{"api_version":"1","generated_at":"2026-10-01T10:34:51+00:00","cve":"CVE-2026-102713","urls":{"html":"https://cve.report/CVE-2026-102713","api":"https://cve.report/api/cve/CVE-2026-102713.json","docs":"https://cve.report/api","cve_org":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-102713","nvd":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-102713"},"summary":{"title":"CVE-2026-102713","description":"The TFTP server accepts a DATA datagram of any size. The dispatcher rejects datagrams shorter than\n\n\n\nfour bytes (nxd_tftp_server.c:1037) and nothing anywhere checks an upper bound, in particular not\n\n\n\nagainst the protocol maximum of 4 + NX_TFTP_FILE_TRANSFER_MAX. Two things follow from that one\n\n\n\nmissing check, both reachable before any authentication because TFTP has none.\n\n\n\nThe handler passes `nx_packet_length - 4` straight to FileX:\n\n\n\n```c\n\n\n\n/* addons/tftp/nxd_tftp_server.c:1863, 1889 */\n\n\n\nstatus = nx_packet_copy(packet_ptr, &temp_ptr,\n\n server_ptr -> nx_tftp_server_packet_pool_ptr, NX_WAIT_FOREVER);\n\n\n...\n\n\n\nfx_file_write(&(client_request_ptr -> nx_tftp_client_request_file),\n\n packet_ptr -> nx_packet_prepend_ptr + 4,\n packet_ptr -> nx_packet_length - 4);\n\n\n```\n\n\n\n`nx_packet_length` is the length of a chain, not of one contiguous buffer, so FileX copies past the\n\n\n\nend of the first packet:\n\n\n\n```\n\n\n\nERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow\n\n\n\nREAD of size 1280 at 0x621000001108 thread T5\n\n #0 __interceptor_memcpy\n #1 _fx_utility_memory_copy filex/common/src/fx_utility_memory_copy.c:78\n\n\n0x621000001108 is 0 bytes to the right of 4104-byte region\n\n\n\n```\n\n\n\nThose bytes are written into the file the attacker is uploading, and a TFTP read request hands them\n\n\n\nback, so this is a memory disclosure with a convenient retrieval channel.\n\n\n\nThe same datagram also wedges the server. `nx_packet_copy` at :1863 needs\n\n\n\nceil(nx_packet_length / pool_payload) packets and asks for them with NX_WAIT_FOREVER, so when the\n\n\n\nattacker sizes the datagram beyond what the pool holds, the server thread suspends and never\n\n\n\nreturns. A liveness probe after one such datagram times out with the pool at 0 of 12 packets and\n\n\n\nthe server thread suspended, and no later client is served.\n\n\n\nReject `nx_packet_length > 4 + NX_TFTP_FILE_TRANSFER_MAX` in the DATA branch before either call,\n\n\n\nand use a bounded wait rather than NX_WAIT_FOREVER for the copy.","state":"PUBLISHED","assigner":"eclipse","published_at":"2026-09-29 18:17:10","updated_at":"2026-09-29 19:17:20"},"problem_types":["CWE-125","CWE-770","CWE-125 CWE-125 Out-of-bounds Read","CWE-770 CWE-770 Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling"],"metrics":[{"version":"4.0","source":"emo@eclipse.org","type":"Secondary","score":"8.8","severity":"HIGH","vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","data":{"version":"4.0","vectorString":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","baseScore":8.8,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","attackVector":"NETWORK","attackComplexity":"LOW","attackRequirements":"NONE","privilegesRequired":"NONE","userInteraction":"NONE","vulnConfidentialityImpact":"HIGH","vulnIntegrityImpact":"NONE","vulnAvailabilityImpact":"HIGH","subConfidentialityImpact":"NONE","subIntegrityImpact":"NONE","subAvailabilityImpact":"NONE","exploitMaturity":"NOT_DEFINED","confidentialityRequirement":"NOT_DEFINED","integrityRequirement":"NOT_DEFINED","availabilityRequirement":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedAttackVector":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedAttackComplexity":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedAttackRequirements":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedPrivilegesRequired":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedUserInteraction":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedSubIntegrityImpact":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact":"NOT_DEFINED","Safety":"NOT_DEFINED","Automatable":"NOT_DEFINED","Recovery":"NOT_DEFINED","valueDensity":"NOT_DEFINED","vulnerabilityResponseEffort":"NOT_DEFINED","providerUrgency":"NOT_DEFINED"}},{"version":"4.0","source":"CNA","type":"CVSS","score":"8.8","severity":"HIGH","vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","data":{"Automatable":"NOT_DEFINED","Recovery":"NOT_DEFINED","Safety":"NOT_DEFINED","attackComplexity":"LOW","attackRequirements":"NONE","attackVector":"NETWORK","baseScore":8.8,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","exploitMaturity":"NOT_DEFINED","privilegesRequired":"NONE","providerUrgency":"NOT_DEFINED","subAvailabilityImpact":"NONE","subConfidentialityImpact":"NONE","subIntegrityImpact":"NONE","userInteraction":"NONE","valueDensity":"NOT_DEFINED","vectorString":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","version":"4.0","vulnAvailabilityImpact":"HIGH","vulnConfidentialityImpact":"HIGH","vulnIntegrityImpact":"NONE","vulnerabilityResponseEffort":"NOT_DEFINED"}}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/eclipse-threadx/netxduo/security/advisories/GHSA-wr79-332c-ff8f","name":"https://github.com/eclipse-threadx/netxduo/security/advisories/GHSA-wr79-332c-ff8f","refsource":"emo@eclipse.org","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-102713","name":"CVE Program record","refsource":"CVE.ORG","tags":["canonical"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-102713","name":"NVD vulnerability detail","refsource":"NVD","tags":["canonical","analysis"]}],"affected":[{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Eclipse Foundation","product":"NetX Duo","version":"affected 6.5.1.202602 semver","platforms":[]}],"timeline":[],"solutions":[],"workarounds":[],"exploits":[],"credits":[{"source":"CNA","value":"L0stHeart","lang":"en"}],"nvd_cpes":[],"vendor_comments":[],"enrichments":{"kev":null,"epss":null,"legacy_qids":[]},"source_records":{"cve_program":{"containers":{"adp":[{"metrics":[{"other":{"content":{"id":"CVE-2026-102713","options":[{"Exploitation":"none"},{"Automatable":"yes"},{"Technical Impact":"partial"}],"role":"CISA Coordinator","timestamp":"2026-09-29T18:44:12.259965Z","version":"2.0.3"},"type":"ssvc"}}],"providerMetadata":{"dateUpdated":"2026-09-29T18:44:38.207Z","orgId":"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0","shortName":"CISA-ADP"},"title":"CISA ADP Vulnrichment"}],"cna":{"affected":[{"defaultStatus":"unaffected","packageName":"NetX Duo","product":"NetX Duo","vendor":"Eclipse Foundation","versions":[{"lessThanOrEqual":"6.5.1.202602","status":"affected","version":"0","versionType":"semver"}]}],"credits":[{"lang":"en","type":"reporter","value":"L0stHeart"}],"descriptions":[{"lang":"en","supportingMedia":[{"base64":false,"type":"text/html","value":"

