{"api_version":"1","generated_at":"2026-10-22T19:07:46+00:00","cve":"CVE-2026-114611","urls":{"html":"https://cve.report/CVE-2026-114611","api":"https://cve.report/api/cve/CVE-2026-114611.json","docs":"https://cve.report/api","cve_org":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-114611","nvd":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-114611"},"summary":{"title":"OCO-Server: MDM /profile endpoint accepts self-signed PKCS#7 signatures (PKCS7_NOVERIFY): device MDM identity (certificate + private key) disclosure and device-record hijack","description":"OCO-Server is a self-hosted endpoint management application for computer inventory, software deployment, and mobile device management. Prior to 1.2.3,the Apple MDM enrollment endpoint `frontend/api-mdm.php` verifies the signed enrollment-request plist with `openssl_pkcs7_verify(..., PKCS7_NOVERIFY, ...)`. `PKCS7_NOVERIFY` disables signer certificate chain and trust validation, so the signature only has to be self-consistent with whatever certificate is embedded in the PKCS#7 blob. A self-signed certificate from an unrelated attacker is accepted. Because the endpoint trusts the `SERIAL` field taken from the unverified payload, anyone who knows a registered device's serial number can sign a forged plist (`SERIAL` = victim device, attacker-chosen `UDID`) with an arbitrary self-signed certificate; POST it unauthenticated to `/api-mdm.php/profile` (Content-Type: `application/pkcs7-signature`); and receive the victim device's freshly minted MDM identity: a certificate with `CN=<serial>` issued by the server's internal MDM device CA, bundled with its private key in a PKCS#12 payload inside the returned `.mobileconfig` enrollment profile. Additionally, the victim's `mobile_device` database row is silently overwritten with the attacker-supplied `UDID` (device-record hijack). With the stolen certificate and key, the attacker can impersonate the victim device on all subsequent MDM traffic (`/checkin`, `/mdm`, `/parameters`), which authenticate callers by the certificate CN (the serial number) via `checkSignature()` in the same file. This yields control over the victim device's MDM relationship: reading its management data, replacing its push token, and disrupting or redirecting its enrollment. Version 1.2.3 fixes the issue.","state":"PUBLISHED","assigner":"GitHub_M","published_at":"2026-10-22 18:17:28","updated_at":"2026-10-22 18:17:28"},"problem_types":["CWE-295","CWE-295 CWE-295: Improper Certificate Validation"],"metrics":[{"version":"3.1","source":"security-advisories@github.com","type":"Secondary","score":"9.1","severity":"CRITICAL","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N","data":{"version":"3.1","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N","baseScore":9.1,"baseSeverity":"CRITICAL","attackVector":"NETWORK","attackComplexity":"LOW","privilegesRequired":"NONE","userInteraction":"NONE","scope":"UNCHANGED","confidentialityImpact":"HIGH","integrityImpact":"HIGH","availabilityImpact":"NONE"}},{"version":"3.1","source":"CNA","type":"DECLARED","score":"9.1","severity":"CRITICAL","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N","data":{"attackComplexity":"LOW","attackVector":"NETWORK","availabilityImpact":"NONE","baseScore":9.1,"baseSeverity":"CRITICAL","confidentialityImpact":"HIGH","integrityImpact":"HIGH","privilegesRequired":"NONE","scope":"UNCHANGED","userInteraction":"NONE","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N","version":"3.1"}}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/schorschii/OCO-Server/security/advisories/GHSA-p549-5h7r-7639","name":"https://github.com/schorschii/OCO-Server/security/advisories/GHSA-p549-5h7r-7639","refsource":"security-advisories@github.com","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://github.com/schorschii/OCO-Server/commit/5cab5ad2461434816d706b7be9cc08bda15c1404","name":"https://github.com/schorschii/OCO-Server/commit/5cab5ad2461434816d706b7be9cc08bda15c1404","refsource":"security-advisories@github.com","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://github.com/schorschii/OCO-Server/commit/f3a6591136f9bd92aff39ddfb26587e6dfdb64df","name":"https://github.com/schorschii/OCO-Server/commit/f3a6591136f9bd92aff39ddfb26587e6dfdb64df","refsource":"security-advisories@github.com","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-114611","name":"CVE