{"api_version":"1","generated_at":"2026-06-21T03:30:35+00:00","cve":"CVE-2026-12044","urls":{"html":"https://cve.report/CVE-2026-12044","api":"https://cve.report/api/cve/CVE-2026-12044.json","docs":"https://cve.report/api","cve_org":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-12044","nvd":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-12044"},"summary":{"title":"pgAdmin 4: SQL injection in COMMENT ON ... IS '' rendering across dialog templates","description":"SQL injection in pgAdmin 4 across every dialog template that renders ``COMMENT ON ... IS ''`` for a user-supplied description field. The Jinja templates for Domains (and their constraints), Foreign Tables, Languages, and Event Triggers, plus the Views OID-lookup query, interpolated the description directly inside a single-quoted SQL literal -- ``'{{ data.description }}'`` -- instead of passing it through the ``qtLiteral`` escape filter. An authenticated pgAdmin user with permission to create or alter the affected object types could submit a description containing an apostrophe, break out of the literal and chain arbitrary SQL. The injected SQL runs under the PostgreSQL role the user is already authenticated as; for a connected role with ``COPY ... TO/FROM PROGRAM`` (typically PostgreSQL superuser), this chains to OS command execution on the PostgreSQL host. The defect does not cross a privilege boundary -- the user already has direct SQL access to that role through pgAdmin's Query Tool -- so the attacker gains no capability beyond what their database role already grants. The marginal impact captures bypass of any application-layer Query Tool gating an operator may have configured.\n\nThe defect was originally reported against the Domain Dialog ``description`` field; a code-wide audit identified sixteen sites of the same pattern across the templates listed above. The same review also surfaced ten related sinks in the pgstattuple/pgstatindex stats templates -- ``pgstattuple('{{schema}}.{{table}}')`` and the matching pgstatindex shape -- where ``qtIdent`` escapes embedded double quotes inside the identifier but not apostrophes, so a user with CREATE privilege on a schema could plant a table or index named ``foo'bar`` and a later stats viewer would render an unbalanced literal.\n\nFix is layered:\n\n 1. Sites: replace every ``'{{ x.description }}'`` with ``{{ x.description|qtLiteral(conn) }}`` (no surrounding quotes -- the filter wraps the value in escaped quotes itself). Plumb ``conn=self.conn`` through every ``render_template`` call that loads one of these templates. Also corrects a ``{ % elif`` Jinja typo in the foreign-table schema diff (dead branch). Rewrite the ten pgstattuple/pgstatindex stats sites to address the relation via OID + ``::oid::regclass`` cast (e.g. ``pgstattuple({{ tid }}::oid::regclass)``), eliminating the embedded literal-call form entirely so that bug-class can no longer recur there.\n\n 2. Driver hardening: ``qtLiteral`` (in ``utils/driver/psycopg3/__init__.py``) used to silently return the raw unescaped value when its ``conn`` argument was falsy. It now raises ``ValueError`` -- surfacing the entire bug class going forward. The change immediately uncovered eight latent plumbing bugs (in ``schemas/__init__.py``, ``schemas/functions/__init__.py``, ``schemas/tables/utils.py``, ``foreign_servers/__init__.py``, and seven sites in ``roles/__init__.py``) -- all fixed as part of this patch. The inner ``except`` block that swallowed adapter-level failures and returned the raw value is also removed, so unadaptable inputs raise instead of leaking unescaped values.\n\n 3. Regression tests: a per-template behavioural test renders each previously-vulnerable template with an apostrophe-injection payload and asserts the escaped fragment is present and the vulnerable fragment absent; a lint test walks every ``*.sql`` template flagging any ``'{{ ... }}'`` single-quote-wrapped interpolation against an explicit allowlist; unit tests cover the new qtLiteral fail-fast and inner-except raise paths.