{"api_version":"1","generated_at":"2026-06-20T17:14:56+00:00","cve":"CVE-2026-10639","urls":{"html":"https://cve.report/CVE-2026-10639","api":"https://cve.report/api/cve/CVE-2026-10639.json","docs":"https://cve.report/api","cve_org":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-10639","nvd":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-10639"},"summary":{"title":"Use-after-free reading `net_pkt_iface()` of a sent ICMPv4 echo-reply packet in `icmpv4_handle_echo_request()`","description":"In Zephyr's native IPv4 stack, icmpv4_handle_echo_request() in subsys/net/ip/icmpv4.c builds an echo-reply packet (reply), hands it to net_try_send_data(), and then, on success, calls net_stats_update_icmp_sent(net_pkt_iface(reply)). net_try_send_data() transfers ownership of reply to the TX path (net_if_try_queue_tx - net_if_tx - L2/driver send, or the asynchronous net_if_tx_thread), which can unref it to refcount 0 and return the struct net_pkt to its slab (net_pkt_unref - k_mem_slab_free) before the stats line runs. net_core.c documents this exact contract ('the pkt might contain garbage already ... do not use pkt after that call').\n\nThe post-send net_pkt_iface(reply) therefore reads reply-iface out of a freed (and possibly already reallocated) net_pkt, a use-after-free read; with CONFIG_NET_STATISTICS_PER_INTERFACE the stats macro additionally increments a counter through that value, i.e. a dereference/write through a stale or recycled-slot pointer.\n\nThe path is reached unauthenticated by any remote host that pings the device (net_icmpv4_input - net_icmp_call_ipv4_handlers - icmpv4_handle_echo_request) and is gated on CONFIG_NET_STATISTICS_ICMP. Impact is a probabilistic read of recycled packet memory plus a possible wild-pointer write under a timing race, leading most likely to corrupted interface statistics or a remotely triggerable crash (DoS).\n\nThe defect was introduced in 2019 (v1.14) and is present through v4.4.0. The companion change in net_icmpv4_send_error() is not a use-after-free because it reads net_pkt_iface(orig), the caller-owned received packet, which stays alive across the send. The fix caches the interface pointer from the live received packet before sending and uses it for the post-send stats updates.","state":"PUBLISHED","assigner":"zephyr","published_at":"2026-06-16 15:16:34","updated_at":"2026-06-16 15:23:42"},"problem_types":["CWE-416","CWE-416 use-after-free"],"metrics":[{"version":"3.1","source":"vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org","type":"Secondary","score":"4.8","severity":"MEDIUM","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L","data":{"version":"3.1","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L","baseScore":4.8,"baseSeverity":"MEDIUM","attackVector":"NETWORK","attackComplexity":"HIGH","privilegesRequired":"NONE","userInteraction":"NONE","scope":"UNCHANGED","confidentialityImpact":"NONE","integrityImpact":"LOW","availabilityImpact":"LOW"}},{"version":"3.1","source":"CNA","type":"CVSS","score":"4.8","severity":"MEDIUM","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L","data":{"baseScore":4.8,"baseSeverity":"MEDIUM","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L","version":"3.1"}}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/86e21665d4641f304dc3895bfb03b8f89db83291","name":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/86e21665d4641f304dc3895bfb03b8f89db83291","refsource":"vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-qhrf-w466-qmpw","name":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-qhrf-w466-qmpw","refsource":"vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-10639","name":"CVE Program record","refsource":"CVE.ORG","tags":["canonical"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-10639","name":"NVD vulnerability detail","refsource":"NVD","tags":["canonical","analysis"]}],"affected":[{"source":"CNA","vendor":"zephyrproject","product":"zephyr","version":"affected 1.14.0 4.5.0 semver","platforms":[]}],"timeline":[],"solutions":[],"workarounds":[],"exploits":[],"credits":[],"nvd_cpes":[],"vendor_comments":[],"enrichments":{"kev":null,"epss":{"cve_year":"2026","cve_id":"10639","cve":"CVE-2026-10639","epss":"0.001930000","percentile":"0.090750000","score_date":"2026-06-19","updated_at":"2026-06-20 00:07:21"},"legacy_qids":[]},"source_records":{"cve_program":{"containers":{"cna":{"affected":[{"collectionURL":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr","defaultStatus":"unaffected","packageName":"zephyr","product":"zephyr","vendor":"zephyrproject","versions":[{"lessThan":"4.5.0","status":"affected","version":"1.14.0","versionType":"semver"}]}],"descriptions":[{"lang":"en","value":"In Zephyr's native IPv4 stack, icmpv4_handle_echo_request() in subsys/net/ip/icmpv4.c builds an echo-reply packet (reply), hands it to net_try_send_data(), and then, on success, calls net_stats_update_icmp_sent(net_pkt_iface(reply)). net_try_send_data() transfers ownership of reply to the TX path (net_if_try_queue_tx - net_if_tx - L2/driver send, or the asynchronous net_if_tx_thread), which can unref it to refcount 0 and return the struct net_pkt to its slab (net_pkt_unref - k_mem_slab_free) before the stats line runs. net_core.c documents this exact contract ('the pkt might contain garbage already ... do not use pkt after that call').