Program record","refsource":"CVE.ORG","tags":["canonical"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-114611","name":"NVD vulnerability detail","refsource":"NVD","tags":["canonical","analysis"]}],"affected":[{"source":"CNA","vendor":"schorschii","product":"OCO-Server","version":"affected < 1.2.3","platforms":[]}],"timeline":[],"solutions":[],"workarounds":[],"exploits":[],"credits":[],"nvd_cpes":[],"vendor_comments":[],"enrichments":{"kev":null,"epss":null,"legacy_qids":[]},"source_records":{"cve_program":{"containers":{"cna":{"affected":[{"product":"OCO-Server","vendor":"schorschii","versions":[{"status":"affected","version":"< 1.2.3"}]}],"descriptions":[{"lang":"en","value":"OCO-Server is a self-hosted endpoint management application for computer inventory, software deployment, and mobile device management. Prior to 1.2.3,the Apple MDM enrollment endpoint `frontend/api-mdm.php` verifies the signed enrollment-request plist with `openssl_pkcs7_verify(..., PKCS7_NOVERIFY, ...)`. `PKCS7_NOVERIFY` disables signer certificate chain and trust validation, so the signature only has to be self-consistent with whatever certificate is embedded in the PKCS#7 blob. A self-signed certificate from an unrelated attacker is accepted. Because the endpoint trusts the `SERIAL` field taken from the unverified payload, anyone who knows a registered device's serial number can sign a forged plist (`SERIAL` = victim device, attacker-chosen `UDID`) with an arbitrary self-signed certificate; POST it unauthenticated to `/api-mdm.php/profile` (Content-Type: `application/pkcs7-signature`); and receive the victim device's freshly minted MDM identity: a certificate with `CN=<serial>` issued by the server's internal MDM device CA, bundled with its private key in a PKCS#12 payload inside the returned `.mobileconfig` enrollment profile. Additionally, the victim's `mobile_device` database row is silently overwritten with the attacker-supplied `UDID` (device-record hijack). With the stolen certificate and key, the attacker can impersonate the victim device on all subsequent MDM traffic (`/checkin`, `/mdm`, `/parameters`), which authenticate callers by the certificate CN (the serial number) via `checkSignature()` in the same file. This yields control over the victim device's MDM relationship: reading its management data, replacing its push token, and disrupting or redirecting its enrollment. Version 1.2.3 fixes the issue."}],"metrics":[{"cvssV3_1":{"attackComplexity":"LOW","attackVector":"NETWORK","availabilityImpact":"NONE","baseScore":9.1,"baseSeverity":"CRITICAL","confidentialityImpact":"HIGH","integrityImpact":"HIGH","privilegesRequired":"NONE","scope":"UNCHANGED","userInteraction":"NONE","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N","version":"3.1"}}],"problemTypes":[{"descriptions":[{"cweId":"CWE-295","description":"CWE-295: Improper Certificate