The TFTP server accepts a DATA datagram of any size. The dispatcher rejects datagrams shorter than

four bytes (nxd_tftp_server.c:1037) and nothing anywhere checks an upper bound, in particular not

against the protocol maximum of 4 + NX_TFTP_FILE_TRANSFER_MAX. Two things follow from that one

missing check, both reachable before any authentication because TFTP has none.

The handler passes `nx_packet_length - 4` straight to FileX:

```c

/* addons/tftp/nxd_tftp_server.c:1863, 1889 */

status = nx_packet_copy(packet_ptr, &temp_ptr,

server_ptr -> nx_tftp_server_packet_pool_ptr, NX_WAIT_FOREVER);

...

fx_file_write(&(client_request_ptr -> nx_tftp_client_request_file),

packet_ptr -> nx_packet_prepend_ptr + 4,
packet_ptr -> nx_packet_length - 4);

```

`nx_packet_length` is the length of a chain, not of one contiguous buffer, so FileX copies past the

end of the first packet:

```

ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow

READ of size 1280 at 0x621000001108 thread T5

#0 __interceptor_memcpy
#1 _fx_utility_memory_copy filex/common/src/fx_utility_memory_copy.c:78

0x621000001108 is 0 bytes to the right of 4104-byte region

```

Those bytes are written into the file the attacker is uploading, and a TFTP read request hands them

back, so this is a memory disclosure with a convenient retrieval channel.

The same datagram also wedges the server. `nx_packet_copy` at :1863 needs

ceil(nx_packet_length / pool_payload) packets and asks for them with NX_WAIT_FOREVER, so when the

attacker sizes the datagram beyond what the pool holds, the server thread suspends and never

returns. A liveness probe after one such datagram times out with the pool at 0 of 12 packets and

the server thread suspended, and no later client is served.

Reject `nx_packet_length > 4 + NX_TFTP_FILE_TRANSFER_MAX` in the DATA branch before either call,

and use a bounded wait rather than NX_WAIT_FOREVER for the copy.