\n\nThe post-send net_pkt_iface(reply) therefore reads reply-iface out of a freed (and possibly already reallocated) net_pkt, a use-after-free read; with CONFIG_NET_STATISTICS_PER_INTERFACE the stats macro additionally increments a counter through that value, i.e. a dereference/write through a stale or recycled-slot pointer.\n\nThe path is reached unauthenticated by any remote host that pings the device (net_icmpv4_input - net_icmp_call_ipv4_handlers - icmpv4_handle_echo_request) and is gated on CONFIG_NET_STATISTICS_ICMP. Impact is a probabilistic read of recycled packet memory plus a possible wild-pointer write under a timing race, leading most likely to corrupted interface statistics or a remotely triggerable crash (DoS).\n\nThe defect was introduced in 2019 (v1.14) and is present through v4.4.0. The companion change in net_icmpv4_send_error() is not a use-after-free because it reads net_pkt_iface(orig), the caller-owned received packet, which stays alive across the send. The fix caches the interface pointer from the live received packet before sending and uses it for the post-send stats updates."}],"metrics":[{"cvssV3_1":{"baseScore":4.8,"baseSeverity":"MEDIUM","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L","version":"3.1"},"format":"CVSS"}],"problemTypes":[{"descriptions":[{"cweId":"CWE-416","description":"use-after-free","lang":"en","type":"CWE"}]}],"providerMetadata":{"dateUpdated":"2026-06-16T13:27:44.366Z","orgId":"e2e69745-5e70-4e92-8431-deb5529a81ad","shortName":"zephyr"},"references":[{"name":"Fix commit","tags":["patch"],"url":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/86e21665d4641f304dc3895bfb03b8f89db83291"},{"name":"GHSA-qhrf-w466-qmpw","url":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-qhrf-w466-qmpw"}],"title":"Use-after-free reading `net_pkt_iface()` of a sent ICMPv4 echo-reply packet in `icmpv4_handle_echo_request()`","x_generator":{"engine":"cvelib 1.8.0"}}},"cveMetadata":{"assignerOrgId":"e2e69745-5e70-4e92-8431-deb5529a81ad","assignerShortName":"zephyr","cveId":"CVE-2026-10639","datePublished":"2026-06-16T13:22:23.165Z","dateReserved":"2026-06-02T15:11:39.435Z","dateUpdated":"2026-06-16T13:27:44.366Z","state":"PUBLISHED"},"dataType":"CVE_RECORD","dataVersion":"5.2"},"nvd":{"publishedDate":"2026-06-16 15:16:34","lastModifiedDate":"2026-06-16 15:23:42","problem_types":["CWE-416","CWE-416 use-after-free"],"metrics":{"cvssMetricV31":[{"source":"vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org","type":"Secondary","cvssData":{"version":"3.1","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L","baseScore":4.8,"baseSeverity":"MEDIUM","attackVector":"NETWORK","attackComplexity":"HIGH","privilegesRequired":"NONE","userInteraction":"NONE","scope":"UNCHANGED","confidentialityImpact":"NONE","integrityImpact":"LOW","availabilityImpact":"LOW"},"exploitabilityScore":2.2,"impactScore":2.5}]},"configurations":[]},"legacy_mitre":{"record":{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"10639","Ordinal":"1","Title":"Use-after-free reading `net_pkt_iface()` of a sent ICMPv4 echo-r","CVE":"CVE-2026-10639","Year":"2026"},"notes":[{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"10639","Ordinal":"1","NoteData":"In Zephyr's native IPv4 stack, icmpv4_handle_echo_request() in subsys/net/ip/icmpv4.c builds an echo-reply packet (reply), hands it to net_try_send_data(), and then, on success, calls net_stats_update_icmp_sent(net_pkt_iface(reply)). net_try_send_data() transfers ownership of reply to the TX path (net_if_try_queue_tx - net_if_tx - L2/driver send, or the asynchronous net_if_tx_thread), which can unref it to refcount 0 and return the struct net_pkt to its slab (net_pkt_unref - k_mem_slab_free) before the stats line runs. net_core.c documents this exact contract ('the pkt might contain garbage already ... do not use pkt after that call').\n\nThe post-send net_pkt_iface(reply) therefore reads reply-iface out of a freed (and possibly already reallocated) net_pkt, a use-after-free read; with CONFIG_NET_STATISTICS_PER_INTERFACE the stats macro additionally increments a counter through that value, i.e. a dereference/write through a stale or recycled-slot pointer.\n\nThe path is reached unauthenticated by any remote host that pings the device (net_icmpv4_input - net_icmp_call_ipv4_handlers - icmpv4_handle_echo_request) and is gated on CONFIG_NET_STATISTICS_ICMP. Impact is a probabilistic read of recycled packet memory plus a possible wild-pointer write under a timing race, leading most likely to corrupted interface statistics or a remotely triggerable crash (DoS).\n\nThe defect was introduced in 2019 (v1.14) and is present through v4.4.0. The companion change in net_icmpv4_send_error() is not a use-after-free because it reads net_pkt_iface(orig), the caller-owned received packet, which stays alive across the send. The fix caches the interface pointer from the live received packet before sending and uses it for the post-send stats updates.","Type":"Description","Title":"Use-after-free reading `net_pkt_iface()` of a sent ICMPv4 echo-r"}]}}}