{"api_version":"1","generated_at":"2026-10-24T04:27:12+00:00","cve":"CVE-2024-56788","urls":{"html":"https://cve.report/CVE-2024-56788","api":"https://cve.report/api/cve/CVE-2024-56788.json","docs":"https://cve.report/api","cve_org":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2024-56788","nvd":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-56788"},"summary":{"title":"net: ethernet: oa_tc6: fix tx skb race condition between reference pointers","description":"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: ethernet: oa_tc6: fix tx skb race condition between reference pointers\n\nThere are two skb pointers to manage tx skb's enqueued from n/w stack.\nwaiting_tx_skb pointer points to the tx skb which needs to be processed\nand ongoing_tx_skb pointer points to the tx skb which is being processed.\n\nSPI thread prepares the tx data chunks from the tx skb pointed by the\nongoing_tx_skb pointer. When the tx skb pointed by the ongoing_tx_skb is\nprocessed, the tx skb pointed by the waiting_tx_skb is assigned to\nongoing_tx_skb and the waiting_tx_skb pointer is assigned with NULL.\nWhenever there is a new tx skb from n/w stack, it will be assigned to\nwaiting_tx_skb pointer if it is NULL. Enqueuing and processing of a tx skb\nhandled in two different threads.\n\nConsider a scenario where the SPI thread processed an ongoing_tx_skb and\nit moves next tx skb from waiting_tx_skb pointer to ongoing_tx_skb pointer\nwithout doing any NULL check. At this time, if the waiting_tx_skb pointer\nis NULL then ongoing_tx_skb pointer is also assigned with NULL. After\nthat, if a new tx skb is assigned to waiting_tx_skb pointer by the n/w\nstack and there is a chance to overwrite the tx skb pointer with NULL in\nthe SPI thread. Finally one of the tx skb will be left as unhandled,\nresulting packet missing and memory leak.\n\n- Consider the below scenario where the TXC reported from the previous\ntransfer is 10 and ongoing_tx_skb holds an tx ethernet frame which can be\ntransported in 20 TXCs and waiting_tx_skb is still NULL.\n\ttx_credits = 10; /* 21 are filled in the previous transfer */\n\tongoing_tx_skb = 20;\n\twaiting_tx_skb = NULL; /* Still NULL */\n- So, (tc6->ongoing_tx_skb || tc6->waiting_tx_skb) becomes true.\n- After oa_tc6_prepare_spi_tx_buf_for_tx_skbs()\n\tongoing_tx_skb = 10;\n\twaiting_tx_skb = NULL; /* Still NULL */\n- Perform SPI transfer.\n- Process SPI rx buffer to get the TXC from footers.\n- Now let's assume previously filled 21 TXCs are freed so we are good to\ntransport the next remaining 10 tx chunks from ongoing_tx_skb.\n\ttx_credits = 21;\n\tongoing_tx_skb = 10;\n\twaiting_tx_skb = NULL;\n- So, (tc6->ongoing_tx_skb || tc6->waiting_tx_skb) becomes true again.\n- In the oa_tc6_prepare_spi_tx_buf_for_tx_skbs()\n\tongoing_tx_skb = NULL;\n\twaiting_tx_skb = NULL;\n\n- Now the below bad case might happen,\n\nThread1 (oa_tc6_start_xmit)\tThread2 (oa_tc6_spi_thread_handler)\n---------------------------\t-----------------------------------\n- if waiting_tx_skb is NULL\n\t\t\t\t- if ongoing_tx_skb is NULL\n\t\t\t\t- ongoing_tx_skb = waiting_tx_skb\n- waiting_tx_skb = skb\n\t\t\t\t- waiting_tx_skb = NULL\n\t\t\t\t...\n\t\t\t\t- ongoing_tx_skb = NULL\n- if waiting_tx_skb is NULL\n- waiting_tx_skb = skb\n\nTo overcome the above issue, protect the moving of tx skb reference from\nwaiting_tx_skb pointer to ongoing_tx_skb pointer and assigning new tx skb\nto waiting_tx_skb pointer, so that the other thread can't access the\nwaiting_tx_skb pointer until the current thread completes moving the tx\nskb reference safely.","state":"PUBLISHED","assigner":"Linux","published_at":"2025-01-11 13:15:29","updated_at":"2026-08-04 