Image-customization-controller: unauthenticated plaintext image server with directory listing exposes ignition images containing cluster pull secret

MITRE NVD CVE.ORG JSON API

Summary

CVECVE-2026-82976
StatePUBLISHED
Assignerredhat
Source PriorityCVE Program / NVD first with legacy fallback
Published2026-11-03 19:18:10 UTC
Updated2026-11-03 19:18:10 UTC
DescriptionA flaw was found in the image-customization-controller used in OpenShift's bare metal provisioning stack. The controller registers an HTTP file server on port 8084 with no authentication. The custom imageFileSystem implementation exposes a browsable HTML directory listing of all registered images at the root path. The only access control on per-host images is the random UUID filename; the directory listing discloses those UUIDs to any caller on the provisioning network. Each served image embeds an Ignition config containing the base64-encoded cluster pull secret, optional IRONIC_RAMDISK_SSH_KEY, proxy settings, and per-host NetworkManager keyfiles. An adjacent network attacker can enumerate all image UUIDs via directory listing, download any image, extract the embedded Ignition config, and recover the cluster pull secret and SSH key. ### Evidence **pkg/imagehandler/imagefilesystem.go — root directory is browsable and enumerates all UUID image names** ```go func (f *imageFileSystem) Readdir(n int) ([]fs.FileInfo, error) { f.mu.Lock() defer f.mu.Unlock() result := []fs.FileInfo{} for _, im := range f.images { result = append(result, im) } return result, nil } func (f *imageFileSystem) Open(name string) (http.File, error) { f.log.Info("Open", "path", name) if name == "/" { return f, nil } ... ``` **cmd/controller/main.go — file server bound on all interfaces without auth or TLS** ```go http.Handle("/", http.FileServer(imageServer.FileSystem())) go func() { server := &http.Server{ Addr: imagesBindAddr, // default ":8084" ReadHeaderTimeout: 5 * time.Second, } err := server.ListenAndServe() ``` **pkg/ignition/service_config.go:94-100 — pull secret is embedded in every served image** ```go func (b *ignitionBuilder) authFile() ignition_config_types_32.File { source := "data:;base64," + strings.TrimSpace(b.ironicAgentPullSecret) return ignition_config_types_32.File{ Node: ignition_config_types_32.Node{Path: "/etc/authfile.json"}, ... ``` ### Attack Pattern Adjacent provisioning-network client → GET / lists UUID image names → download ISO/initramfs → extract embedded Ignition → recover cluster pull secret and SSH key.

Risk And Classification

Primary CVSS: v3.1 7.1 HIGH from [email protected]

CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N

Problem Types: CWE-548 | CWE-548 Exposure of Information Through Directory Listing

VersionSourceTypeScoreSeverityVector
3.1[email protected]Primary7.1HIGHCVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N
3.1CNACVSS7.1HIGHCVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N

CVSS v3.1 Breakdown

Attack Vector
Adjacent
Attack Complexity
Low
Privileges Required
None
User Interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
Low
Availability
None

CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N

Vendor Declared Affected Products

SourceVendorProductVersionPlatforms
CNA Red Hat Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4 Not specified Not specified
CNA Red Hat Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4 Not specified Not specified
CNA Red Hat Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 5 Not specified Not specified

References

ReferenceSourceLinkTags
redhat.atlassian.net/browse/OCPBUGS-105396 [email protected] redhat.atlassian.net
bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi [email protected] bugzilla.redhat.com
access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-82976 [email protected] access.redhat.com
github.com/openshift/image-customization-controller [email protected] github.com
CVE Program record CVE.ORG www.cve.org canonical
NVD vulnerability detail NVD nvd.nist.gov canonical, analysis

Additional Advisory Data

SourceTimeEvent
CNA2026-08-07T10:39:22.000ZReported to Red Hat.
CNA2026-11-03T12:03:30.152ZMade public.

Workarounds

CNA: There is no way to disable the directory listing or add authentication without a code change. As a workaround, administrators can apply network-level controls to restrict access to port 8084 on the image-customization-controller pod to only the BMC/provisioning network hosts that require it. Use NetworkPolicy or firewall rules to block access from workload pods. Additionally, rotate any pull secrets and SSH keys that may have been exposed if unauthorized access to the provisioning network is suspected.

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