable `isBuffer` member. `utils.isBuffer` duck-types buffers by calling `obj.constructor.isBuffer(obj)` after checking only that the property is truthy, so a value such as `{ constructor: { isBuffer: "x" } }` makes the call throw `TypeError: obj.constructor.isBuffer is not a function`. ### Details `lib/stringify.js:127` calls `utils.isBuffer` on every non-primitive value it serializes. `utils.isBuffer` (`lib/utils.js:332`) reads `obj.constructor.isBuffer` and invokes it without verifying that it is a function. `constructor` and `isBuffer` are ordinary property names, so any object carrying them as own properties reaches the unchecked call. Such an object can be built from untrusted input. `qs.parse("x[constructor][isBuffer]=y", { plainObjects: true })` or `{ allowPrototypes: true }` keeps the `constructor` key as an own property (the default parse options drop it), and `JSON.parse("{\"a\":{\"constructor\":{\"isBuffer\":\"x\"}}}")` produces the same shape with no qs option involved. Express 4 with its default `query parser` setting and body-parser with `extended: true` both call `qs.parse` with `allowPrototypes: true`, so on those stacks `req.query` and `req.body` can carry the shape directly. #### PoC ```js var qs = require("qs"); qs.stringify(qs.parse("x[constructor][isBuffer]=y", { plainObjects: true })); qs.stringify(JSON.parse("{\"a\":{\"constructor\":{\"isBuffer\":\"x\"}}}")); // TypeError: obj.constructor.isBuffer is not a function // at Object.isBuffer (lib/utils.js:332:78) // at stringify (lib/stringify.js:127:45) ``` #### Fix `lib/utils.js`, applied in e83d321 on `main` and released as v6.16.0: ```diff - return !!(obj.constructor && obj.constructor.isBuffer && obj.constructor.isBuffer(obj)); + return !!(obj.constructor && typeof obj.constructor.isBuffer === "function" && obj.constructor.isBuffer(obj)); ``` Real `Buffer`, `safer-buffer`, and browserify `buffer` polyfill instances serialize exactly as before; only the throw is removed. ### Affected versions `>=2.2.5 <6.16.0`, fixed in v6.16.0. The unguarded duck-type was introduced in 3768a75 and first shipped in v2.2.5 (September 2014). v2.2.4 and earlier used `Buffer.isBuffer` and are not affected. Every release from v2.2.5 through v6.15.3 contains the unguarded call. ### Impact An unauthenticated request can make any code path that re-serializes attacker-influenced data with `qs.stringify` (for example, rebuilding a query string from `req.query` for a redirect or an upstream request, or serializing a parsed JSON body) throw synchronously. In a typical Node.js HTTP framework the throw is caught by the framework error boundary and the affected request returns a 500; the process survives and other requests are unaffected. Where the call runs outside an error boundary, such as an `async` Express 4 handler (where the throw becomes an unhandled promise rejection) or a background job, the process exits, so the impact in that case depends on the application error handling rather than on qs. |
Risk And Classification
Primary CVSS: v4.0 6.3 MEDIUM from 7ffcee3d-2c14-4c3e-b844-86c6a321a158
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Problem Types: CWE-248 | CWE-703 | CWE-248 CWE-248 Uncaught Exception | CWE-703 CWE-703 Improper Check or Handling of Exceptional Conditions
| Version | Source | Type | Score | Severity | Vector |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 4.0 | 7ffcee3d-2c14-4c3e-b844-86c6a321a158 | Secondary | 6.3 | MEDIUM | CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/C... |
| 4.0 | CNA | CVSS | 6.3 | MEDIUM | CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N |
| 3.1 | 7ffcee3d-2c14-4c3e-b844-86c6a321a158 | Secondary | 5.3 | MEDIUM | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L |
| 3.1 | CNA | CVSS | 5.3 | MEDIUM | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L |
CVSS v4.0 Breakdown
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
CVSS v3.1 Breakdown
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
Vendor Declared Affected Products
References
| Reference | Source | Link | Tags |
|---|---|---|---|
| github.com/ljharb/qs/security/advisories/GHSA-4mjr-xmp4-gh2g | 7ffcee3d-2c14-4c3e-b844-86c6a321a158 | github.com | |
| github.com/ljharb/qs/commit/e83d321ffafb38cf210683ac31714fce6ce1c6c6 | 7ffcee3d-2c14-4c3e-b844-86c6a321a158 | github.com | |
| CVE Program record | CVE.ORG | www.cve.org | canonical |
| NVD vulnerability detail | NVD | nvd.nist.gov | canonical, analysis |
Vendor Comments And Credit
Discovery Credit
CNA: waydeshi (en)
CNA: ljharb (en)
Additional Advisory Data
Solutions
CNA: Upgrade to qs 6.16.0 or later.
Workarounds
CNA: Pass a `filter` function to `qs.stringify` that drops values carrying an own `constructor` property; it runs before the `isBuffer` check. Alternatively, wrap `qs.stringify` calls on externally influenced objects in try/catch, and avoid `allowPrototypes: true` / `plainObjects: true` when parsed untrusted input is fed back into `qs.stringify`.