11:22:27"},"problem_types":["CWE-362"],"metrics":[{"version":"3.1","source":"nvd@nist.gov","type":"Primary","score":"4.7","severity":"MEDIUM","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H","data":{"version":"3.1","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H","baseScore":4.7,"baseSeverity":"MEDIUM","attackVector":"LOCAL","attackComplexity":"HIGH","privilegesRequired":"LOW","userInteraction":"NONE","scope":"UNCHANGED","confidentialityImpact":"NONE","integrityImpact":"NONE","availabilityImpact":"HIGH"}},{"version":"3.1","source":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","type":"Secondary","score":"7.5","severity":"HIGH","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H","data":{"version":"3.1","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H","baseScore":7.5,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","attackVector":"NETWORK","attackComplexity":"LOW","privilegesRequired":"NONE","userInteraction":"NONE","scope":"UNCHANGED","confidentialityImpact":"NONE","integrityImpact":"NONE","availabilityImpact":"HIGH"}},{"version":"3.1","source":"CNA","type":"DECLARED","score":"7.5","severity":"HIGH","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H","data":{"baseScore":7.5,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H","version":"3.1"}}],"references":[{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e592b5110b3e9393881b0a019d86832bbf71a47f","name":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e592b5110b3e9393881b0a019d86832bbf71a47f","refsource":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","tags":["Patch"],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1f2eb6c32bae04b375bb7a0aedbeefb6dbbcb775","name":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1f2eb6c32bae04b375bb7a0aedbeefb6dbbcb775","refsource":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","tags":["Patch"],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2024-56788","name":"CVE Program record","refsource":"CVE.ORG","tags":["canonical"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-56788","name":"NVD vulnerability detail","refsource":"NVD","tags":["canonical","analysis"]}],"affected":[{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"affected 53fbde8ab21e8c2c6187159cc17fc10cbf20900a 1f2eb6c32bae04b375bb7a0aedbeefb6dbbcb775 git","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"affected 53fbde8ab21e8c2c6187159cc17fc10cbf20900a e592b5110b3e9393881b0a019d86832bbf71a47f git","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"affected 6.12","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"unaffected 6.12 semver","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"unaffected 6.12.7 6.12.* semver","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Linux","product":"Linux","version":"unaffected 6.13 * original_commit_for_fix","platforms":[]}],"timeline":[],"solutions":[],"workarounds":[],"exploits":[],"credits":[],"nvd_cpes":[{"cve_year":"2024","cve_id":"56788","vulnerable":"1","versionEndIncluding":"","cpe1":"cpe","cpe2":"2.3","cpe3":"o","cpe4":"linux","cpe5":"linux_kernel","cpe6":"*","cpe7":"*","cpe8":"*","cpe9":"*","cpe10":"*","cpe11":"*","cpe12":"*","cpe13":"*"},{"cve_year":"2024","cve_id":"56788","vulnerable":"1","versionEndIncluding":"","cpe1":"cpe","cpe2":"2.3","cpe3":"o","cpe4":"linux","cpe5":"linux_kernel","cpe6":"6.13","cpe7":"rc1","cpe8":"*","cpe9":"*","cpe10":"*","cpe11":"*","cpe12":"*","cpe13":"*"},{"cve_year":"2024","cve_id":"56788","vulnerable":"1","versionEndIncluding":"","cpe1":"cpe","cpe2":"2.3","cpe3":"o","cpe4":"linux","cpe5":"linux_kernel","cpe6":"6.13","cpe7":"rc2","cpe8":"*","cpe9":"*","cpe10":"*","cpe11":"*","cpe12":"*","cpe13":"*"},{"cve_year":"2024","cve_id":"56788","vulnerable":"1","versionEndIncluding":"","cpe1":"cpe","cpe2":"2.3","cpe3":"o","cpe4":"linux","cpe5":"linux_kernel","cpe6":"6.13","cpe7":"rc3","cpe8":"*","cpe9":"*","cpe10":"*","cpe11":"*","cpe12":"*","cpe13":"*"}],"vendor_comments":[],"enrichments":{"kev":null,"epss":{"cve_year":"2024","cve_id":"56788","cve":"CVE-2024-56788","epss":"0.002410000","percentile":"0.151970000","score_date":"2026-08-06","updated_at":"2026-08-07 