{"api_version":"1","generated_at":"2026-11-11T16:05:31+00:00","cve":"CVE-2026-116794","urls":{"html":"https://cve.report/CVE-2026-116794","api":"https://cve.report/api/cve/CVE-2026-116794.json","docs":"https://cve.report/api","cve_org":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-116794","nvd":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-116794"},"summary":{"title":"russh: Agent server never calls `Agent::confirm`, so keys added with the confirm constraint (`ssh-add -c`) sign without confirmation","description":"russh is a Rust SSH client and server library that includes an SSH agent protocol implementation. From 0.50.0-beta.12 until 0.65.0, the agent server's Connection::try_sign path in russh/src/keys/agent/server.rs recognizes SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM but returns a hard-coded successful result instead of calling Agent::confirm. 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