{"api_version":"1","generated_at":"2026-07-15T03:16:37+00:00","cve":"CVE-2026-10663","urls":{"html":"https://cve.report/CVE-2026-10663","api":"https://cve.report/api/cve/CVE-2026-10663.json","docs":"https://cve.report/api","cve_org":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-10663","nvd":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-10663"},"summary":{"title":"Use-after-free / double-free of the root USB device in the experimental USB host stack","description":"In Zephyr's experimental USB host stack (CONFIG_USB_HOST_STACK), usbh_device_disconnect() (subsys/usb/host/usbh_device.c) freed the root usb_device slab object without clearing the cached pointer ctx->root. The bus removal handler dev_removed_handler() (subsys/usb/host/usbh_core.c) decides what to tear down solely from ctx->root, checking only that it is non-NULL.\n\nBecause UHC controller drivers (e.g. uhc_max3421e, uhc_mcux_common) synthesize UHC_EVT_DEV_REMOVED directly from physical bus line state with no debounce or state guard, an attacker with physical USB access (or a rogue device that bounces its connection) can deliver a second device-removed event after a root device disconnect. The handler then re-enters usbh_device_disconnect() with the dangling pointer, locking a mutex inside the freed object (use-after-free), removing the freed node from the device list, and calling k_mem_slab_free() on the already-freed block (double-free). If the slab block has been reissued to a newly attached device in between, this corrupts a live object.\n\nImpact is denial of service (crash) and memory corruption; the attack vector is physical/local. The flaw was introduced in v4.4.0 by the connect/disconnect refactor and is fixed by clearing ctx->root in usbh_device_disconnect() before freeing.","state":"PUBLISHED","assigner":"zephyr","published_at":"2026-07-12 17:16:23","updated_at":"2026-07-14 19:16:49"},"problem_types":["CWE-416","CWE-416 use-after-free"],"metrics":[{"version":"3.1","source":"vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org","type":"Secondary","score":"6.1","severity":"MEDIUM","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H","data":{"version":"3.1","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H","baseScore":6.1,"baseSeverity":"MEDIUM","attackVector":"PHYSICAL","attackComplexity":"LOW","privilegesRequired":"NONE","userInteraction":"NONE","scope":"UNCHANGED","confidentialityImpact":"NONE","integrityImpact":"HIGH","availabilityImpact":"HIGH"}},{"version":"3.1","source":"CNA","type":"CVSS","score":"6.1","severity":"MEDIUM","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H","data":{"baseScore":6.1,"baseSeverity":"MEDIUM","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H","version":"3.1"}}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-26q8-xjq3-f5p6","name":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-26q8-xjq3-f5p6","refsource":"vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/4b87a8f161a44cb19505fa97db7cf72f64d49165","name":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/4b87a8f161a44cb19505fa97db7cf72f64d49165","refsource":"vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-10663","name":"CVE Program record","refsource":"CVE.ORG","tags":["canonical"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-10663","name":"NVD vulnerability detail","refsource":"NVD","tags":["canonical","analysis"]}],"affected":[{"source":"CNA","vendor":"zephyrproject","product":"zephyr","version":"affected 4.4.0 4.5.0 semver","platforms":[]}],"timeline":[],"solutions":[],"workarounds":[],"exploits":[],"credits":[],"nvd_cpes":[],"vendor_comments":[],"enrichments":{"kev":null,"epss":{"cve_year":"2026","cve_id":"10663","cve":"CVE-2026-10663","epss":"0.001590000","percentile":"0.054050000","score_date":"2026-07-14","updated_at":"2026-07-15 00:14:55"},"legacy_qids":[]},"source_records":{"cve_program":{"containers":{"adp":[{"metrics":[{"other":{"content":{"id":"CVE-2026-10663","options":[{"Exploitation":"none"},{"Automatable":"no"},{"Technical Impact":"partial"}],"role":"CISA Coordinator","timestamp":"2026-07-13T15:46:57.175579Z","version":"2.0.3"},"type":"ssvc"}}],"providerMetadata":{"dateUpdated":"2026-07-13T15:47:06.125Z","orgId":"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0","shortName":"CISA-ADP"},"title":"CISA ADP Vulnrichment"}],"cna":{"affected":[{"collectionURL":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr","defaultStatus":"unaffected","packageName":"zephyr","product":"zephyr","programFiles":["subsys/usb/host/usbh_core.c","subsys/usb/host/usbh_device.c"],"vendor":"zephyrproject","versions":[{"lessThan":"4.5.0","status":"affected","version":"4.4.0","versionType":"semver"}]}],"descriptions":[{"lang":"en","value":"In Zephyr's experimental USB host stack (CONFIG_USB_HOST_STACK), usbh_device_disconnect() (subsys/usb/host/usbh_device.c) freed the root usb_device slab object without clearing the cached pointer ctx->root. The bus removal handler dev_removed_handler() (subsys/usb/host/usbh_core.c) decides what to tear down solely from ctx->root, checking only that it is non-NULL.