{"api_version":"1","generated_at":"2026-10-14T19:24:07+00:00","cve":"CVE-2026-104795","urls":{"html":"https://cve.report/CVE-2026-104795","api":"https://cve.report/api/cve/CVE-2026-104795.json","docs":"https://cve.report/api","cve_org":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-104795","nvd":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-104795"},"summary":{"title":"Insights-runtime-extractor: insights-runtime-extractor: container escape via privileged binary execution","description":"The insights-runtime-extractor runs as a privileged DaemonSet (`hostPID: true`)\nthat scans container processes for runtime fingerprinting. When scanning a\ncontainer, the coordinator:\n\n1. **fork()s** a child process\n2. **setns()** into the target container's PID and mount namespaces\n3. **fchdir()** back to an orphaned FD pointing at the extractor's own root\n   filesystem (where `/crio.sock` is hostPath-mounted)\n4. Calls **only `seteuid(target_uid)`** — changing the effective UID but leaving\n   the **real UID and saved-set-UID at 0** and **retaining the permitted\n   capability set**\n5. The `check_no_privileged_perms()` guard inspects only the Effective capability\n   set (so it passes), and is **skipped entirely when the target runs as uid 0**\n6. The `VersionExecutable` fingerprint invokes `fpr_kind_executable` with\n   `process.command_line[0]` — the target's argv[0], read from\n   `/proc/<pid>/cmdline` and **fully controlled by the workload**\n7. `fpr_kind_executable` calls `exec.Command(executable, \"--version\").Output()`\n   — executing the **workload's own binary** inside the workload's mount\n   namespace while **ruid=0 in the host user namespace**\n\nThe executed process can call `setuid(0)` to restore full root with\n`CAP_SYS_ADMIN`, and inherits the orphaned cwd which resolves into the extractor\ncontainer's filesystem containing the host CRI-O socket.\n\n## Affected Code\n\n### 1. Insufficient privilege drop (Rust — extractor coordinator)\n\n**File:** `extractor/src/insights_runtime_extractor.rs`\n\n```rust\n// Lines 139-146 — seteuid-only drop, guard skipped for root containers\njoin_process_namespaces(process.pid)?;\nchange_dir(current_dir);\nswitch_user(*process.uid)?;\nif *process.uid != 0 {\n    perms::check_no_privileged_perms()\n        .expect(\"Must not have privileged permissions to run fingerprints\");\n}\nfingerprint::run_fingerprints(&config, out_dir, &process);\n```\n\n```rust\n// Lines 182-185 — only effective UID changed; ruid/suid stay 0\nfn switch_user(uid: u32) -> Result<(), ScannerError> {\n    debug!(\"... Becoming user: {uid}\");\n    seteuid(uid.into()).map_err(|e| ScannerError::Errno(e))\n}\n```\n\n### 2. Execution of untrusted binary (Go — fingerprint)\n\n**File:** `fingerprints/pkg/utils/file.go`\n\n```go\n// Lines 75-80 — executes a path taken verbatim from workload's argv[0]\nfunc GetExecutableVersionOutput(executable string) (string, error) {\n    out, err := exec.Command(executable, \"--version\").Output()\n    if err != nil {\n        return \"\", err\n    }\n    return string(out), nil\n}\n```\n\n### 3. Workload-controlled path forwarded (Rust — version_executable)\n\n**File:** `version_executable.rs`\n\n```rust\n// Lines 29-34 — workload-controlled command_line[0] forwarded to fingerprint\nreturn Some(vec![\n    fpr_kind_executable,\n    out_dir.to_string(),\n    String::from(&process.command_line[0]),\n    String::from(&version_executable.runtime_kind_name),\n]);\n```\n\n## Attack Pattern\n\n**Attacker:** Any tenant able to schedule a pod (unprivileged, any namespace)\n**Victim:** The node running the insights-runtime-extractor DaemonSet\n**Trigger:** Automatic — the DaemonSet scans all container processes on the node\n\n**Attack sequence:**\n\n1. Attacker creates a pod whose process name matches a configured\n   