00:14:20"},"legacy_qids":[]},"source_records":{"cve_program":{"containers":{"cna":{"affected":[{"defaultStatus":"unaffected","product":"Linux","programFiles":["drivers/net/ethernet/oa_tc6.c"],"repo":"https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git","vendor":"Linux","versions":[{"lessThan":"1f2eb6c32bae04b375bb7a0aedbeefb6dbbcb775","status":"affected","version":"53fbde8ab21e8c2c6187159cc17fc10cbf20900a","versionType":"git"},{"lessThan":"e592b5110b3e9393881b0a019d86832bbf71a47f","status":"affected","version":"53fbde8ab21e8c2c6187159cc17fc10cbf20900a","versionType":"git"}]},{"defaultStatus":"affected","product":"Linux","programFiles":["drivers/net/ethernet/oa_tc6.c"],"repo":"https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git","vendor":"Linux","versions":[{"status":"affected","version":"6.12"},{"lessThan":"6.12","status":"unaffected","version":"0","versionType":"semver"},{"lessThanOrEqual":"6.12.*","status":"unaffected","version":"6.12.7","versionType":"semver"},{"lessThanOrEqual":"*","status":"unaffected","version":"6.13","versionType":"original_commit_for_fix"}]}],"cpeApplicability":[{"nodes":[{"cpeMatch":[{"criteria":"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","versionEndExcluding":"6.12.7","versionStartIncluding":"6.12","vulnerable":true},{"criteria":"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","versionEndExcluding":"6.13","versionStartIncluding":"6.12","vulnerable":true}],"negate":false,"operator":"OR"}]}],"descriptions":[{"lang":"en","value":"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: ethernet: oa_tc6: fix tx skb race condition between reference pointers\n\nThere are two skb pointers to manage tx skb's enqueued from n/w stack.\nwaiting_tx_skb pointer points to the tx skb which needs to be processed\nand ongoing_tx_skb pointer points to the tx skb which is being processed.\n\nSPI thread prepares the tx data chunks from the tx skb pointed by the\nongoing_tx_skb pointer. When the tx skb pointed by the ongoing_tx_skb is\nprocessed, the tx skb pointed by the waiting_tx_skb is assigned to\nongoing_tx_skb and the waiting_tx_skb pointer is assigned with NULL.\nWhenever there is a new tx skb from n/w stack, it will be assigned to\nwaiting_tx_skb pointer if it is NULL. Enqueuing and processing of a tx skb\nhandled in two different threads.\n\nConsider a scenario where the SPI thread processed an ongoing_tx_skb and\nit moves next tx skb from waiting_tx_skb pointer to ongoing_tx_skb pointer\nwithout doing any NULL check. At this time, if the waiting_tx_skb pointer\nis NULL then ongoing_tx_skb pointer is also assigned with NULL. After\nthat, if a new tx skb is assigned to waiting_tx_skb pointer by the n/w\nstack and there is a chance to overwrite the tx skb pointer with NULL in\nthe SPI thread. Finally one of the tx skb will be left as unhandled,\nresulting packet missing and memory leak.\n\n- Consider the below scenario where the TXC reported from the previous\ntransfer is 10 and ongoing_tx_skb holds an tx ethernet frame which can be\ntransported in 20 TXCs and waiting_tx_skb is still NULL.\n\ttx_credits = 10; /* 21 are filled in the previous transfer */\n\tongoing_tx_skb = 20;\n\twaiting_tx_skb = NULL; /* Still NULL */\n- So, (tc6->ongoing_tx_skb || tc6->waiting_tx_skb) becomes true.\n- After oa_tc6_prepare_spi_tx_buf_for_tx_skbs()\n\tongoing_tx_skb = 10;\n\twaiting_tx_skb = NULL; /* Still NULL */\n- Perform SPI transfer.