tun: Require CAP_NET_ADMIN to attach to an ownerless device

MITRE NVD CVE.ORG JSON API

Summary

CVECVE-2026-99281
StatePUBLISHED
AssignerLinux
Source PriorityCVE Program / NVD first with legacy fallback
Published2026-11-07 14:17:03 UTC
Updated2026-11-07 14:17:03 UTC
DescriptionIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tun: Require CAP_NET_ADMIN to attach to an ownerless device Twenty years ago I made creating a tuntap device require CAP_NET_ADMIN in commit ca6bb5d7ab22 ("[NET]: Require CAP_NET_ADMIN to create tuntap devices.") The idea was to allow the permissions on /dev/net/tun to be relaxed to 0666 and thus allow owners of tun devices assigned with TUNSETOWNER to actually open it and get at their devices. What we missed at the time was that persistent devices with *no* owner were already essentially world-consumable, and anyone who could open the device node could also attach to those. Even then, using persistent devices with no explicitly set owner — on the (false) presumption that CAP_NET_ADMIN would be required to open them — wasn't an egregious userspace bug. There are cases where it does make sense to separate the creation/configuration of the netdevice, from the process which shovels packets into it. Since then, TUNSETGROUP was added a year later in commit 8c644623fe7e ("[NET]: Allow group ownership of TUN/TAP devices."). Its commit message noted that if both uid and gid are set, both have to match (in itself a bizarre choice) — but still not that with *neither* set, no permission at all was required. Then in 2012 commit c8d68e6be1c3 ("tuntap: multiqueue support") allowed new queues to be attached to a device from the moment of its creation, with no way for userspace to close the race between creation and a subsequent TUNSET{OWNER,GROUP}. In 2024, commit 3ca459eaba1bf ("tun: fix group permission check") tried to fix things to be saner: only require the user *or* the group to match, in line with standard POSIX permissions, and require CAP_NET_ADMIN if neither the user nor group authorised the access (although it put the CAP_NET_ADMIN check first, and would wrongly have reported the capability as having been used even when it was not). That fix was reverted in commit a70c7b3cbc06 ("tun: revert fix group permission check") due to allegedly causing a regression in an selinux test suite which *expected* the attachment to succeed when authorised by none of user, group, nor CAP_NET_ADMIN: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CAFqZXNtkCBT4f+PwyVRmQGoT3p1eVa01fCG_aNtpt6dakXncUg@mail.gmail.com/ We should not break UAPI. But we don't have to consider an selinux test case which deliberately exercises a security flaw to be UAPI worth preserving either. To which end, I have fixed it in selinux-testsuite commit b2f894f0016b ("tests/tun_tap: set an owner on the device for the relabel tests"). So: fix the lack of CAP_NET_ADMIN check on devices which *haven't* been assigned an owner or group, while leaving the weird tun ownership model as it was (user *and* group have to match, if both are set). If someone still wants to fix the latter (which wasn't actually the reason the previous attempt was reverted), they can do it under separate cover. Permit attaching to an existing device only if an owner and/or group was set and the caller matches all that were set, or if the caller has CAP_NET_ADMIN. The only behavioural change is that a device with no owner or group now requires CAP_NET_ADMIN to attach — precisely the loophole we want to close. And put the CAP_NET_ADMIN check in the right place this time.

Vendor Declared Affected Products

SourceVendorProductVersionPlatforms
CNA Linux Linux affected ca6bb5d7ab22ac79f608fe6cbc6b12de6a5a19f0 2f92c0286cfd58bff9d6d54c01a771073d5eb775 git Not specified
CNA Linux Linux affected ca6bb5d7ab22ac79f608fe6cbc6b12de6a5a19f0 e53d1cf05da8ea58a5743b7ce5894fb51b0b9700 git Not specified
CNA Linux Linux affected ca6bb5d7ab22ac79f608fe6cbc6b12de6a5a19f0 ffdf678dd16610e3f006dac904bd37c09684673c git Not specified
CNA Linux Linux affected 2.6.18 Not specified
CNA Linux Linux unaffected 2.6.18 semver Not specified
CNA Linux Linux unaffected 6.18.61 6.18.* semver Not specified
CNA Linux Linux unaffected 7.3.2 7.3.* semver Not specified
CNA Linux Linux unaffected 7.4-rc1 * original_commit_for_fix Not specified

References

ReferenceSourceLinkTags
git.kernel.org/stable/c/e53d1cf05da8ea58a5743b7ce5894fb51b0b9700 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67 git.kernel.org
git.kernel.org/stable/c/ffdf678dd16610e3f006dac904bd37c09684673c 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67 git.kernel.org
git.kernel.org/stable/c/2f92c0286cfd58bff9d6d54c01a771073d5eb775 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67 git.kernel.org
CVE Program record CVE.ORG www.cve.org canonical
NVD vulnerability detail NVD nvd.nist.gov canonical, analysis

© CVE.report 2026

Use of this information constitutes acceptance for use in an AS IS condition. There are NO warranties, implied or otherwise, with regard to this information or its use. Any use of this information is at the user's risk. It is the responsibility of user to evaluate the accuracy, completeness or usefulness of any information, opinion, advice or other content. EACH USER WILL BE SOLELY RESPONSIBLE FOR ANY consequences of his or her direct or indirect use of this web site. ALL WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND ARE EXPRESSLY DISCLAIMED. This site will NOT BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT or any other kind of loss.

CVE, CWE, and OVAL are registred trademarks of The MITRE Corporation and the authoritative source of CVE content is MITRE's CVE web site. This site includes MITRE data granted under the following license.

Free CVE JSON API cve.report/api

CVE.report and Source URL Uptime Status status.cve.report