{"api_version":"1","generated_at":"2026-09-04T11:31:47+00:00","cve":"CVE-2026-12999","urls":{"html":"https://cve.report/CVE-2026-12999","api":"https://cve.report/api/cve/CVE-2026-12999.json","docs":"https://cve.report/api","cve_org":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-12999","nvd":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-12999"},"summary":{"title":"Infineon Airoc Wi-Fi driver leaks TX buffers on send failure, leading to permanent pool exhaustion","description":"The Infineon Airoc Wi-Fi driver's transmit callback airoc_mgmt_send() in drivers/wifi/infineon/airoc_wifi.c allocates a net_buf from the fixed airoc_pool for every outbound packet. When whd_network_send_ethernet_data() returns a synchronous failure, the underlying WHD library does not take ownership of the buffer, but the pre-fix driver returned -EIO without releasing it. Each failed transmit therefore permanently leaks one buffer from the pool.\n\nairoc_pool is small and fixed (AIROC_WIFI_TX_PACKET_POOL_COUNT + AIROC_WIFI_RX_PACKET_POOL_COUNT, default 20 buffers) and is shared by WHD's whd_host_buffer_get callback for both transmit and receive. Once enough send failures have leaked the pool dry, airoc_wifi_host_buffer_get() returns WHD_BUFFER_ALLOC_FAIL for all subsequent allocations, so both transmit and the WHD-driven receive path fail and Wi-Fi connectivity is lost until the device is rebooted.\n\nThe leak occurs only on the transmit error path. A Wi-Fi-adjacent attacker can influence the conditions that cause synchronous send failures (for example by deauthenticating/disassociating the station while the local stack continues to attempt transmits), and ordinary transient failures over the device's lifetime accumulate toward the same state. Reliable on-demand triggering is of high complexity and the impact is availability-only, but the resulting denial of service is permanent and non-recoverable without a reboot.\n\nThe fix releases the buffer with airoc_wifi_buffer_release() on the failure branch, returning it to the pool. The commit also removes a redundant k_sem_give() in airoc_mgmt_disconnect(); because data->sema_common is a binary semaphore (limit 1) the duplicate give merely saturated at 1 and had no security impact.","state":"PUBLISHED","assigner":"zephyr","published_at":"2026-08-22 21:16:48","updated_at":"2026-08-26 16:59:23"},"problem_types":["CWE-401","CWE-401 dos"],"metrics":[{"version":"3.1","source":"vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org","type":"Secondary","score":"5.3","severity":"MEDIUM","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H","data":{"version":"3.1","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H","baseScore":5.3,"baseSeverity":"MEDIUM","attackVector":"ADJACENT_NETWORK","attackComplexity":"HIGH","privilegesRequired":"NONE","userInteraction":"NONE","scope":"UNCHANGED","confidentialityImpact":"NONE","integrityImpact":"NONE","availabilityImpact":"HIGH"}},{"version":"3.1","source":"CNA","type":"CVSS","score":"5.3","severity":"MEDIUM","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H","data":{"baseScore":5.3,"baseSeverity":"MEDIUM","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H","version":"3.1"}}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/4e6f624292ed153a762e98c7a297998c8d0b52c4","name":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/4e6f624292ed153a762e98c7a297998c8d0b52c4","refsource":"vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-8w97-ghfm-5wjp","name":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-8w97-ghfm-5wjp","refsource":"vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-12999","name":"CVE Program record","refsource":"CVE.ORG","tags":["canonical"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-12999","name":"NVD vulnerability detail","refsource":"NVD","tags":["canonical","analysis"]}],"affected":[{"source":"CNA","vendor":"zephyrproject","product":"zephyr","version":"affected 3.6.0 4.4.2 semver","platforms":[]}],"timeline":[],"solutions":[],"workarounds":[],"exploits":[],"credits":[],"nvd_cpes":[],"vendor_comments":[],"enrichments":{"kev":null,"epss":{"cve_year":"2026","cve_id":"12999","cve":"CVE-2026-12999","epss":"0.001590000","percentile":"0.053510000","score_date":"2026-08-27","updated_at":"2026-08-28 00:03:41"},"legacy_qids":[]},"source_records":{"cve_program":{"containers":{"adp":[{"metrics":[{"other":{"content":{"id":"CVE-2026-12999","options":[{"Exploitation":"none"},{"Automatable":"no"},{"Technical Impact":"partial"}],"role":"CISA Coordinator","timestamp":"2026-08-25T19:07:13.318585Z","version":"2.0.3"},"type":"ssvc"}}],"providerMetadata":{"dateUpdated":"2026-08-25T19:07:22.689Z","orgId":"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0","shortName":"CISA-ADP"},"title":"CISA ADP Vulnrichment"}],"cna":{"affected":[{"collectionURL":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr","defaultStatus":"unaffected","packageName":"zephyr","product":"zephyr","programFiles":["drivers/wifi/infineon/airoc_wifi.c"],"vendor":"zephyrproject","versions":[{"lessThan":"4.4.2","status":"affected","version":"3.6.0","versionType":"semver"}]}],"descriptions":[{"lang":"en","value":"The Infineon Airoc Wi-Fi driver's transmit callback airoc_mgmt_send() in drivers/wifi/infineon/airoc_wifi.c allocates a net_buf from the fixed airoc_pool for every outbound packet. When whd_network_send_ethernet_data() returns a synchronous failure, the underlying WHD library does not take ownership of the buffer, but the pre-fix driver returned -EIO without releasing it. Each failed transmit therefore permanently leaks one buffer from the pool.