\n- Process SPI rx buffer to get the TXC from footers.\n- Now let's assume previously filled 21 TXCs are freed so we are good to\ntransport the next remaining 10 tx chunks from ongoing_tx_skb.\n\ttx_credits = 21;\n\tongoing_tx_skb = 10;\n\twaiting_tx_skb = NULL;\n- So, (tc6->ongoing_tx_skb || tc6->waiting_tx_skb) becomes true again.\n- In the oa_tc6_prepare_spi_tx_buf_for_tx_skbs()\n\tongoing_tx_skb = NULL;\n\twaiting_tx_skb = NULL;\n\n- Now the below bad case might happen,\n\nThread1 (oa_tc6_start_xmit)\tThread2 (oa_tc6_spi_thread_handler)\n---------------------------\t-----------------------------------\n- if waiting_tx_skb is NULL\n\t\t\t\t- if ongoing_tx_skb is NULL\n\t\t\t\t- ongoing_tx_skb = waiting_tx_skb\n- waiting_tx_skb = skb\n\t\t\t\t- waiting_tx_skb = NULL\n\t\t\t\t...\n\t\t\t\t- ongoing_tx_skb = NULL\n- if waiting_tx_skb is NULL\n- waiting_tx_skb = skb\n\nTo overcome the above issue, protect the moving of tx skb reference from\nwaiting_tx_skb pointer to ongoing_tx_skb pointer and assigning new tx skb\nto waiting_tx_skb pointer, so that the other thread can't access the\nwaiting_tx_skb pointer until the current thread completes moving the tx\nskb reference safely."}],"metrics":[{"cvssV3_1":{"baseScore":7.5,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H","version":"3.1"}}],"providerMetadata":{"dateUpdated":"2026-08-04T09:40:21.008Z","orgId":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","shortName":"Linux"},"references":[{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1f2eb6c32bae04b375bb7a0aedbeefb6dbbcb775"},{"url":"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e592b5110b3e9393881b0a019d86832bbf71a47f"}],"title":"net: ethernet: oa_tc6: fix tx skb race condition between reference pointers","x_generator":{"engine":"bippy-1.2.0"}}},"cveMetadata":{"assignerOrgId":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","assignerShortName":"Linux","cveId":"CVE-2024-56788","datePublished":"2025-01-11T12:35:47.985Z","dateReserved":"2024-12-29T11:26:39.770Z","dateUpdated":"2026-08-04T09:40:21.008Z","state":"PUBLISHED"},"dataType":"CVE_RECORD","dataVersion":"5.2"},"nvd":{"publishedDate":"2025-01-11 13:15:29","lastModifiedDate":"2026-08-04 11:22:27","problem_types":["CWE-362"],"metrics":{"cvssMetricV31":[{"source":"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67","type":"Secondary","cvssData":{"version":"3.1","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H","baseScore":7.5,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","attackVector":"NETWORK","attackComplexity":"LOW","privilegesRequired":"NONE","userInteraction":"NONE","scope":"UNCHANGED","confidentialityImpact":"NONE","integrityImpact":"NONE","availabilityImpact":"HIGH"},"exploitabilityScore":3.9,"impactScore":3.6},{"source":"nvd@nist.gov","type":"Primary","cvssData":{"version":"3.1","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H","baseScore":4.7,"baseSeverity":"MEDIUM","attackVector":"LOCAL","attackComplexity":"HIGH","privilegesRequired":"LOW","userInteraction":"NONE","scope":"UNCHANGED","confidentialityImpact":"NONE","integrityImpact":"NONE","availabilityImpact":"HIGH"},"exploitabilityScore":1,"impactScore":3.6}]},"configurations":[{"nodes":[{"operator":"OR","negate":false,"cpeMatch":[{"vulnerable":true,"criteria":"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","versionStartIncluding":"6.12","versionEndExcluding":"6.12.7","matchCriteriaId":"BB2B083D-CB9D-4D06-9284-5BCF6F66A34C"},{"vulnerable":true,"criteria":"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.13:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:*","matchCriteriaId":"62567B3C-6CEE-46D0-BC2E-B3717FBF7D13"},{"vulnerable":true,"criteria":"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.13:rc2:*:*:*:*:*:*","matchCriteriaId":"5A073481-106D-4B15-B4C7-FB0213B8E1D4"},{"vulnerable":true,"criteria":"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.13:rc3:*:*:*:*:*:*","matchCriteriaId":"DE491969-75AE-4A6B-9A58-8FC5AF98798F"}]}]}]},"legacy_mitre":{"record":{"CveYear":"2024","CveId":"56788","Ordinal":"1","Title":"net: