{"api_version":"1","generated_at":"2026-11-17T17:10:49+00:00","cve":"CVE-2026-130627","urls":{"html":"https://cve.report/CVE-2026-130627","api":"https://cve.report/api/cve/CVE-2026-130627.json","docs":"https://cve.report/api","cve_org":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-130627","nvd":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-130627"},"summary":{"title":"Vert.x HTTP client forwards Authorization and all headers to cross-authority redirect target when followRedirects(true)","description":"The Vert.x HTTP client transport (a2a-java-sdk-http-client-vertx) hand-rolls a POST redirect follower that, when the documented PostBuilder.followRedirects(true) opt-in is enabled, re-issues the redirected request with the full request header map copied verbatim and performs no credential stripping and no same-authority check. A malicious, compromised, or mistyped agent that returns a 30x response with an absolute cross-host Location causes the client to forward the standard Authorization header (Bearer/Basic/OAuth) — plus every other header, including the allowlisted API-key headers — to the attacker-controlled authority. This breaks the project's own cross-transport invariant (SECURITY.md §8, OkHttpPostRedirectHeaderLeakTest) that credentials are stripped on cross-authority redirects even when redirects are followed. The sibling JDK and OkHttp/Android transports strip Authorization; Vert.x uniquely does not. This is a \"fix introduced the bug\" variant — the follower was added by the GHSA-9rhm hardening PR (3ae82912, refined by a5e76a0b).","state":"PUBLISHED","assigner":"redhat-cnalr","published_at":"2026-11-17 15:17:40","updated_at":"2026-11-17 15:17:40"},"problem_types":["CWE-522","CWE-522 CWE-522"],"metrics":[{"version":"3.1","source":"74b3a70d-cca6-4d34-9789-e83b222ae3be","type":"Secondary","score":"7.5","severity":"HIGH","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N","data":{"version":"3.1","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N","baseScore":7.5,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","attackVector":"NETWORK","attackComplexity":"LOW","privilegesRequired":"NONE","userInteraction":"NONE","scope":"UNCHANGED","confidentialityImpact":"HIGH","integrityImpact":"NONE","availabilityImpact":"NONE"}},{"version":"3.1","source":"CNA","type":"CVSS","score":"7.5","severity":"HIGH","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N","data":{"attackComplexity":"LOW","attackVector":"NETWORK","availabilityImpact":"NONE","baseScore":7.5,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","confidentialityImpact":"HIGH","integrityImpact":"NONE","privilegesRequired":"NONE","scope":"UNCHANGED","userInteraction":"NONE","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N","version":"3.1"}}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/a2aproject/a2a-java/security/advisories/GHSA-w377-w7c6-c8hr","name":"https://github.com/a2aproject/a2a-java/security/advisories/GHSA-w377-w7c6-c8hr","refsource":"74b3a70d-cca6-4d34-9789-e83b222ae3be","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-130627","name":"CVE Program record","refsource":"CVE.ORG","tags":["canonical"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-130627","name":"NVD vulnerability detail","refsource":"NVD","tags":["canonical","analysis"]}],"affected":[{"source":"CNA","vendor":"a2a-java","product":"a2a-java-sdk-http-client-vertx","version":"affected 1.3.2.Final 1.4.0.Final custom","platforms":[]}],"timeline":[],"solutions":[{"source":"CNA","title":"","value":"Upgrade to 1.5.0.Final or later. PR #1255 applies the shared RedirectHeaderPolicy to explicitly enabled, one-hop synchronous POST redirects across the JDK, Vert.x, and Android HTTP clients. The policy strips Authorization and the allowlisted API-key headers when a redirect crosses authorities. 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A malicious, compromised, or mistyped agent that returns a 30x response with an absolute cross-host Location causes the client to forward the standard Authorization header (Bearer/Basic/OAuth) — plus every other header, including the allowlisted API-key headers — to the attacker-controlled authority. This breaks the project's own cross-transport invariant (SECURITY.md §8, OkHttpPostRedirectHeaderLeakTest) that credentials are stripped on cross-authority redirects even when redirects are followed. The sibling JDK and OkHttp/Android transports strip Authorization; Vert.x uniquely does not. 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The sibling JDK and OkHttp/Android transports strip Authorization; Vert.x uniquely does not. 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A malicious, compromised, or mistyped agent that returns a 30x response with an absolute cross-host Location causes the client to forward the standard Authorization header (Bearer/Basic/OAuth) — plus every other header, including the allowlisted API-key headers — to the attacker-controlled authority. This breaks the project's own cross-transport invariant (SECURITY.md §8, OkHttpPostRedirectHeaderLeakTest) that credentials are stripped on cross-authority redirects even when redirects are followed. The sibling JDK and OkHttp/Android transports strip Authorization; Vert.x uniquely does not. This is a \"fix introduced the bug\" variant — the follower was added by the GHSA-9rhm hardening PR (3ae82912, refined by a5e76a0b).","Type":"Description","Title":"Vert.x HTTP client forwards Authorization and all headers to cro"}]}}}