\n\nThis issue affects pgAdmin 4: from 1.0 before 9.16.","state":"PUBLISHED","assigner":"PostgreSQL","published_at":"2026-06-19 00:16:46","updated_at":"2026-06-19 00:16:46"},"problem_types":["CWE-89","CWE-116","CWE-89 CWE-89 Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')","CWE-116 CWE-116 Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output"],"metrics":[{"version":"4.0","source":"f86ef6dc-4d3a-42ad-8f28-e6d5547a5007","type":"Secondary","score":"8.7","severity":"HIGH","vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","data":{"version":"4.0","vectorString":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","baseScore":8.7,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","attackVector":"NETWORK","attackComplexity":"LOW","attackRequirements":"NONE","privilegesRequired":"LOW","userInteraction":"NONE","vulnConfidentialityImpact":"HIGH","vulnIntegrityImpact":"HIGH","vulnAvailabilityImpact":"HIGH","subConfidentialityImpact":"NONE","subIntegrityImpact":"NONE","subAvailabilityImpact":"NONE","exploitMaturity":"NOT_DEFINED","confidentialityRequirement":"NOT_DEFINED","integrityRequirement":"NOT_DEFINED","availabilityRequirement":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedAttackVector":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedAttackComplexity":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedAttackRequirements":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedPrivilegesRequired":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedUserInteraction":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedSubIntegrityImpact":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact":"NOT_DEFINED","Safety":"NOT_DEFINED","Automatable":"NOT_DEFINED","Recovery":"NOT_DEFINED","valueDensity":"NOT_DEFINED","vulnerabilityResponseEffort":"NOT_DEFINED","providerUrgency":"NOT_DEFINED"}},{"version":"4.0","source":"CNA","type":"CVSS","score":"8.7","severity":"HIGH","vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","data":{"baseScore":8.7,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","vectorString":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","version":"4.0"}},{"version":"3.1","source":"f86ef6dc-4d3a-42ad-8f28-e6d5547a5007","type":"Secondary","score":"8.8","severity":"HIGH","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","data":{"version":"3.1","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","baseScore":8.8,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","attackVector":"NETWORK","attackComplexity":"LOW","privilegesRequired":"LOW","userInteraction":"NONE","scope":"UNCHANGED","confidentialityImpact":"HIGH","integrityImpact":"HIGH","availabilityImpact":"HIGH"}},{"version":"3.1","source":"CNA","type":"CVSS","score":"8.8","severity":"HIGH","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","data":{"attackComplexity":"LOW","attackVector":"NETWORK","availabilityImpact":"HIGH","baseScore":8.8,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","confidentialityImpact":"HIGH","integrityImpact":"HIGH","privilegesRequired":"LOW","scope":"UNCHANGED","userInteraction":"NONE","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","version":"3.1"}}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/commit/2ae0d3610","name":"https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/commit/2ae0d3610","refsource":"f86ef6dc-4d3a-42ad-8f28-e6d5547a5007","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/issues/10078","name":"https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/issues/10078","refsource":"f86ef6dc-4d3a-42ad-8f28-e6d5547a5007","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/commit/658bb585d","name":"https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/commit/658bb585d","refsource":"f86ef6dc-4d3a-42ad-8f28-e6d5547a5007","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-12044","name":"CVE Program record","refsource":"CVE.ORG","tags":["canonical"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-12044","name":"NVD vulnerability detail","refsource":"NVD","tags":["canonical","analysis"]}],"affected":[{"source":"CNA","vendor":"pgadmin.org","product":"pgAdmin 4","version":"affected 1.0 9.16 custom","platforms":[]}],"timeline":[],"solutions":[],"workarounds":[],"exploits":[],"credits":[{"source":"CNA","value":"Jasser Chebbi ","lang":"en"},{"source":"CNA","value":"Dave Page ","lang":"en"},{"source":"CNA","value":"Ashesh Vashi ","lang":"en"}],"nvd_cpes":[],"vendor_comments":[],"enrichments":{"kev":null,"epss":null,"legacy_qids":[]},"source_records":{"cve_program":{"containers":{"cna":{"affected":[{"defaultStatus":"unaffected","modules":["Domains","Domain Constraints","Foreign Tables","Languages","Event Triggers","Views","Tables","Indexes","Index Constraints","Exclusion Constraints","Materialized Views","Driver (qtLiteral)"],"product":"pgAdmin 