Apache Karaf: config:install missing ACL entry allows privilege escalation to admin
Summary
| CVE | CVE-2026-91085 |
|---|---|
| State | PUBLISHED |
| Assigner | apache |
| Source Priority | CVE Program / NVD first with legacy fallback |
| Published | 2026-09-29 09:17:10 UTC |
| Updated | 2026-09-29 14:56:12 UTC |
| Description | Apache Karaf's shell/SSH command security is enforced by per-scope ACL configuration files (etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.<scope>.cfg). SecuredSessionFactoryImpl.checkSecurity() resolves the roles required for an invocation and, when no ACL rule matches the command, fails open: ACLConfigurationParser.Specificity.NO_MATCH sets passCheck = true. The safety valve for this, karaf.secured.command.compulsory.roles, ships commented out in etc/system.properties, so an unmatched command is allowed for any authenticated user. The shipped org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config ACL (assemblies/features/standard/src/main/feature/feature.xml, mirrored into instance/.../etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config.cfg) has no install entry. It restricts delete to admin, restricts edit/property-*/update on the jmx.acl.*, org.apache.karaf.command.acl.* and org.apache.karaf.service.acl.* PIDs to admin, and allows manager for everything else, but config:install was simply unmatched, and therefore allowed for any authenticated user, including one holding only the viewer role. config:install <url> <finalname> fetches url and writes it into ${karaf.etc} as finalname. It calls PathUtils.checkWithin() to block .. traversal outside karaf.etc, but that folder holds every security-relevant file Karaf ships: users.properties, keys.properties, host.key, and all org.apache.karaf.*.acl.* files, including the very ACL file that (mis)governs this command. With -o/--override, an existing file is overwritten with attacker-controlled bytes fetched from an arbitrary URL. Because felix.fileinstall.dir = ${karaf.etc} (etc/config.properties), Felix FileInstall also watches and reloads any .cfg file dropped there, closing the loop without requiring a restart. By contrast, bundle:install, feature:install and kar:install are all admin-only in their own ACLs, and config:delete is admin in this same ACL, config:install was the outlier. MitigationAdd install = admin in etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config.cfg (create the file is absent), and/or set karaf.secured.command.compulsory.roles=admin in etc/system.properties (and restart) to make unmatched commands fail closed by default. |
Risk And Classification
EPSS: 0.001630000 probability, percentile 0.048850000 (date 2026-09-29)
Problem Types: CWE-862 | CWE-862 CWE-862
Vendor Declared Affected Products
| Source | Vendor | Product | Version | Platforms |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CNA | Apache Software Foundation | Apache Karaf | affected 4.4.12 semver | Not specified |
References
| Reference | Source | Link | Tags |
|---|---|---|---|
| karaf.apache.org/security/cve-2026-91085.txt | [email protected] | karaf.apache.org | |
| www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/09/28/10 | af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108 | www.openwall.com | |
| CVE Program record | CVE.ORG | www.cve.org | canonical |
| NVD vulnerability detail | NVD | nvd.nist.gov | canonical, analysis |
Vendor Comments And Credit
Discovery Credit
CNA: Rin Ray <[email protected]> (en)
There are currently no legacy QID mappings associated with this CVE.