The Tapo\nCloud MQTT broker contains a broken access control vulnerability in a proxy\ntopic used by authenticated Tapo devices to request service tokens. The broker\ndoes not verify that the device ID supplied in a proxy request belongs to the\nauthenticated device. An attacker who owns a Tapo device and knows another\ndevice's ID may obtain a device token scoped to the target device and use it to\nupload attacker-controlled content to the target user's Tapo Cloud storage. The\ncontent may then be presented in the Tapo app as a legitimate event.
\n\nSuccessful\nexploitation may allow an attacker to upload attacker-controlled content that\nis presented to a target user as a legitimate Tapo event, retrieve internal\nservice information through crafted proxy requests, or abuse Tapo Cloud\noutbound request capability in activity that could affect service\navailability.
"}],"value":"The Tapo\nCloud MQTT broker contains a broken access control vulnerability in a proxy\ntopic used by authenticated Tapo devices to request service tokens. The broker\ndoes not verify that the device ID supplied in a proxy request belongs to the\nauthenticated device. An attacker who owns a Tapo device and knows another\ndevice's ID may obtain a device token scoped to the target device and use it to\nupload attacker-controlled content to the target user's Tapo Cloud storage. The\ncontent may then be presented in the Tapo app as a legitimate event.\n\n\n\n\n\nSuccessful\nexploitation may allow an attacker to upload attacker-controlled content that\nis presented to a target user as a legitimate Tapo event, retrieve internal\nservice information through crafted proxy requests, or abuse Tapo Cloud\noutbound request capability in activity that could affect service\navailability."}],"impacts":[{"capecId":"CAPEC-1","descriptions":[{"lang":"en","value":"CAPEC-1 Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs"}]}],"metrics":[{"cvssV4_0":{"Automatable":"NOT_DEFINED","Recovery":"NOT_DEFINED","Safety":"NOT_DEFINED","attackComplexity":"LOW","attackRequirements":"PRESENT","attackVector":"NETWORK","baseScore":8.3,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","exploitMaturity":"NOT_DEFINED","privilegesRequired":"NONE","providerUrgency":"NOT_DEFINED","subAvailabilityImpact":"NONE","subConfidentialityImpact":"NONE","subIntegrityImpact":"NONE","userInteraction":"NONE","valueDensity":"NOT_DEFINED","vectorString":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","version":"4.0","vulnAvailabilityImpact":"HIGH","vulnConfidentialityImpact":"NONE","vulnIntegrityImpact":"HIGH","vulnerabilityResponseEffort":"NOT_DEFINED"},"format":"CVSS","scenarios":[{"lang":"en","value":"GENERAL"}]}],"problemTypes":[{"descriptions":[{"cweId":"CWE-862","description":"CWE-862 Missing Authorization","lang":"en","type":"CWE"}]}],"providerMetadata":{"dateUpdated":"2026-11-03T19:41:03.841Z","orgId":"f23511db-6c3e-4e32-a477-6aa17d310630","shortName":"TPLink"},"references":[{"tags":["vendor-advisory"],"url":"https://www.tp-link.com/us/support/faq/5370/"}],"source":{"discovery":"UNKNOWN"},"title":"Broken Access Control Leading to Cross-Device Token Issuance in Tapo Cloud MQTT Proxy","x_generator":{"engine":"Vulnogram 1.0.5"}}},"cveMetadata":{"assignerOrgId":"f23511db-6c3e-4e32-a477-6aa17d310630","assignerShortName":"TPLink","cveId":"CVE-2026-105821","datePublished":"2026-11-03T19:41:03.841Z","dateReserved":"2026-10-05T21:36:14.670Z","dateUpdated":"2026-11-06T19:51:09.933Z","state":"PUBLISHED"},"dataType":"CVE_RECORD","dataVersion":"5.2"},"nvd":{"publishedDate":"2026-11-03 20:18:05","lastModifiedDate":"2026-11-06 21:15:29","problem_types":["CWE-862","CWE-862 CWE-862 Missing Authorization"],"metrics":{"cvssMetricV40":[{"source":"f23511db-6c3e-4e32-a477-6aa17d310630","type":"Secondary","cvssData":{"version":"4.0","vectorString":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","baseScore":8.3,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","attackVector":"NETWORK","attackComplexity":"LOW","attackRequirements":"PRESENT","privilegesRequired":"NONE","userInteraction":"NONE","vulnConfidentialityImpact":"NONE","vulnIntegrityImpact":"HIGH","vulnAvailabilityImpact":"HIGH","subConfidentialityImpact":"NONE","subIntegrityImpact":"NONE","subAvailabilityImpact":"NONE","exploitMaturity":"NOT_DEFINED","confidentialityRequirement":"NOT_DEFINED","integrityRequirement":"NOT_DEFINED","availabilityRequirement":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedAttackVector":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedAttackComplexity":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedAttackRequirements":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedPrivilegesRequired":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedUserInteraction":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedSubIntegrityImpact":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact":"NOT_DEFINED","Safety":"NOT_DEFINED","Automatable":"NOT_DEFINED","Recovery":"NOT_DEFINED","valueDensity":"NOT_DEFINED","vulnerabilityResponseEffort":"NOT_DEFINED","providerUrgency":"NOT_DEFINED"}}],"ssvcV203":[{"source":"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0","ssvcData":{"timestamp":"2026-11-06T19:50:54.166983Z","id":"CVE-2026-105821","options":[{"exploitation":"none"},{"automatable":"no"},{"technicalImpact":"partial"}],"role":"CISA Coordinator","version":"2.0.3"}}]},"configurations":[]},"legacy_mitre":{"record":{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"105821","Ordinal":"1","Title":"Broken Access Control Leading to Cross-Device Token Issuance in ","CVE":"CVE-2026-105821","Year":"2026"},"notes":[{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"105821","Ordinal":"1","NoteData":"The Tapo\nCloud MQTT broker contains a broken access control vulnerability in a proxy\ntopic used by authenticated Tapo devices to request service tokens. The broker\ndoes not verify that the device ID supplied in a proxy request belongs to the\nauthenticated device. An attacker who owns a Tapo device and knows another\ndevice's ID may obtain a device token scoped to the target device and use it to\nupload attacker-controlled content to the target user's Tapo Cloud storage. The\ncontent may then be presented in the Tapo app as a legitimate event.\n\n\n\n\n\nSuccessful\nexploitation may allow an attacker to upload attacker-controlled content that\nis presented to a target user as a legitimate Tapo event, retrieve internal\nservice information through crafted proxy requests, or abuse Tapo Cloud\noutbound request capability in activity that could affect service\navailability.","Type":"Description","Title":"Broken Access Control Leading to Cross-Device Token Issuance in "}]}}}