ethernet: oa_tc6: fix tx skb race condition between referen","CVE":"CVE-2024-56788","Year":"2024"},"notes":[{"CveYear":"2024","CveId":"56788","Ordinal":"1","NoteData":"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: ethernet: oa_tc6: fix tx skb race condition between reference pointers\n\nThere are two skb pointers to manage tx skb's enqueued from n/w stack.\nwaiting_tx_skb pointer points to the tx skb which needs to be processed\nand ongoing_tx_skb pointer points to the tx skb which is being processed.\n\nSPI thread prepares the tx data chunks from the tx skb pointed by the\nongoing_tx_skb pointer. When the tx skb pointed by the ongoing_tx_skb is\nprocessed, the tx skb pointed by the waiting_tx_skb is assigned to\nongoing_tx_skb and the waiting_tx_skb pointer is assigned with NULL.\nWhenever there is a new tx skb from n/w stack, it will be assigned to\nwaiting_tx_skb pointer if it is NULL. Enqueuing and processing of a tx skb\nhandled in two different threads.\n\nConsider a scenario where the SPI thread processed an ongoing_tx_skb and\nit moves next tx skb from waiting_tx_skb pointer to ongoing_tx_skb pointer\nwithout doing any NULL check. At this time, if the waiting_tx_skb pointer\nis NULL then ongoing_tx_skb pointer is also assigned with NULL. After\nthat, if a new tx skb is assigned to waiting_tx_skb pointer by the n/w\nstack and there is a chance to overwrite the tx skb pointer with NULL in\nthe SPI thread. Finally one of the tx skb will be left as unhandled,\nresulting packet missing and memory leak.\n\n- Consider the below scenario where the TXC reported from the previous\ntransfer is 10 and ongoing_tx_skb holds an tx ethernet frame which can be\ntransported in 20 TXCs and waiting_tx_skb is still NULL.\n\ttx_credits = 10; /* 21 are filled in the previous transfer */\n\tongoing_tx_skb = 20;\n\twaiting_tx_skb = NULL; /* Still NULL */\n- So, (tc6->ongoing_tx_skb || tc6->waiting_tx_skb) becomes true.\n- After oa_tc6_prepare_spi_tx_buf_for_tx_skbs()\n\tongoing_tx_skb = 10;\n\twaiting_tx_skb = NULL; /* Still NULL */\n- Perform SPI transfer.\n- Process SPI rx buffer to get the TXC from footers.\n- Now let's assume previously filled 21 TXCs are freed so we are good to\ntransport the next remaining 10 tx chunks from ongoing_tx_skb.\n\ttx_credits = 21;\n\tongoing_tx_skb = 10;\n\twaiting_tx_skb = NULL;\n- So, (tc6->ongoing_tx_skb || tc6->waiting_tx_skb) becomes true again.\n- In the oa_tc6_prepare_spi_tx_buf_for_tx_skbs()\n\tongoing_tx_skb = NULL;\n\twaiting_tx_skb = NULL;\n\n- Now the below bad case might happen,\n\nThread1 (oa_tc6_start_xmit)\tThread2 (oa_tc6_spi_thread_handler)\n---------------------------\t-----------------------------------\n- if waiting_tx_skb is NULL\n\t\t\t\t- if ongoing_tx_skb is NULL\n\t\t\t\t- ongoing_tx_skb = waiting_tx_skb\n- waiting_tx_skb = skb\n\t\t\t\t- waiting_tx_skb = NULL\n\t\t\t\t...\n\t\t\t\t- ongoing_tx_skb = NULL\n- if waiting_tx_skb is NULL\n- waiting_tx_skb = skb\n\nTo overcome the above issue, protect the moving of tx skb reference from\nwaiting_tx_skb pointer to ongoing_tx_skb pointer and assigning new tx skb\nto waiting_tx_skb pointer, so that the other thread can't access the\nwaiting_tx_skb pointer until the current thread completes moving the tx\nskb reference safely.","Type":"Description","Title":"net: ethernet: oa_tc6: fix tx skb race condition between referen"}]}}}