"}],"value":"The TFTP server accepts a DATA datagram of any size. The dispatcher rejects datagrams shorter than\n\n\n\nfour bytes (nxd_tftp_server.c:1037) and nothing anywhere checks an upper bound, in particular not\n\n\n\nagainst the protocol maximum of 4 + NX_TFTP_FILE_TRANSFER_MAX. Two things follow from that one\n\n\n\nmissing check, both reachable before any authentication because TFTP has none.\n\n\n\nThe handler passes `nx_packet_length - 4` straight to FileX:\n\n\n\n```c\n\n\n\n/* addons/tftp/nxd_tftp_server.c:1863, 1889 */\n\n\n\nstatus = nx_packet_copy(packet_ptr, &temp_ptr,\n\n server_ptr -> nx_tftp_server_packet_pool_ptr, NX_WAIT_FOREVER);\n\n\n...\n\n\n\nfx_file_write(&(client_request_ptr -> nx_tftp_client_request_file),\n\n packet_ptr -> nx_packet_prepend_ptr + 4,\n packet_ptr -> nx_packet_length - 4);\n\n\n```\n\n\n\n`nx_packet_length` is the length of a chain, not of one contiguous buffer, so FileX copies past the\n\n\n\nend of the first packet:\n\n\n\n```\n\n\n\nERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow\n\n\n\nREAD of size 1280 at 0x621000001108 thread T5\n\n #0 __interceptor_memcpy\n #1 _fx_utility_memory_copy filex/common/src/fx_utility_memory_copy.c:78\n\n\n0x621000001108 is 0 bytes to the right of 4104-byte region\n\n\n\n```\n\n\n\nThose bytes are written into the file the attacker is uploading, and a TFTP read request hands them\n\n\n\nback, so this is a memory disclosure with a convenient retrieval channel.\n\n\n\nThe same datagram also wedges the server. `nx_packet_copy` at :1863 needs\n\n\n\nceil(nx_packet_length / pool_payload) packets and asks for them with NX_WAIT_FOREVER, so when the\n\n\n\nattacker sizes the datagram beyond what the pool holds, the server thread suspends and never\n\n\n\nreturns. A liveness probe after one such datagram times out with the pool at 0 of 12 packets and\n\n\n\nthe server thread suspended, and no later client is served.\n\n\n\nReject `nx_packet_length > 4 + NX_TFTP_FILE_TRANSFER_MAX` in the DATA branch before either call,\n\n\n\nand use a bounded wait rather than NX_WAIT_FOREVER for the copy."}],"metrics":[{"cvssV4_0":{"Automatable":"NOT_DEFINED","Recovery":"NOT_DEFINED","Safety":"NOT_DEFINED","attackComplexity":"LOW","attackRequirements":"NONE","attackVector":"NETWORK","baseScore":8.8,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","exploitMaturity":"NOT_DEFINED","privilegesRequired":"NONE","providerUrgency":"NOT_DEFINED","subAvailabilityImpact":"NONE","subConfidentialityImpact":"NONE","subIntegrityImpact":"NONE","userInteraction":"NONE","valueDensity":"NOT_DEFINED","vectorString":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","version":"4.0","vulnAvailabilityImpact":"HIGH","vulnConfidentialityImpact":"HIGH","vulnIntegrityImpact":"NONE","vulnerabilityResponseEffort":"NOT_DEFINED"},"format":"CVSS","scenarios":[{"lang":"en","value":"GENERAL"}]}],"problemTypes":[{"descriptions":[{"cweId":"CWE-125","description":"CWE-125 Out-of-bounds Read","lang":"en","type":"CWE"}]},{"descriptions":[{"cweId":"CWE-770","description":"CWE-770 Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling","lang":"en","type":"CWE"}]}],"providerMetadata":{"dateUpdated":"2026-09-29T17:40:40.067Z","orgId":"e51fbebd-6053-4e49-959f-1b94eeb69a2c","shortName":"eclipse"},"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/eclipse-threadx/netxduo/security/advisories/GHSA-wr79-332c-ff8f"}],"source":{"discovery":"UNKNOWN"},"x_generator":{"engine":"Vulnogram 1.0.5"}}},"cveMetadata":{"assignerOrgId":"e51fbebd-6053-4e49-959f-1b94eeb69a2c","assignerShortName":"eclipse","cveId":"CVE-2026-102713","datePublished":"2026-09-29T17:40:40.067Z","dateReserved":"2026-09-29T16:15:09.632Z","dateUpdated":"2026-09-29T18:44:38.207Z","state":"PUBLISHED"},"dataType":"CVE_RECORD","dataVersion":"5.2"},"nvd":{"publishedDate":"2026-09-29 18:17:10","lastModifiedDate":"2026-09-29 19:17:20","problem_types":["CWE-125","CWE-770","CWE-125 CWE-125 Out-of-bounds Read","CWE-770 CWE-770 Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling"],"metrics":{"cvssMetricV40":[{"source":"emo@eclipse.org","type":"Secondary","cvssData":{"version":"4.0","vectorString":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","baseScore":8.8,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","attackVector":"NETWORK","attackComplexity":"LOW","attackRequirements":"NONE","privilegesRequired":"NONE","userInteraction":"NONE","vulnConfidentialityImpact":"HIGH","vulnIntegrityImpact":"NONE","vulnAvailabilityImpact":"HIGH","subConfidentialityImpact":"NONE","subIntegrityImpact":"NONE","subAvailabilityImpact":"NONE","exploitMaturity":"NOT_DEFINED","confidentialityRequirement":"NOT_DEFINED","integrityRequirement":"NOT_DEFINED","availabilityRequirement":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedAttackVector":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedAttackComplexity":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedAttackRequirements":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedPrivilegesRequired":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedUserInteraction":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedSubIntegrityImpact":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact":"NOT_DEFINED","Safety":"NOT_DEFINED","Automatable":"NOT_DEFINED","Recovery":"NOT_DEFINED","valueDensity":"NOT_DEFINED","vulnerabilityResponseEffort":"NOT_DEFINED","providerUrgency":"NOT_DEFINED"}}],"ssvcV203":[{"source":"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0","ssvcData":{"timestamp":"2026-09-29T18:44:12.259965Z","id":"CVE-2026-102713","options":[{"exploitation":"none"},{"automatable":"yes"},{"technicalImpact":"partial"}],"role":"CISA Coordinator","version":"2.0.3"}}]},"configurations":[]},"legacy_mitre":{"record":{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"102713","Ordinal":"1","Title":"CVE-2026-102713","CVE":"CVE-2026-102713","Year":"2026"},"notes":[{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"102713","Ordinal":"1","NoteData":"The TFTP server accepts a DATA datagram of any size. The dispatcher rejects datagrams shorter than\n\n\n\nfour bytes (nxd_tftp_server.c:1037) and nothing anywhere checks an upper bound, in particular not\n\n\n\nagainst the protocol maximum of 4 + NX_TFTP_FILE_TRANSFER_MAX. Two things follow from that one\n\n\n\nmissing check, both reachable before any authentication because TFTP has none.\n\n\n\nThe handler passes `nx_packet_length - 4` straight to FileX:\n\n\n\n```c\n\n\n\n/* addons/tftp/nxd_tftp_server.c:1863, 1889 */\n\n\n\nstatus = nx_packet_copy(packet_ptr, &temp_ptr,\n\n server_ptr -> nx_tftp_server_packet_pool_ptr, NX_WAIT_FOREVER);\n\n\n...\n\n\n\nfx_file_write(&(client_request_ptr -> nx_tftp_client_request_file),\n\n packet_ptr -> nx_packet_prepend_ptr + 4,\n packet_ptr -> nx_packet_length - 4);\n\n\n```\n\n\n\n`nx_packet_length` is the length of a chain, not of one contiguous buffer, so FileX copies past the\n\n\n\nend of the first packet:\n\n\n\n```\n\n\n\nERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow\n\n\n\nREAD of size 1280 at 0x621000001108 thread T5\n\n #0 __interceptor_memcpy\n #1 _fx_utility_memory_copy filex/common/src/fx_utility_memory_copy.c:78\n\n\n0x621000001108 is 0 bytes to the right of 4104-byte region\n\n\n\n```\n\n\n\nThose bytes are written into the file the attacker is uploading, and a TFTP read request hands them\n\n\n\nback, so this is a memory disclosure with a convenient retrieval channel.\n\n\n\nThe same datagram also wedges the server. `nx_packet_copy` at :1863 needs\n\n\n\nceil(nx_packet_length / pool_payload) packets and asks for them with NX_WAIT_FOREVER, so when the\n\n\n\nattacker sizes the datagram beyond what the pool holds, the server thread suspends and never\n\n\n\nreturns. A liveness probe after one such datagram times out with the pool at 0 of 12 packets and\n\n\n\nthe server thread suspended, and no later client is served.\n\n\n\nReject `nx_packet_length > 4 + NX_TFTP_FILE_TRANSFER_MAX` in the DATA branch before either call,\n\n\n\nand use a bounded wait rather than NX_WAIT_FOREVER for the copy.","Type":"Description","Title":"CVE-2026-102713"}]}}}