\n\nBecause UHC controller drivers (e.g. uhc_max3421e, uhc_mcux_common) synthesize UHC_EVT_DEV_REMOVED directly from physical bus line state with no debounce or state guard, an attacker with physical USB access (or a rogue device that bounces its connection) can deliver a second device-removed event after a root device disconnect. The handler then re-enters usbh_device_disconnect() with the dangling pointer, locking a mutex inside the freed object (use-after-free), removing the freed node from the device list, and calling k_mem_slab_free() on the already-freed block (double-free). If the slab block has been reissued to a newly attached device in between, this corrupts a live object.\n\nImpact is denial of service (crash) and memory corruption; the attack vector is physical/local. The flaw was introduced in v4.4.0 by the connect/disconnect refactor and is fixed by clearing ctx->root in usbh_device_disconnect() before freeing."}],"metrics":[{"cvssV3_1":{"baseScore":6.1,"baseSeverity":"MEDIUM","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H","version":"3.1"},"format":"CVSS"}],"problemTypes":[{"descriptions":[{"cweId":"CWE-416","description":"use-after-free","lang":"en","type":"CWE"}]}],"providerMetadata":{"dateUpdated":"2026-07-14T18:38:44.214Z","orgId":"e2e69745-5e70-4e92-8431-deb5529a81ad","shortName":"zephyr"},"references":[{"name":"Fix commit","tags":["patch"],"url":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/4b87a8f161a44cb19505fa97db7cf72f64d49165"},{"name":"GHSA-26q8-xjq3-f5p6","url":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-26q8-xjq3-f5p6"}],"title":"Use-after-free / double-free of the root USB device in the experimental USB host stack","x_generator":{"engine":"cvelib 1.8.0"}}},"cveMetadata":{"assignerOrgId":"e2e69745-5e70-4e92-8431-deb5529a81ad","assignerShortName":"zephyr","cveId":"CVE-2026-10663","datePublished":"2026-07-12T16:16:48.576Z","dateReserved":"2026-06-02T15:25:23.699Z","dateUpdated":"2026-07-14T18:38:44.214Z","state":"PUBLISHED"},"dataType":"CVE_RECORD","dataVersion":"5.2"},"nvd":{"publishedDate":"2026-07-12 17:16:23","lastModifiedDate":"2026-07-14 19:16:49","problem_types":["CWE-416","CWE-416 use-after-free"],"metrics":{"cvssMetricV31":[{"source":"vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org","type":"Secondary","cvssData":{"version":"3.1","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H","baseScore":6.1,"baseSeverity":"MEDIUM","attackVector":"PHYSICAL","attackComplexity":"LOW","privilegesRequired":"NONE","userInteraction":"NONE","scope":"UNCHANGED","confidentialityImpact":"NONE","integrityImpact":"HIGH","availabilityImpact":"HIGH"},"exploitabilityScore":0.9,"impactScore":5.2}],"ssvcV203":[{"source":"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0","ssvcData":{"timestamp":"2026-07-13T15:46:57.175579Z","id":"CVE-2026-10663","options":[{"exploitation":"none"},{"automatable":"no"},{"technicalImpact":"partial"}],"role":"CISA Coordinator","version":"2.0.3"}}]},"configurations":[]},"legacy_mitre":{"record":{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"10663","Ordinal":"1","Title":"Use-after-free / double-free of the root USB device in the exper","CVE":"CVE-2026-10663","Year":"2026"},"notes":[{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"10663","Ordinal":"1","NoteData":"In Zephyr's experimental USB host stack (CONFIG_USB_HOST_STACK), usbh_device_disconnect() (subsys/usb/host/usbh_device.c) freed the root usb_device slab object without clearing the cached pointer ctx->root. The bus removal handler dev_removed_handler() (subsys/usb/host/usbh_core.c) decides what to tear down solely from ctx->root, checking only that it is non-NULL.\n\nBecause UHC controller drivers (e.g. uhc_max3421e, uhc_mcux_common) synthesize UHC_EVT_DEV_REMOVED directly from physical bus line state with no debounce or state guard, an attacker with physical USB access (or a rogue device that bounces its connection) can deliver a second device-removed event after a root device disconnect. The handler then re-enters usbh_device_disconnect() with the dangling pointer, locking a mutex inside the freed object (use-after-free), removing the freed node from the device list, and calling k_mem_slab_free() on the already-freed block (double-free). If the slab block has been reissued to a newly attached device in between, this corrupts a live object.\n\nImpact is denial of service (crash) and memory corruption; the attack vector is physical/local. The flaw was introduced in v4.4.0 by the connect/disconnect refactor and is fixed by clearing ctx->root in usbh_device_disconnect() before freeing.","Type":"Description","Title":"Use-after-free / double-free of the root USB device in the exper"}]}}}