Validation","lang":"en","type":"CWE"}]}],"providerMetadata":{"dateUpdated":"2026-10-22T17:33:13.611Z","orgId":"a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa","shortName":"GitHub_M"},"references":[{"name":"https://github.com/schorschii/OCO-Server/security/advisories/GHSA-p549-5h7r-7639","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM"],"url":"https://github.com/schorschii/OCO-Server/security/advisories/GHSA-p549-5h7r-7639"},{"name":"https://github.com/schorschii/OCO-Server/commit/5cab5ad2461434816d706b7be9cc08bda15c1404","tags":["x_refsource_MISC"],"url":"https://github.com/schorschii/OCO-Server/commit/5cab5ad2461434816d706b7be9cc08bda15c1404"},{"name":"https://github.com/schorschii/OCO-Server/commit/f3a6591136f9bd92aff39ddfb26587e6dfdb64df","tags":["x_refsource_MISC"],"url":"https://github.com/schorschii/OCO-Server/commit/f3a6591136f9bd92aff39ddfb26587e6dfdb64df"}],"source":{"advisory":"GHSA-p549-5h7r-7639","discovery":"UNKNOWN"},"title":"OCO-Server: MDM /profile endpoint accepts self-signed PKCS#7 signatures (PKCS7_NOVERIFY): device MDM identity (certificate + private key) disclosure and device-record hijack"}},"cveMetadata":{"assignerOrgId":"a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa","assignerShortName":"GitHub_M","cveId":"CVE-2026-114611","datePublished":"2026-10-22T17:33:13.611Z","dateReserved":"2026-10-21T20:34:25.599Z","dateUpdated":"2026-10-22T17:33:13.611Z","state":"PUBLISHED"},"dataType":"CVE_RECORD","dataVersion":"5.2"},"nvd":{"publishedDate":"2026-10-22 18:17:28","lastModifiedDate":"2026-10-22 18:17:28","problem_types":["CWE-295","CWE-295 CWE-295: Improper Certificate Validation"],"metrics":{"cvssMetricV31":[{"source":"security-advisories@github.com","type":"Secondary","cvssData":{"version":"3.1","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N","baseScore":9.1,"baseSeverity":"CRITICAL","attackVector":"NETWORK","attackComplexity":"LOW","privilegesRequired":"NONE","userInteraction":"NONE","scope":"UNCHANGED","confidentialityImpact":"HIGH","integrityImpact":"HIGH","availabilityImpact":"NONE"},"exploitabilityScore":3.9,"impactScore":5.2}]},"configurations":[]},"legacy_mitre":{"record":{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"114611","Ordinal":"1","Title":"OCO-Server: MDM /profile endpoint accepts self-signed PKCS#7 sig","CVE":"CVE-2026-114611","Year":"2026"},"notes":[{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"114611","Ordinal":"1","NoteData":"OCO-Server is a self-hosted endpoint management application for computer inventory, software deployment, and mobile device management. Prior to 1.2.3,the Apple MDM enrollment endpoint `frontend/api-mdm.php` verifies the signed enrollment-request plist with `openssl_pkcs7_verify(..., PKCS7_NOVERIFY, ...)`. `PKCS7_NOVERIFY` disables signer certificate chain and trust validation, so the signature only has to be self-consistent with whatever certificate is embedded in the PKCS#7 blob. A self-signed certificate from an unrelated attacker is accepted. Because the endpoint trusts the `SERIAL` field taken from the unverified payload, anyone who knows a registered device's serial number can sign a forged plist (`SERIAL` = victim device, attacker-chosen `UDID`) with an arbitrary self-signed certificate; POST it unauthenticated to `/api-mdm.php/profile` (Content-Type: `application/pkcs7-signature`); and receive the victim device's freshly minted MDM identity: a certificate with `CN=<serial>` issued by the server's internal MDM device CA, bundled with its private key in a PKCS#12 payload inside the returned `.mobileconfig` enrollment profile. Additionally, the victim's `mobile_device` database row is silently overwritten with the attacker-supplied `UDID` (device-record hijack). With the stolen certificate and key, the attacker can impersonate the victim device on all subsequent MDM traffic (`/checkin`, `/mdm`, `/parameters`), which authenticate callers by the certificate CN (the serial number) via `checkSignature()` in the same file. This yields control over the victim device's MDM relationship: reading its management data, replacing its push token, and disrupting or redirecting its enrollment. Version 1.2.3 fixes the issue.","Type":"Description","Title":"OCO-Server: MDM /profile endpoint accepts self-signed PKCS#7 sig"}]}}}