{"api_version":"1","generated_at":"2026-11-07T06:42:04+00:00","cve":"CVE-2026-12522","urls":{"html":"https://cve.report/CVE-2026-12522","api":"https://cve.report/api/cve/CVE-2026-12522.json","docs":"https://cve.report/api","cve_org":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-12522","nvd":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-12522"},"summary":{"title":"Stack buffer overflow in Zephyr hl7800 modem driver parsing network-supplied +CGCONTRDP address fields","description":"The HL7800 cellular modem driver's +CGCONTRDP: response handler on_cmd_atcmdinfo_ipaddr() in drivers/modem/vendor_standalone/hl7800.c parses the PDP-context dynamic parameters (local address, subnet mask, gateway, and DNS servers) that the cellular network assigns to the device. The response is linearized into a 256-byte stack buffer, after which each address field length is computed from comma/. delimiter positions in the network-supplied data and used directly as the length argument to strncpy() into the fixed 64-byte stack buffer temp_addr_str (and the 16-byte iface_ctx.dns_v4_string).\n\nBecause the field length is derived from attacker-controlled delimiter positions and was not bounded against the destination buffer, a single field can be far larger than 64 bytes. A malicious or impersonated cellular network (for example a rogue base station) can return a crafted +CGCONTRDP response with an overlong address field, causing strncpy() to write past temp_addr_str on the modem worker thread's stack, plus an out-of-bounds NUL write at temp_addr_str[addr_len].\n\nNo device-side privileges or user interaction are required: the device itself issues the AT+CGCONTRDP=1 query during normal network attach and parses whatever the network returns. The overflow corrupts adjacent stack memory in supervisor context, yielding at minimum a remotely triggerable crash and potentially control-flow hijacking on targets without stack protection.\n\nThe fix bounds every field length against its destination buffer (temp_addr_str and dns_v4_string) before each copy, rejecting overlong fields.","state":"PUBLISHED","assigner":"zephyr","published_at":"2026-08-19 21:16:53","updated_at":"2026-11-04 05:18:39"},"problem_types":["CWE-787","CWE-787 bounds"],"metrics":[{"version":"3.1","source":"vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org","type":"Secondary","score":"8.8","severity":"HIGH","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","data":{"version":"3.1","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","baseScore":8.8,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","attackVector":"ADJACENT_NETWORK","attackComplexity":"LOW","privilegesRequired":"NONE","userInteraction":"NONE","scope":"UNCHANGED","confidentialityImpact":"HIGH","integrityImpact":"HIGH","availabilityImpact":"HIGH"}},{"version":"3.1","source":"CNA","type":"CVSS","score":"8.8","severity":"HIGH","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","data":{"baseScore":8.8,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","version":"3.1"}}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-hchc-6489-w66v","name":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-hchc-6489-w66v","refsource":"vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/a1cbced64181bc0bdf95e1fd7118f2bb70cf679b","name":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/a1cbced64181bc0bdf95e1fd7118f2bb70cf679b","refsource":"vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-12522","name":"CVE Program record","refsource":"CVE.ORG","tags":["canonical"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-12522","name":"NVD vulnerability detail","refsource":"NVD","tags":["canonical","analysis"]}],"affected":[{"source":"CNA","vendor":"zephyrproject","product":"zephyr","version":"affected 2.4.0 4.3.2 semver","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"zephyrproject","product":"zephyr","version":"affected 4.4.0 4.4.2 semver","platforms":[]}],"timeline":[],"solutions":[],"workarounds":[],"exploits":[],"credits":[],"nvd_cpes":[],"vendor_comments":[],"enrichments":{"kev":null,"epss":{"cve_year":"2026","cve_id":"12522","cve":"CVE-2026-12522","epss":"0.003400000","percentile":"0.276880000","score_date":"2026-11-04","updated_at":"2026-11-05 00:04:17"},"legacy_qids":[]},"source_records":{"cve_program":{"containers":{"adp":[{"metrics":[{"other":{"content":{"id":"CVE-2026-12522","options":[{"Exploitation":"none"},{"Automatable":"no"},{"Technical Impact":"total"}],"role":"CISA Coordinator","timestamp":"2026-08-20T15:16:05.454260Z","version":"2.0.3"},"type":"ssvc"}}],"providerMetadata":{"dateUpdated":"2026-08-20T15:26:33.628Z","orgId":"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0","shortName":"CISA-ADP"},"title":"CISA ADP Vulnrichment"}],"cna":{"affected":[{"collectionURL":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr","defaultStatus":"unaffected","packageName":"zephyr","product":"zephyr","programFiles":["drivers/modem/vendor_standalone/hl7800.c"],"vendor":"zephyrproject","versions":[{"lessThan":"4.3.2","status":"affected","version":"2.4.0","versionType":"semver"},{"lessThan":"4.4.2","status":"affected","version":"4.4.0","versionType":"semver"}]}],"descriptions":[{"lang":"en","value":"The HL7800 cellular modem driver's +CGCONTRDP: response handler on_cmd_atcmdinfo_ipaddr() in drivers/modem/vendor_standalone/hl7800.c parses the PDP-context dynamic parameters (local address, subnet mask, gateway, and DNS servers) that the cellular network assigns to the device. The response is linearized into a 256-byte stack buffer, after which each address field length is computed from comma/. delimiter positions in the network-supplied data and used directly as the length argument to strncpy() into the fixed 64-byte stack buffer temp_addr_str (and the 16-byte iface_ctx.dns_v4_string).