4","programFiles":["https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/blob/master/web/pgadmin/utils/driver/psycopg3/__init__.py","https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/blob/master/web/pgadmin/browser/server_groups/servers/databases/schemas/domains/templates/domains/sql/default/create.sql","https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/blob/master/web/pgadmin/browser/server_groups/servers/databases/schemas/tables/templates/tables/sql/16_plus/stats.sql"],"repo":"https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4","vendor":"pgadmin.org","versions":[{"lessThan":"9.16","status":"affected","version":"1.0","versionType":"custom"}]}],"credits":[{"lang":"en","type":"finder","value":"Jasser Chebbi "},{"lang":"en","type":"remediation developer","value":"Dave Page "},{"lang":"en","type":"remediation developer","value":"Ashesh Vashi "}],"descriptions":[{"lang":"en","value":"SQL injection in pgAdmin 4 across every dialog template that renders ``COMMENT ON ... IS ''`` for a user-supplied description field. The Jinja templates for Domains (and their constraints), Foreign Tables, Languages, and Event Triggers, plus the Views OID-lookup query, interpolated the description directly inside a single-quoted SQL literal -- ``'{{ data.description }}'`` -- instead of passing it through the ``qtLiteral`` escape filter. An authenticated pgAdmin user with permission to create or alter the affected object types could submit a description containing an apostrophe, break out of the literal and chain arbitrary SQL. The injected SQL runs under the PostgreSQL role the user is already authenticated as; for a connected role with ``COPY ... TO/FROM PROGRAM`` (typically PostgreSQL superuser), this chains to OS command execution on the PostgreSQL host. The defect does not cross a privilege boundary -- the user already has direct SQL access to that role through pgAdmin's Query Tool -- so the attacker gains no capability beyond what their database role already grants. The marginal impact captures bypass of any application-layer Query Tool gating an operator may have configured.\n\nThe defect was originally reported against the Domain Dialog ``description`` field; a code-wide audit identified sixteen sites of the same pattern across the templates listed above. The same review also surfaced ten related sinks in the pgstattuple/pgstatindex stats templates -- ``pgstattuple('{{schema}}.{{table}}')`` and the matching pgstatindex shape -- where ``qtIdent`` escapes embedded double quotes inside the identifier but not apostrophes, so a user with CREATE privilege on a schema could plant a table or index named ``foo'bar`` and a later stats viewer would render an unbalanced literal.\n\nFix is layered:\n\n 1. Sites: replace every ``'{{ x.description }}'`` with ``{{ x.description|qtLiteral(conn) }}`` (no surrounding quotes -- the filter wraps the value in escaped quotes itself). Plumb ``conn=self.conn`` through every ``render_template`` call that loads one of these templates. Also corrects a ``{ % elif`` Jinja typo in the foreign-table schema diff (dead branch). Rewrite the ten pgstattuple/pgstatindex stats sites to address the relation via OID + ``::oid::regclass`` cast (e.g. ``pgstattuple({{ tid }}::oid::regclass)``), eliminating the embedded literal-call form entirely so that bug-class can no longer recur there.\n\n 2. Driver hardening: ``qtLiteral`` (in ``utils/driver/psycopg3/__init__.py``) used to silently return the raw unescaped value when its ``conn`` argument was falsy. It now raises ``ValueError`` -- surfacing the entire bug class going forward. The change immediately uncovered eight latent plumbing bugs (in ``schemas/__init__.py``, ``schemas/functions/__init__.py``, ``schemas/tables/utils.py``, ``foreign_servers/__init__.py``, and seven sites in ``roles/__init__.py``) -- all fixed as part of this patch. The inner ``except`` block that swallowed adapter-level failures and returned the raw value is also removed, so unadaptable inputs raise instead of leaking unescaped values.\n\n 3. Regression tests: a per-template behavioural test renders each previously-vulnerable template with an apostrophe-injection payload and asserts the escaped fragment is present and the vulnerable fragment absent; a lint test walks every ``*.sql`` template flagging any ``'{{ ... }}'`` single-quote-wrapped interpolation against an explicit allowlist; unit tests cover the new qtLiteral fail-fast and inner-except raise paths.\n\nThis issue affects pgAdmin 4: from 1.0 before 9.16."