versioned-executable pattern (`node`, `python`, `python3`, `MainThread`,\n   or contains `java`)\n2. The pod's main binary (at the path matching argv[0]) is a malicious\n   executable that calls `setuid(0)` to restore root\n3. When the insights operator triggers a scan, the DaemonSet forks, enters the\n   attacker's mount namespace, and executes the attacker's binary with ruid=0\n4. The attacker's code regains full root with `CAP_SYS_ADMIN` in the host user\n   namespace\n5. The inherited cwd contains the host CRI-O socket → full node compromise","state":"PUBLISHED","assigner":"redhat","published_at":"2026-10-14 11:16:59","updated_at":"2026-10-14 16:17:31"},"problem_types":["CWE-250","CWE-250 Execution with Unnecessary Privileges"],"metrics":[{"version":"3.1","source":"secalert@redhat.com","type":"Secondary","score":"8.8","severity":"HIGH","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","data":{"version":"3.1","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","baseScore":8.8,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","attackVector":"LOCAL","attackComplexity":"LOW","privilegesRequired":"LOW","userInteraction":"NONE","scope":"CHANGED","confidentialityImpact":"HIGH","integrityImpact":"HIGH","availabilityImpact":"HIGH"}},{"version":"3.1","source":"CNA","type":"CVSS","score":"8.8","severity":"HIGH","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","data":{"attackComplexity":"LOW","attackVector":"LOCAL","availabilityImpact":"HIGH","baseScore":8.8,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","confidentialityImpact":"HIGH","integrityImpact":"HIGH","privilegesRequired":"LOW","scope":"CHANGED","userInteraction":"NONE","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","version":"3.1"}}],"references":[{"url":"https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-104795","name":"https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-104795","refsource":"secalert@redhat.com","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2543917","name":"https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2543917","refsource":"secalert@redhat.com","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-104795","name":"CVE Program record","refsource":"CVE.ORG","tags":["canonical"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-104795","name":"NVD vulnerability detail","refsource":"NVD","tags":["canonical","analysis"]}],"affected":[{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Red Hat","product":"Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4","version":"","platforms":[]}],"timeline":[{"source":"CNA","time":"2026-09-30T12:50:08.063Z","lang":"en","value":"Reported to Red Hat."},{"source":"CNA","time":"2026-10-14T09:47:53.272Z","lang":"en","value":"Made public."}],"solutions":[],"workarounds":[{"source":"CNA","title":"","value":"The vulnerability requires a\ncode fix to implement a complete privilege drop (setting all three UID/GID\nfields, clearing all Linux capability sets, and setting `PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS`)\nbefore executing any fingerprint binary.","time":"","lang":"en"}],"exploits":[],"credits":[],"nvd_cpes":[],"vendor_comments":[],"enrichments":{"kev":null,"epss":null,"legacy_qids":[]},"source_records":{"cve_program":{"containers":{"adp":[{"metrics":[{"other":{"content":{"id":"CVE-2026-104795","options":[{"Exploitation":"none"},{"Automatable":"no"},{"Technical Impact":"total"}],"role":"CISA Coordinator","timestamp":"2026-10-14T15:25:50.103511Z","version":"2.0.3"},"type":"ssvc"}}],"providerMetadata":{"dateUpdated":"2026-10-14T15:26:53.109Z","orgId":"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0","shortName":"CISA-ADP"},"title":"CISA ADP