\n\nBecause the field length is derived from attacker-controlled delimiter positions and was not bounded against the destination buffer, a single field can be far larger than 64 bytes. A malicious or impersonated cellular network (for example a rogue base station) can return a crafted +CGCONTRDP response with an overlong address field, causing strncpy() to write past temp_addr_str on the modem worker thread's stack, plus an out-of-bounds NUL write at temp_addr_str[addr_len].\n\nNo device-side privileges or user interaction are required: the device itself issues the AT+CGCONTRDP=1 query during normal network attach and parses whatever the network returns. The overflow corrupts adjacent stack memory in supervisor context, yielding at minimum a remotely triggerable crash and potentially control-flow hijacking on targets without stack protection.\n\nThe fix bounds every field length against its destination buffer (temp_addr_str and dns_v4_string) before each copy, rejecting overlong fields."}],"metrics":[{"cvssV3_1":{"baseScore":8.8,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","version":"3.1"},"format":"CVSS"}],"problemTypes":[{"descriptions":[{"cweId":"CWE-787","description":"bounds","lang":"en","type":"CWE"}]}],"providerMetadata":{"dateUpdated":"2026-11-04T04:59:37.869Z","orgId":"e2e69745-5e70-4e92-8431-deb5529a81ad","shortName":"zephyr"},"references":[{"name":"Fix commit","tags":["patch"],"url":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/a1cbced64181bc0bdf95e1fd7118f2bb70cf679b"},{"name":"GHSA-hchc-6489-w66v","url":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-hchc-6489-w66v"}],"title":"Stack buffer overflow in Zephyr hl7800 modem driver parsing network-supplied +CGCONTRDP address fields","x_generator":{"engine":"cvelib 1.8.0"}}},"cveMetadata":{"assignerOrgId":"e2e69745-5e70-4e92-8431-deb5529a81ad","assignerShortName":"zephyr","cveId":"CVE-2026-12522","datePublished":"2026-08-19T20:37:35.638Z","dateReserved":"2026-06-17T12:59:14.964Z","dateUpdated":"2026-11-04T04:59:37.869Z","state":"PUBLISHED"},"dataType":"CVE_RECORD","dataVersion":"5.2"},"nvd":{"publishedDate":"2026-08-19 21:16:53","lastModifiedDate":"2026-11-04 05:18:39","problem_types":["CWE-787","CWE-787 bounds"],"metrics":{"cvssMetricV31":[{"source":"vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org","type":"Secondary","cvssData":{"version":"3.1","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","baseScore":8.8,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","attackVector":"ADJACENT_NETWORK","attackComplexity":"LOW","privilegesRequired":"NONE","userInteraction":"NONE","scope":"UNCHANGED","confidentialityImpact":"HIGH","integrityImpact":"HIGH","availabilityImpact":"HIGH"},"exploitabilityScore":2.8,"impactScore":5.9}],"ssvcV203":[{"source":"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0","ssvcData":{"timestamp":"2026-08-20T15:16:05.454260Z","id":"CVE-2026-12522","options":[{"exploitation":"none"},{"automatable":"no"},{"technicalImpact":"total"}],"role":"CISA Coordinator","version":"2.0.3"}}]},"configurations":[]},"legacy_mitre":{"record":{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"12522","Ordinal":"1","Title":"Stack buffer overflow in Zephyr hl7800 modem driver parsing netw","CVE":"CVE-2026-12522","Year":"2026"},"notes":[{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"12522","Ordinal":"1","NoteData":"The HL7800 cellular modem driver's +CGCONTRDP: response handler on_cmd_atcmdinfo_ipaddr() in drivers/modem/vendor_standalone/hl7800.c parses the PDP-context dynamic parameters (local address, subnet mask, gateway, and DNS servers) that the cellular network assigns to the device. The response is linearized into a 256-byte stack buffer, after which each address field length is computed from comma/. delimiter positions in the network-supplied data and used directly as the length argument to strncpy() into the fixed 64-byte stack buffer temp_addr_str (and the 16-byte iface_ctx.dns_v4_string).\n\nBecause the field length is derived from attacker-controlled delimiter positions and was not bounded against the destination buffer, a single field can be far larger than 64 bytes. A malicious or impersonated cellular network (for example a rogue base station) can return a crafted +CGCONTRDP response with an overlong address field, causing strncpy() to write past temp_addr_str on the modem worker thread's stack, plus an out-of-bounds NUL write at temp_addr_str[addr_len].\n\nNo device-side privileges or user interaction are required: the device itself issues the AT+CGCONTRDP=1 query during normal network attach and parses whatever the network returns. The overflow corrupts adjacent stack memory in supervisor context, yielding at minimum a remotely triggerable crash and potentially control-flow hijacking on targets without stack protection.\n\nThe fix bounds every field length against its destination buffer (temp_addr_str and dns_v4_string) before each copy, rejecting overlong fields.","Type":"Description","Title":"Stack buffer overflow in Zephyr hl7800 modem driver parsing netw"}]}}}