QUIC: Unbounded RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID Backlog

MITRE NVD CVE.ORG JSON API

Summary

CVECVE-2026-84784
StatePUBLISHED
Assigneropenssl
Source PriorityCVE Program / NVD first with legacy fallback
Published2026-09-29 16:17:12 UTC
Updated2026-09-29 21:27:41 UTC
DescriptionIssue summary: A malicious remote peer may flood the local QUIC stack with NEW_CONNECTION_ID frames by avoiding a limit check on how many connection IDs the remote QUIC stack can use. Impact summary: The local QUIC stack sends a RETIRE_CONN_ID frame for every NEW_CONNECTION_ID frame it receives. The RETIRE_CONN_ID frame is dispatched via the Control Frame Queue (CFQ). If the remote peer also withholds ACKs, then it can force the local stack to allocate ~400MB (depending on ACK delay). CWE: CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling Description: RFC 9000 sections 5.1.1 and 5.1.2 [1] describe the mechanism by which a remote peer can notify the local QUIC stack to change the destination connection ID (a.k.a. CID) the local stack uses to identify the connection at the remote peer. Each CID is associated with a sequence number. The sequence number is transmitted in NEW_CONNECTION_ID and RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frames to identify the CID which is being either associated with a connection or retired. The remote peer sends a NEW_CONNECTION_ID frame to let the local stack know a new CID is being associated with an existing connection. The NEW_CONNECTION_ID frame carries the new CID, its sequence number, and the retire-prior-to number. The retire-prior-to identifies existing CIDs that are to be retired. The local QUIC stack must send a RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID for every destination CID whose sequence number is less than retire-prior-to. The CID becomes retired after the local stack receives an ACK for its RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frame. Although the OpenSSL QUIC stack supports at most one destination CID for every connection, it can be tricked into processing more than one RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frame per connection. The OpenSSL QUIC stack currently retires the destination CID as soon as it receives the NEW_CONNECTION_ID, while in fact the destination CID must be retired after an ACK for the RETIRE_CONNECTION_ID frame is received. Correcting the flawed logic also fixes the backlog growth. [1] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9000#name-issuing-connection-ids FIPS impact: no The FIPS module is not affected as the QUIC implementation is outside of the OpenSSL FIPS module boundary.

Risk And Classification

Primary CVSS: v3.1 7.5 HIGH from ADP

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Problem Types: CWE-770 | CWE-770 CWE-770 Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling

VersionSourceTypeScoreSeverityVector
3.1ADPDECLARED7.5HIGHCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
3.1134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0Secondary7.5HIGHCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

CVSS v3.1 Breakdown

Attack Vector
Network
Attack Complexity
Low
Privileges Required
None
User Interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
None
Availability
High

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Vendor Declared Affected Products

SourceVendorProductVersionPlatforms
CNA OpenSSL OpenSSL affected 4.0.0 4.0.3 semver Not specified
CNA OpenSSL OpenSSL affected 3.6.0 3.6.5 semver Not specified
CNA OpenSSL OpenSSL affected 3.5.0 3.5.9 semver Not specified
CNA OpenSSL OpenSSL affected 3.4.0 3.4.8 semver Not specified

References

ReferenceSourceLinkTags
github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/e9e5155833fa968bee50024bf9ca3a185ab599fe [email protected] github.com
github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/dba3c48d653c64fcbc9070a17a0ee2b3e2f3af1f [email protected] github.com
github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/9a30fe0fba195c14e5b87bf93c0d0fdb70373806 [email protected] github.com
openssl-library.org/news/secadv/20260929.txt [email protected] openssl-library.org
github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/4685c914b0d410b1034f40b547c95bc95e7a380a [email protected] github.com
CVE Program record CVE.ORG www.cve.org canonical
NVD vulnerability detail NVD nvd.nist.gov canonical, analysis

Vendor Comments And Credit

Discovery Credit

CNA: Bhabani Sankar Das (en)

CNA: Alexandr Nedvedicky (en)

© CVE.report 2026

Use of this information constitutes acceptance for use in an AS IS condition. There are NO warranties, implied or otherwise, with regard to this information or its use. Any use of this information is at the user's risk. It is the responsibility of user to evaluate the accuracy, completeness or usefulness of any information, opinion, advice or other content. EACH USER WILL BE SOLELY RESPONSIBLE FOR ANY consequences of his or her direct or indirect use of this web site. ALL WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND ARE EXPRESSLY DISCLAIMED. This site will NOT BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT or any other kind of loss.

CVE, CWE, and OVAL are registred trademarks of The MITRE Corporation and the authoritative source of CVE content is MITRE's CVE web site. This site includes MITRE data granted under the following license.

Free CVE JSON API cve.report/api

CVE.report and Source URL Uptime Status status.cve.report