Artemis-server: artemis-jms-client: artemis-core-client: undertow-core: wildfly-messaging-activemq-subsystem: artemis messaging handlers in red hat eap permit deserialization by default
Summary
| CVE | CVE-2026-86404 |
|---|---|
| State | PUBLISHED |
| Assigner | redhat |
| Source Priority | CVE Program / NVD first with legacy fallback |
| Published | 2026-09-07 12:17:21 UTC |
| Updated | 2026-09-09 15:17:17 UTC |
| Description | EAP's Artemis deserialization configuration permits deserialization by default. ObjectMessage.getObject() uses ObjectInputStreamWithClassLoader, which implements allow-list/block-list filtering via its checkSecurity()/isTrustedType() method. However, by default both allow-list and block-list are empty. When the allow-list is empty (size == 0), isTrustedType() returns true for ALL classes. This means all classes are deserializable by default. |
Risk And Classification
Primary CVSS: v3.1 8.8 HIGH from [email protected]
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
EPSS: 0.004500000 probability, percentile 0.378840000 (date 2026-09-09)
Problem Types: CWE-502 | CWE-502 Deserialization of Untrusted Data
| Version | Source | Type | Score | Severity | Vector |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3.1 | [email protected] | Secondary | 8.8 | HIGH | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H |
| 3.1 | CNA | CVSS | 8.8 | HIGH | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H |
CVSS v3.1 Breakdown
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Vendor Declared Affected Products
References
| Reference | Source | Link | Tags |
|---|---|---|---|
| access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-86404 | [email protected] | access.redhat.com | |
| access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:53644 | [email protected] | access.redhat.com | |
| bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi | [email protected] | bugzilla.redhat.com | |
| CVE Program record | CVE.ORG | www.cve.org | canonical |
| NVD vulnerability detail | NVD | nvd.nist.gov | canonical, analysis |
Additional Advisory Data
| Source | Time | Event |
|---|---|---|
| CNA | 2026-05-15T15:34:21.130Z | Reported to Red Hat. |
| CNA | 2026-08-11T05:45:33.075Z | Made public. |
Workarounds
CNA: Configure a restrictive deserialization-allow-list on every pooled-connection-factory resource. For example, if your MDBs only expect to receive objects of type com.yourapp.OrderEvent, set the allow-list to "com.yourapp". This switches ObjectInputStreamWithClassLoader from "allow everything" to "deny by default, allow only listed classes." With this in place, even if an attacker injects a malicious ObjectMessage through any vector, the deserialization of gadget chain classes is blocked.