Vulnrichment"}],"cna":{"affected":[{"collectionURL":"https://access.redhat.com/downloads/content/package-browser/","cpes":["cpe:/a:redhat:openshift:4"],"defaultStatus":"affected","packageName":"openshift4/insights-runtime-extractor-rhel9","product":"Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4","vendor":"Red Hat"}],"datePublic":"2026-10-14T09:47:53.272Z","descriptions":[{"lang":"en","value":"The insights-runtime-extractor runs as a privileged DaemonSet (`hostPID: true`)\nthat scans container processes for runtime fingerprinting. When scanning a\ncontainer, the coordinator:\n\n1. **fork()s** a child process\n2. **setns()** into the target container's PID and mount namespaces\n3. **fchdir()** back to an orphaned FD pointing at the extractor's own root\n   filesystem (where `/crio.sock` is hostPath-mounted)\n4. Calls **only `seteuid(target_uid)`** — changing the effective UID but leaving\n   the **real UID and saved-set-UID at 0** and **retaining the permitted\n   capability set**\n5. The `check_no_privileged_perms()` guard inspects only the Effective capability\n   set (so it passes), and is **skipped entirely when the target runs as uid 0**\n6. The `VersionExecutable` fingerprint invokes `fpr_kind_executable` with\n   `process.command_line[0]` — the target's argv[0], read from\n   `/proc/<pid>/cmdline` and **fully controlled by the workload**\n7. `fpr_kind_executable` calls `exec.Command(executable, \"--version\").Output()`\n   — executing the **workload's own binary** inside the workload's mount\n   namespace while **ruid=0 in the host user namespace**\n\nThe executed process can call `setuid(0)` to restore full root with\n`CAP_SYS_ADMIN`, and inherits the orphaned cwd which resolves into the extractor\ncontainer's filesystem containing the host CRI-O socket.\n\n## Affected Code\n\n### 1. Insufficient privilege drop (Rust — extractor coordinator)\n\n**File:** `extractor/src/insights_runtime_extractor.rs`\n\n```rust\n// Lines 139-146 — seteuid-only drop, guard skipped for root containers\njoin_process_namespaces(process.pid)?;\nchange_dir(current_dir);\nswitch_user(*process.uid)?;\nif *process.uid != 0 {\n    perms::check_no_privileged_perms()\n        .expect(\"Must not have privileged permissions to run fingerprints\");\n}\nfingerprint::run_fingerprints(&config, out_dir, &process);\n```\n\n```rust\n// Lines 182-185 — only effective UID changed; ruid/suid stay 0\nfn switch_user(uid: u32) -> Result<(), ScannerError> {\n    debug!(\"... Becoming user: {uid}\");\n    seteuid(uid.into()).map_err(|e| ScannerError::Errno(e))\n}\n```\n\n### 2. Execution of untrusted binary (Go — fingerprint)\n\n**File:** `fingerprints/pkg/utils/file.go`\n\n```go\n// Lines 75-80 — executes a path taken verbatim from workload's argv[0]\nfunc GetExecutableVersionOutput(executable string) (string, error) {\n    out, err := exec.Command(executable, \"--version\").Output()\n    if err != nil {\n        return \"\", err\n    }\n    return string(out), nil\n}\n```\n\n### 3. Workload-controlled path forwarded (Rust — version_executable)\n\n**File:** `version_executable.rs`\n\n```rust\n// Lines 29-34 — workload-controlled command_line[0] forwarded to fingerprint\nreturn Some(vec![\n    fpr_kind_executable,\n    out_dir.to_string(),\n    String::from(&process.command_line[0]),\n    String::from(&version_executable.runtime_kind_name),\n]);\n```\n\n## Attack Pattern\n\n**Attacker:** Any tenant able to schedule a pod (unprivileged, any namespace)\n**Victim:** The node running the insights-runtime-extractor DaemonSet\n**Trigger:** Automatic — the DaemonSet scans all container processes on the node\n\n**Attack sequence:**\n\n1. Attacker creates a pod whose process name matches a configured\n   versioned-executable pattern (`node`, `python`, `python3`, `MainThread`,\n   or contains `java`)\n2. The pod's main binary (at the path matching argv[0]) is a malicious\n   executable that calls `setuid(0)` to restore