namespace: keep the lock on a mount that a propagated copy is moved beneath
Summary
| CVE | CVE-2026-98976 |
| State | PUBLISHED |
| Assigner | Linux |
| Source Priority | CVE Program / NVD first with legacy fallback |
| Published | 2026-10-23 13:17:19 UTC |
| Updated | 2026-10-23 13:17:19 UTC |
| Description | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
namespace: keep the lock on a mount that a propagated copy is moved beneath
attach_recursive_mnt() transfers MNT_LOCKED from the top mount to the
mount that is moved beneath it with MOVE_MOUNT_BENEATH. This allows the
owner of a user namespace to replace its locked /proc or its root. The
mount beneath takes on the job of covering the underlying mountpoint
allowing the top mount to be unmounted.
Consider two mount namespaces:
(H) The host H has a shared mount P with a secret in P/d
(Z) Z is a user namespace made from M. Its copy of P receives
propagation from the host's P and its copy of M's cover on P/d is
locked Z's owner must not get to see P/d.
Now (H) mounts X on P/d. This propagates into (Z). The copy of X lands
beneath (Z)'s locked cover. The locked property is transfered from (Z)'s
cover to the copy of X propagated beneath it. The cover is now unlocked.
Now (H) unmounts X again. The copy of X in (Z) gets unmounted and the
covering mount is left unlocked on top of P/d. (Z) can now unmount it:
Z: umount2(P/d) = EINVAL /* the cover is locked */
H: mount X on P/d, umount X /* both propagate into Z /*
Z: umount2(P/d) = 0 /* the cover is now unlocked */
Z: read P/d/secret = "covered-by-root" /* secret revealed */
So only transfer the locked property to the mount beneath for mounts the
caller has placed. A propagated copy that lands beneath a locked mount
is locked as well so that the mount at the bottom of the stack carries a
lock the way every check expects. The mount on top of it remains locked
to ensure that it keeps covering even if the propagated mount is
unmounted again. |
Vendor Declared Affected Products
| Source | Vendor | Product | Version | Platforms |
|---|
| CNA |
Linux |
Linux |
affected c62a4766937edec2962d52e583276b459b739f2d f1f0c24ca701d7d3061c7f69f7450f1734c11745 git |
Not specified |
| CNA |
Linux |
Linux |
affected c62a4766937edec2962d52e583276b459b739f2d d74d66aa708ccf2bc0b1e265a83fed0f2308d5c4 git |
Not specified |
| CNA |
Linux |
Linux |
affected 7.1 |
Not specified |
| CNA |
Linux |
Linux |
unaffected 7.1 semver |
Not specified |
| CNA |
Linux |
Linux |
unaffected 7.2.11 7.2.* semver |
Not specified |
| CNA |
Linux |
Linux |
unaffected 7.3 * original_commit_for_fix |
Not specified |
References
| Reference | Source | Link | Tags |
|---|
| git.kernel.org/stable/c/d74d66aa708ccf2bc0b1e265a83fed0f2308d5c4 |
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67 |
git.kernel.org |
|
| git.kernel.org/stable/c/f1f0c24ca701d7d3061c7f69f7450f1734c11745 |
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67 |
git.kernel.org |
|
| CVE Program record |
CVE.ORG |
www.cve.org |
canonical |
| NVD vulnerability detail |
NVD |
nvd.nist.gov |
canonical, analysis |
No vendor comments have been submitted for this CVE.
There are currently no legacy QID mappings associated with this CVE.