{"api_version":"1","generated_at":"2026-10-06T22:37:47+00:00","cve":"CVE-2026-101027","urls":{"html":"https://cve.report/CVE-2026-101027","api":"https://cve.report/api/cve/CVE-2026-101027.json","docs":"https://cve.report/api","cve_org":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-101027","nvd":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-101027"},"summary":{"title":"Gitea migration SSRF through ALLOWED_DOMAINS address check bypass","description":"When `[migrations] ALLOWED_DOMAINS` was configured, a hostname matching the allow list was accepted without checking its resolved address against the local-network restrictions. A user who can start repository migrations and control the DNS of an allowed hostname could make it resolve to loopback or private addresses and bypass `ALLOW_LOCALNETWORKS = false`, reaching internal services from the Gitea server. Instances without `ALLOWED_DOMAINS` configured are not affected by this specific bypass.","state":"PUBLISHED","assigner":"Gitea","published_at":"2026-10-06 20:17:08","updated_at":"2026-10-06 20:17:08"},"problem_types":[],"metrics":[],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/releases/tag/v28.0.0","name":"https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/releases/tag/v28.0.0","refsource":"88ee5874-cf24-4952-aea0-31affedb7ff2","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/pull/39426","name":"https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/pull/39426","refsource":"88ee5874-cf24-4952-aea0-31affedb7ff2","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://blog.gitea.com/release-of-28.0.0/","name":"https://blog.gitea.com/release-of-28.0.0/","refsource":"88ee5874-cf24-4952-aea0-31affedb7ff2","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/security/advisories/GHSA-fqjr-23c8-gg9m","name":"https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/security/advisories/GHSA-fqjr-23c8-gg9m","refsource":"88ee5874-cf24-4952-aea0-31affedb7ff2","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-101027","name":"CVE Program record","refsource":"CVE.ORG","tags":["canonical"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-101027","name":"NVD vulnerability detail","refsource":"NVD","tags":["canonical","analysis"]}],"affected":[{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Gitea","product":"Gitea","version":"affected 1.27.3 semver","platforms":[]}],"timeline":[],"solutions":[],"workarounds":[],"exploits":[],"credits":[{"source":"CNA","value":"https://github.com/Razzlemouse","lang":"en"},{"source":"CNA","value":"https://github.com/TheFox0x7","lang":"en"},{"source":"CNA","value":"https://github.com/silverwind","lang":"en"},{"source":"CNA","value":"https://github.com/bircni","lang":"en"},{"source":"CNA","value":"https://github.com/wxiaoguang","lang":"en"}],"nvd_cpes":[],"vendor_comments":[],"enrichments":{"kev":null,"epss":null,"legacy_qids":[]},"source_records":{"cve_program":{"containers":{"cna":{"affected":[{"defaultStatus":"unaffected","packageName":"gitea.dev","product":"Gitea","vendor":"Gitea","versions":[{"lessThanOrEqual":"1.27.3","status":"affected","version":"0","versionType":"semver"}]}],"credits":[{"lang":"en","type":"reporter","value":"https://github.com/Razzlemouse"},{"lang":"en","type":"remediation developer","value":"https://github.com/TheFox0x7"},{"lang":"en","type":"remediation developer","value":"https://github.com/silverwind"},{"lang":"en","type":"remediation developer","value":"https://github.com/bircni"},{"lang":"en","type":"remediation developer","value":"https://github.com/wxiaoguang"}],"descriptions":[{"lang":"en","value":"When `[migrations] ALLOWED_DOMAINS` was configured, a hostname matching the allow list was accepted without checking its resolved address against the local-network restrictions. A user who can start repository migrations and control the DNS of an allowed hostname could make it resolve to loopback or private addresses and bypass `ALLOW_LOCALNETWORKS = false`, reaching internal services from the Gitea server. Instances without `ALLOWED_DOMAINS` configured are not affected by this specific bypass."}],"providerMetadata":{"dateUpdated":"2026-10-06T19:23:20.387Z","orgId":"88ee5874-cf24-4952-aea0-31affedb7ff2","shortName":"Gitea"},"references":[{"name":"GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-fqjr-23c8-gg9m","tags":["vendor-advisory"],"url":"https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/security/advisories/GHSA-fqjr-23c8-gg9m"},{"name":"Fix: go-gitea/gitea pull request #39426","tags":["patch"],"url":"https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/pull/39426"},{"name":"Gitea 28.0.0 release announcement","tags":["release-notes"],"url":"https://blog.gitea.com/release-of-28.0.0/"},{"name":"go-gitea/gitea v28.0.0 release","tags":["release-notes"],"url":"https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/releases/tag/v28.0.0"}],"title":"Gitea migration SSRF through ALLOWED_DOMAINS address check bypass"}},"cveMetadata":{"assignerOrgId":"88ee5874-cf24-4952-aea0-31affedb7ff2","assignerShortName":"Gitea","cveId":"CVE-2026-101027","datePublished":"2026-10-06T19:23:20.387Z","dateReserved":"2026-10-04T21:57:35.568Z","dateUpdated":"2026-10-06T19:23:20.387Z","state":"PUBLISHED"},"dataType":"CVE_RECORD","dataVersion":"5.2"},"nvd":{"publishedDate":"2026-10-06 20:17:08","lastModifiedDate":"2026-10-06 20:17:08","problem_types":[],"metrics":[],"configurations":[]},"legacy_mitre":{"record":{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"101027","Ordinal":"1","Title":"Gitea migration SSRF through ALLOWED_DOMAINS address check bypas","CVE":"CVE-2026-101027","Year":"2026"},"notes":[{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"101027","Ordinal":"1","NoteData":"When `[migrations] ALLOWED_DOMAINS` was configured, a hostname matching the allow list was accepted without checking its resolved address against the local-network restrictions. A user who can start repository migrations and control the DNS of an allowed hostname could make it resolve to loopback or private addresses and bypass `ALLOW_LOCALNETWORKS = false`, reaching internal services from the Gitea server. Instances without `ALLOWED_DOMAINS` configured are not affected by this specific bypass.","Type":"Description","Title":"Gitea migration SSRF through ALLOWED_DOMAINS address check bypas"}]}}}