root\n3. When the insights operator triggers a scan, the DaemonSet forks, enters the\n   attacker's mount namespace, and executes the attacker's binary with ruid=0\n4. The attacker's code regains full root with `CAP_SYS_ADMIN` in the host user\n   namespace\n5. The inherited cwd contains the host CRI-O socket → full node compromise"}],"metrics":[{"other":{"content":{"namespace":"https://access.redhat.com/security/updates/classification/","value":"Important"},"type":"Red Hat severity rating"}},{"cvssV3_1":{"attackComplexity":"LOW","attackVector":"LOCAL","availabilityImpact":"HIGH","baseScore":8.8,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","confidentialityImpact":"HIGH","integrityImpact":"HIGH","privilegesRequired":"LOW","scope":"CHANGED","userInteraction":"NONE","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","version":"3.1"},"format":"CVSS"}],"problemTypes":[{"descriptions":[{"cweId":"CWE-250","description":"Execution with Unnecessary Privileges","lang":"en","type":"CWE"}]}],"providerMetadata":{"dateUpdated":"2026-10-14T10:55:17.144Z","orgId":"53f830b8-0a3f-465b-8143-3b8a9948e749","shortName":"redhat"},"references":[{"tags":["vdb-entry","x_refsource_REDHAT"],"url":"https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-104795"},{"name":"RHBZ#2543917","tags":["issue-tracking","x_refsource_REDHAT"],"url":"https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2543917"}],"timeline":[{"lang":"en","time":"2026-09-30T12:50:08.063Z","value":"Reported to Red Hat."},{"lang":"en","time":"2026-10-14T09:47:53.272Z","value":"Made public."}],"title":"Insights-runtime-extractor: insights-runtime-extractor: container escape via privileged binary execution","workarounds":[{"lang":"en","value":"The vulnerability requires a\ncode fix to implement a complete privilege drop (setting all three UID/GID\nfields, clearing all Linux capability sets, and setting `PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS`)\nbefore executing any fingerprint binary."}],"x_generator":{"engine":"cvelib 1.8.0"},"x_redhatCweChain":"CWE-250: Execution with Unnecessary Privileges"}},"cveMetadata":{"assignerOrgId":"53f830b8-0a3f-465b-8143-3b8a9948e749","assignerShortName":"redhat","cveId":"CVE-2026-104795","datePublished":"2026-10-14T10:55:17.144Z","dateReserved":"2026-10-02T13:07:13.820Z","dateUpdated":"2026-10-14T15:26:53.109Z","state":"PUBLISHED"},"dataType":"CVE_RECORD","dataVersion":"5.2"},"nvd":{"publishedDate":"2026-10-14 11:16:59","lastModifiedDate":"2026-10-14 16:17:31","problem_types":["CWE-250","CWE-250 Execution with Unnecessary Privileges"],"metrics":{"cvssMetricV31":[{"source":"secalert@redhat.com","type":"Secondary","cvssData":{"version":"3.1","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","baseScore":8.8,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","attackVector":"LOCAL","attackComplexity":"LOW","privilegesRequired":"LOW","userInteraction":"NONE","scope":"CHANGED","confidentialityImpact":"HIGH","integrityImpact":"HIGH","availabilityImpact":"HIGH"},"exploitabilityScore":2,"impactScore":6}],"ssvcV203":[{"source":"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0","ssvcData":{"timestamp":"2026-10-14T15:25:50.103511Z","id":"CVE-2026-104795","options":[{"exploitation":"none"},{"automatable":"no"},{"technicalImpact":"total"}],"role":"CISA Coordinator","version":"2.0.3"}}]},"configurations":[]},"legacy_mitre":{"record":{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"104795","Ordinal":"1","Title":"Insights-runtime-extractor: insights-runtime-extractor: containe","CVE":"CVE-2026-104795","Year":"2026"},"notes":[{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"104795","Ordinal":"1","NoteData":"The insights-runtime-extractor runs as a privileged DaemonSet (`hostPID: true`)\nthat scans container processes for runtime fingerprinting. When