}],"metrics":[{"cvssV3_1":{"attackComplexity":"LOW","attackVector":"NETWORK","availabilityImpact":"HIGH","baseScore":8.8,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","confidentialityImpact":"HIGH","integrityImpact":"HIGH","privilegesRequired":"LOW","scope":"UNCHANGED","userInteraction":"NONE","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","version":"3.1"},"format":"CVSS","scenarios":[{"lang":"en","value":"The 8.8 is earned by the stored pgstattuple / pgstatindex sinks (commit 2ae0d3610). The chain: a low-privilege user with CREATE on a schema names a table or index containing an apostrophe (e.g. foo'bar); pgAdmin's stats templates render that identifier inside a string literal -- pgstattuple('schema.foo'bar') -- when a *different* user views statistics on the object. If the viewing user is a PostgreSQL superuser, the SQL injection executes under the superuser role, reaching COPY ... TO/FROM PROGRAM and OS code execution on the DB host. The privilege crossing (low-priv planter -> superuser viewer) is what justifies C:H/I:H/A:H even with S:U: the impact is felt by a different security principal than the attacker, but it lands inside the same DB authority.\n\nThe originally-reported Domain Dialog description field is the same code-class but is self-SQLi -- the user injecting the apostrophe is the user whose role runs it. That sub-vector alone would score in the #10026 range (4.3 MEDIUM); it is bundled here because the fix is the same qtLiteral plumbing across all sixteen sites.\n\nS:U because pgAdmin does not mediate a privilege boundary between the planter, the viewer, and the DB role; the boundary that is crossed lives entirely inside PostgreSQL's privilege model."}]},{"cvssV4_0":{"baseScore":8.7,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","vectorString":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","version":"4.0"},"format":"CVSS","scenarios":[{"lang":"en","value":"Same reasoning as the CVSS 3.1 entry: the stored pgstattuple sink is the load-bearing impact (low-priv planter, superuser viewer, superuser-role SQL). VC:H/VI:H/VA:H from the COPY ... TO PROGRAM reach; SC/SI/SA:N because pgAdmin is not the security authority being crossed -- the boundary lives in PostgreSQL."}]}],"problemTypes":[{"descriptions":[{"cweId":"CWE-89","description":"CWE-89 Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')","lang":"en","type":"CWE"},{"cweId":"CWE-116","description":"CWE-116 Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output","lang":"en","type":"CWE"}]}],"providerMetadata":{"dateUpdated":"2026-06-18T23:37:16.202Z","orgId":"f86ef6dc-4d3a-42ad-8f28-e6d5547a5007","shortName":"PostgreSQL"},"references":[{"tags":["issue-tracking"],"url":"https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/issues/10078"},{"tags":["patch"],"url":"https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/commit/658bb585d"},{"tags":["patch"],"url":"https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/commit/2ae0d3610"}],"source":{"discovery":"EXTERNAL"},"title":"pgAdmin 4: SQL injection in COMMENT ON ... IS '' rendering across dialog templates"}},"cveMetadata":{"assignerOrgId":"f86ef6dc-4d3a-42ad-8f28-e6d5547a5007","assignerShortName":"PostgreSQL","cveId":"CVE-2026-12044","datePublished":"2026-06-18T23:37:16.202Z","dateReserved":"2026-06-11T20:40:05.751Z","dateUpdated":"2026-06-18T23:37:16.202Z","state":"PUBLISHED"},"dataType":"CVE_RECORD","dataVersion":"5.2"},"nvd":{"publishedDate":"2026-06-19 00:16:46","lastModifiedDate":"2026-06-19 00:16:46","problem_types":["CWE-89","CWE-116","CWE-89 CWE-89 Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')","CWE-116 CWE-116 Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output"],"metrics":{"cvssMetricV40":[{"source":"f86ef6dc-4d3a-42ad-8f28-e6d5547a5007","type":"Secondary","cvssData":{"version":"4.0","vectorString":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","baseScore":8.7,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","attackVector":"NETWORK","attackComplexity":"LOW","attackRequirements":"NONE","privilegesRequired":"LOW","userInteraction":"NONE","vulnConfidentialityImpact":"HIGH","vulnIntegrityImpact":"HIGH","vulnAvailabilityImpact":"HIGH","subConfidentialityImpact":"NONE","subIntegrityImpact":"NONE","subAvailabilityImpact":"NONE","exploitMaturity":"NOT_DEFINED","confidentialityRequirement":"NOT_DEFINED","integrityRequirement":"NOT_DEFINED","availabilityRequirement":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedAttackVector":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedAttackComplexity":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedAttackRequirements":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedPrivilegesRequired":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedUserInteraction":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedSubIntegrityImpact":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact":"NOT_DEFINED","Safety":"NOT_DEFINED","Automatable":"NOT_DEFINED","Recovery":"NOT_DEFINED","valueDensity":"NOT_DEFINED","vulnerabilityResponseEffort":"NOT_DEFINED","providerUrgency":"NOT_DEFINED"}}],"cvssMetricV31":[{"source":"f86ef6dc-4d3a-42ad-8f28-e6d5547a5007","type":"Secondary","cvssData":{"version":"3.1","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","baseScore":8.8,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","attackVector":"NETWORK","attackComplexity":"LOW","privilegesRequired":"LOW","userInteraction":"NONE","scope":"UNCHANGED","confidentialityImpact":"HIGH","integrityImpact":"HIGH","availabilityImpact":"HIGH"},"exploitabilityScore":2.8,"impactScore":5.9}]},"configurations":[]},"legacy_mitre":{"record":{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"12044","Ordinal":"1","Title":"pgAdmin 4: SQL injection in COMMENT ON ... IS '' re","CVE":"CVE-2026-12044","Year":"2026"},"notes":[{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"12044","Ordinal":"1","NoteData":"SQL injection in pgAdmin 4 across every dialog template that renders ``COMMENT ON ... IS ''`` for a user-supplied description field. The Jinja templates for Domains (and their constraints), Foreign Tables, Languages, and Event Triggers, plus the Views OID-lookup query, interpolated the description directly inside a single-quoted SQL literal -- ``'{{ data.description }}'`` -- instead of passing it through the ``qtLiteral`` escape filter. An authenticated pgAdmin user with permission to create or alter the affected object types could submit a description containing an apostrophe, break out of the literal and chain arbitrary SQL. The injected SQL runs under the PostgreSQL role the user is already authenticated as; for a connected role with ``COPY ... TO/FROM PROGRAM`` (typically PostgreSQL superuser), this chains to OS command execution on the PostgreSQL host. The defect does not cross a privilege boundary -- the user already has direct SQL access to that role through pgAdmin's Query Tool -- so the attacker gains no capability beyond what their database role already grants. The marginal impact captures bypass of any application-layer Query Tool gating an operator may have configured.\n\nThe defect was originally reported against the Domain Dialog ``description`` field; a code-wide audit identified sixteen sites of the same pattern across the templates listed above. The same review also surfaced ten related sinks in the pgstattuple/pgstatindex stats templates -- ``pgstattuple('{{schema}}.{{table}}')`` and the matching pgstatindex shape -- where ``qtIdent`` escapes embedded double quotes inside the identifier but not apostrophes, so a user with CREATE privilege on a schema could plant a table or index named ``foo'bar`` and a later stats viewer would render an unbalanced literal.\n\nFix is layered:\n\n 1. Sites: replace every ``'{{ x.description }}'`` with ``{{ x.description|qtLiteral(conn) }}`` (no surrounding quotes -- the filter wraps the value in escaped quotes itself). Plumb ``conn=self.conn`` through every ``render_template`` call that loads one of these templates. Also corrects a ``{ % elif`` Jinja typo in the foreign-table schema diff (dead branch). Rewrite the ten pgstattuple/pgstatindex stats sites to address the relation via OID + ``::oid::regclass`` cast (e.g. ``pgstattuple({{ tid }}::oid::regclass)``), eliminating the embedded literal-call form entirely so that bug-class can no longer recur there.\n\n 2. Driver hardening: ``qtLiteral`` (in ``utils/driver/psycopg3/__init__.py``) used to silently return the raw unescaped value when its ``conn`` argument was falsy. It now raises ``ValueError`` -- surfacing the entire bug class going forward. The change immediately uncovered eight latent plumbing bugs (in ``schemas/__init__.py``, ``schemas/functions/__init__.py``, ``schemas/tables/utils.py``, ``foreign_servers/__init__.py``, and seven sites in ``roles/__init__.py``) -- all fixed as part of this patch. The inner ``except`` block that swallowed adapter-level failures and returned the raw value is also removed, so unadaptable inputs raise instead of leaking unescaped values.\n\n 3. Regression tests: a per-template behavioural test renders each previously-vulnerable template with an apostrophe-injection payload and asserts the escaped fragment is present and the vulnerable fragment absent; a lint test walks every ``*.sql`` template flagging any ``'{{ ... }}'`` single-quote-wrapped interpolation against an explicit allowlist; unit tests cover the new qtLiteral fail-fast and inner-except raise paths.\n\nThis issue affects pgAdmin 4: from 1.0 before 9.16.","Type":"Description","Title":"pgAdmin 4: SQL injection in COMMENT ON ... IS '' re"}]}}}