Reachy Mini daemon allows unauthenticated remote code execution through the app installation endpoint

Summary

CVE	CVE-2026-96455
State	PUBLISHED
Assigner	JFROG
Source Priority	CVE Program / NVD first with legacy fallback
Published	2026-09-23 11:17:18 UTC
Updated	2026-09-23 15:17:32 UTC
Description	The Reachy Mini daemon exposes an HTTP API for managing the robot. Its app installation endpoint, POST /apps/install in src/reachy_mini/daemon/app/routers/apps.py, has no authentication. The handler's only dependency is Depends(get_app_manager), which just hands back the manager object from application state, so nothing in the chain ever checks a credential. The endpoint takes an AppInfo body naming a Hugging Face Space. The daemon downloads that Space and installs it as a Python package through install_package in src/reachy_mini/apps/sources/local_common_venv.py, using uv or pip. Installing a Python package runs the package's own build and setup code, so whoever chooses the Space chooses what code the robot runs. Anyone can publish a public Hugging Face Space, so this is not a meaningful restriction on the attacker. How far this reaches depends on the model. In _resolve_bind_host in src/reachy_mini/daemon/app/main.py the daemon binds 0.0.0.0 when it runs as the wireless version and 127.0.0.1 otherwise, with the vendor's own comment explaining that the robot has to be reachable on the LAN. On a wireless unit, then, any host on the same network can install and run code on the robot without credentials. One related change has already shipped but does not fix this. Version 1.8.2 replaced the wildcard CORS policy with an allow list of localhost and Tauri origins. That closes the browser drive-by route, where a web page the victim visits silently calls the endpoint in the background. It has no effect on this issue: CORS is enforced by browsers and governs whether script may read a response, while a direct HTTP request from another machine on the network involves no browser, no preflight and no CORS check at all.

Risk And Classification

Primary CVSS: v3.1 8.8 HIGH from [email protected]

CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Problem Types: CWE-306 | CWE-494 | CWE-306 CWE-306 Missing Authentication for Critical Function | CWE-494 CWE-494 Download of Code Without Integrity Check

Version	Source	Type	Score	Severity	Vector
3.1	[email protected]	Secondary	8.8	HIGH	`CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`
3.1	CNA	CVSS	8.8	HIGH	`CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`

CVSS v3.1 Breakdown

Attack Vector

Adjacent

Attack Complexity

Low

Privileges Required

None

User Interaction

None

Scope

Unchanged

Confidentiality

High

Integrity

High

Availability

High

CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Vendor Declared Affected Products

Source	Vendor	Product	Version	Platforms
CNA	Pollen Robotics	Reachy Mini	affected 1.11.0 semver	Linux

References

Reference	Source	Link	Tags
github.com/pollen-robotics/reachy_mini	[email protected]	github.com
github.com/pollen-robotics/reachy_mini/blob/main/src/reachy_mini/daemon/...	[email protected]	github.com
github.com/pollen-robotics/reachy_mini/releases/tag/v1.11.0	[email protected]	github.com
github.com/pollen-robotics/reachy_mini/pull/1207	[email protected]	github.com
github.com/pollen-robotics/reachy_mini/blob/main/src/reachy_mini/daemon/...	[email protected]	github.com
CVE Program record	CVE.ORG	www.cve.org	canonical
NVD vulnerability detail	NVD	nvd.nist.gov	canonical, analysis

Vendor Comments And Credit

Discovery Credit

CNA: Yuval Moravchick | JFrog (en)

Additional Advisory Data

Exploits

CNA: JFrog holds a private proof of concept, including a recording, that was shared with the vendor as part of the original disclosure on 2026-05-17. Full exploit details are not included in this record.

There are currently no legacy QID mappings associated with this CVE.