scanning a\ncontainer, the coordinator:\n\n1. **fork()s** a child process\n2. **setns()** into the target container's PID and mount namespaces\n3. **fchdir()** back to an orphaned FD pointing at the extractor's own root\n   filesystem (where `/crio.sock` is hostPath-mounted)\n4. Calls **only `seteuid(target_uid)`** — changing the effective UID but leaving\n   the **real UID and saved-set-UID at 0** and **retaining the permitted\n   capability set**\n5. The `check_no_privileged_perms()` guard inspects only the Effective capability\n   set (so it passes), and is **skipped entirely when the target runs as uid 0**\n6. The `VersionExecutable` fingerprint invokes `fpr_kind_executable` with\n   `process.command_line[0]` — the target's argv[0], read from\n   `/proc/<pid>/cmdline` and **fully controlled by the workload**\n7. `fpr_kind_executable` calls `exec.Command(executable, \"--version\").Output()`\n   — executing the **workload's own binary** inside the workload's mount\n   namespace while **ruid=0 in the host user namespace**\n\nThe executed process can call `setuid(0)` to restore full root with\n`CAP_SYS_ADMIN`, and inherits the orphaned cwd which resolves into the extractor\ncontainer's filesystem containing the host CRI-O socket.\n\n## Affected Code\n\n### 1. Insufficient privilege drop (Rust — extractor coordinator)\n\n**File:** `extractor/src/insights_runtime_extractor.rs`\n\n```rust\n// Lines 139-146 — seteuid-only drop, guard skipped for root containers\njoin_process_namespaces(process.pid)?;\nchange_dir(current_dir);\nswitch_user(*process.uid)?;\nif *process.uid != 0 {\n    perms::check_no_privileged_perms()\n        .expect(\"Must not have privileged permissions to run fingerprints\");\n}\nfingerprint::run_fingerprints(&config, out_dir, &process);\n```\n\n```rust\n// Lines 182-185 — only effective UID changed; ruid/suid stay 0\nfn switch_user(uid: u32) -> Result<(), ScannerError> {\n    debug!(\"... Becoming user: {uid}\");\n    seteuid(uid.into()).map_err(|e| ScannerError::Errno(e))\n}\n```\n\n### 2. Execution of untrusted binary (Go — fingerprint)\n\n**File:** `fingerprints/pkg/utils/file.go`\n\n```go\n// Lines 75-80 — executes a path taken verbatim from workload's argv[0]\nfunc GetExecutableVersionOutput(executable string) (string, error) {\n    out, err := exec.Command(executable, \"--version\").Output()\n    if err != nil {\n        return \"\", err\n    }\n    return string(out), nil\n}\n```\n\n### 3. Workload-controlled path forwarded (Rust — version_executable)\n\n**File:** `version_executable.rs`\n\n```rust\n// Lines 29-34 — workload-controlled command_line[0] forwarded to fingerprint\nreturn Some(vec![\n    fpr_kind_executable,\n    out_dir.to_string(),\n    String::from(&process.command_line[0]),\n    String::from(&version_executable.runtime_kind_name),\n]);\n```\n\n## Attack Pattern\n\n**Attacker:** Any tenant able to schedule a pod (unprivileged, any namespace)\n**Victim:** The node running the insights-runtime-extractor DaemonSet\n**Trigger:** Automatic — the DaemonSet scans all container processes on the node\n\n**Attack sequence:**\n\n1. Attacker creates a pod whose process name matches a configured\n   versioned-executable pattern (`node`, `python`, `python3`, `MainThread`,\n   or contains `java`)\n2. The pod's main binary (at the path matching argv[0]) is a malicious\n   executable that calls `setuid(0)` to restore root\n3. When the insights operator triggers a scan, the DaemonSet forks, enters the\n   attacker's mount namespace, and executes the attacker's binary with ruid=0\n4. The attacker's code regains full root with `CAP_SYS_ADMIN` in the host user\n   namespace\n5. The inherited cwd contains the host CRI-O socket → full node compromise","Type":"Description","Title":"Insights-runtime-extractor: insights-runtime-extractor: containe"}]}}}