\n\nairoc_pool is small and fixed (AIROC_WIFI_TX_PACKET_POOL_COUNT + AIROC_WIFI_RX_PACKET_POOL_COUNT, default 20 buffers) and is shared by WHD's whd_host_buffer_get callback for both transmit and receive. Once enough send failures have leaked the pool dry, airoc_wifi_host_buffer_get() returns WHD_BUFFER_ALLOC_FAIL for all subsequent allocations, so both transmit and the WHD-driven receive path fail and Wi-Fi connectivity is lost until the device is rebooted.\n\nThe leak occurs only on the transmit error path. A Wi-Fi-adjacent attacker can influence the conditions that cause synchronous send failures (for example by deauthenticating/disassociating the station while the local stack continues to attempt transmits), and ordinary transient failures over the device's lifetime accumulate toward the same state. Reliable on-demand triggering is of high complexity and the impact is availability-only, but the resulting denial of service is permanent and non-recoverable without a reboot.\n\nThe fix releases the buffer with airoc_wifi_buffer_release() on the failure branch, returning it to the pool. The commit also removes a redundant k_sem_give() in airoc_mgmt_disconnect(); because data->sema_common is a binary semaphore (limit 1) the duplicate give merely saturated at 1 and had no security impact."}],"metrics":[{"cvssV3_1":{"baseScore":5.3,"baseSeverity":"MEDIUM","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H","version":"3.1"},"format":"CVSS"}],"problemTypes":[{"descriptions":[{"cweId":"CWE-401","description":"dos","lang":"en","type":"CWE"}]}],"providerMetadata":{"dateUpdated":"2026-08-22T20:35:40.445Z","orgId":"e2e69745-5e70-4e92-8431-deb5529a81ad","shortName":"zephyr"},"references":[{"name":"Fix commit","tags":["patch"],"url":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/4e6f624292ed153a762e98c7a297998c8d0b52c4"},{"name":"GHSA-8w97-ghfm-5wjp","url":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-8w97-ghfm-5wjp"}],"title":"Infineon Airoc Wi-Fi driver leaks TX buffers on send failure, leading to permanent pool exhaustion","x_generator":{"engine":"cvelib 1.8.0"}}},"cveMetadata":{"assignerOrgId":"e2e69745-5e70-4e92-8431-deb5529a81ad","assignerShortName":"zephyr","cveId":"CVE-2026-12999","datePublished":"2026-08-22T20:35:40.445Z","dateReserved":"2026-06-23T13:18:10.190Z","dateUpdated":"2026-08-25T19:07:22.689Z","state":"PUBLISHED"},"dataType":"CVE_RECORD","dataVersion":"5.2"},"nvd":{"publishedDate":"2026-08-22 21:16:48","lastModifiedDate":"2026-08-26 16:59:23","problem_types":["CWE-401","CWE-401 dos"],"metrics":{"cvssMetricV31":[{"source":"vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org","type":"Secondary","cvssData":{"version":"3.1","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H","baseScore":5.3,"baseSeverity":"MEDIUM","attackVector":"ADJACENT_NETWORK","attackComplexity":"HIGH","privilegesRequired":"NONE","userInteraction":"NONE","scope":"UNCHANGED","confidentialityImpact":"NONE","integrityImpact":"NONE","availabilityImpact":"HIGH"},"exploitabilityScore":1.6,"impactScore":3.6}],"ssvcV203":[{"source":"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0","ssvcData":{"timestamp":"2026-08-25T19:07:13.318585Z","id":"CVE-2026-12999","options":[{"exploitation":"none"},{"automatable":"no"},{"technicalImpact":"partial"}],"role":"CISA Coordinator","version":"2.0.3"}}]},"configurations":[]},"legacy_mitre":{"record":{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"12999","Ordinal":"1","Title":"Infineon Airoc Wi-Fi driver leaks TX buffers on send failure, le","CVE":"CVE-2026-12999","Year":"2026"},"notes":[{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"12999","Ordinal":"1","NoteData":"The Infineon Airoc Wi-Fi driver's transmit callback airoc_mgmt_send() in drivers/wifi/infineon/airoc_wifi.c allocates a net_buf from the fixed airoc_pool for every outbound packet. When whd_network_send_ethernet_data() returns a synchronous failure, the underlying WHD library does not take ownership of the buffer, but the pre-fix driver returned -EIO without releasing it. Each failed transmit therefore permanently leaks one buffer from the pool.\n\nairoc_pool is small and fixed (AIROC_WIFI_TX_PACKET_POOL_COUNT + AIROC_WIFI_RX_PACKET_POOL_COUNT, default 20 buffers) and is shared by WHD's whd_host_buffer_get callback for both transmit and receive. Once enough send failures have leaked the pool dry, airoc_wifi_host_buffer_get() returns WHD_BUFFER_ALLOC_FAIL for all subsequent allocations, so both transmit and the WHD-driven receive path fail and Wi-Fi connectivity is lost until the device is rebooted.\n\nThe leak occurs only on the transmit error path. A Wi-Fi-adjacent attacker can influence the conditions that cause synchronous send failures (for example by deauthenticating/disassociating the station while the local stack continues to attempt transmits), and ordinary transient failures over the device's lifetime accumulate toward the same state. Reliable on-demand triggering is of high complexity and the impact is availability-only, but the resulting denial of service is permanent and non-recoverable without a reboot.\n\nThe fix releases the buffer with airoc_wifi_buffer_release() on the failure branch, returning it to the pool. The commit also removes a redundant k_sem_give() in airoc_mgmt_disconnect(); because data->sema_common is a binary semaphore (limit 1) the duplicate give merely saturated at 1 and had no security impact.","Type":"Description","Title":"Infineon Airoc Wi-Fi driver leaks TX buffers on send failure, le"}]}}}