{"api_version":"1","generated_at":"2026-11-20T15:21:36+00:00","cve":"CVE-2026-133190","urls":{"html":"https://cve.report/CVE-2026-133190","api":"https://cve.report/api/cve/CVE-2026-133190.json","docs":"https://cve.report/api","cve_org":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-133190","nvd":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-133190"},"summary":{"title":"MISP CryptographicKey: Revoked PGP Keys Still Validate Protected Event Signatures and Key Revocation Sync Is Ineffective","description":"MISP, a threat intelligence sharing platform, contains a vulnerability in its cryptographic key management for protected (PGP-signed) events. Two related defects allow a revoked PGP key to remain effective for signing and validating protected events.\n\nFirst, the validateProtectedEvent() method in the CryptographicKey model iterates over the event's stored cryptographic keys to verify a PGP signature but does not check the revoked flag on each key. A key explicitly marked as revoked is still used to validate signatures, meaning an entity whose key has been revoked can continue to sign protected events and have them accepted by the MISP instance.\n\nSecond, the captureCryptographicKeyUpdate() method, responsible for synchronizing the key list when a sync user edits a protected event, contained a query bug (find('first') instead of find('all')) that caused only the first stored key to be considered. As a result, revocations of additional keys were never persisted, keys absent from the pushed list were not removed, and entries lacking an explicit fingerprint were mismatched and incorrectly deleted. Additionally, the revocation logic did not enforce the invariant that a revocation, once stored, is never lifted by subsequent pushes.\n\nA third minor issue: a signed protected event submitted without any cryptographic keys triggered an unhandled 500 error rather than a proper rejection response.\n\nPreconditions: the attacker must be an authenticated sync user with permission to add or edit protected events on the MISP instance. The impact is that revoked keys retain signing authority, key revocations propagated by sync partners are silently dropped, and the integrity of the protected-event trust chain is compromised. In a multi-instance MISP deployment, events signed by revoked keys can propagate to other instances, extending the integrity impact across the sync network.","state":"PUBLISHED","assigner":"CIRCL","published_at":"2026-11-19 15:17:39","updated_at":"2026-11-19 15:17:40"},"problem_types":["CWE-287","CWE-345","CWE-345 CWE-345 Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity","CWE-287 CWE-287 Improper Authentication"],"metrics":[{"version":"4.0","source":"5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8","type":"Secondary","score":"6.3","severity":"MEDIUM","vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","data":{"version":"4.0","vectorString":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","baseScore":6.3,"baseSeverity":"MEDIUM","attackVector":"NETWORK","attackComplexity":"HIGH","attackRequirements":"NONE","privilegesRequired":"NONE","userInteraction":"NONE","vulnConfidentialityImpact":"NONE","vulnIntegrityImpact":"LOW","vulnAvailabilityImpact":"NONE","subConfidentialityImpact":"NONE","subIntegrityImpact":"NONE","subAvailabilityImpact":"NONE","exploitMaturity":"NOT_DEFINED","confidentialityRequirement":"NOT_DEFINED","integrityRequirement":"NOT_DEFINED","availabilityRequirement":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedAttackVector":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedAttackComplexity":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedAttackRequirements":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedPrivilegesRequired":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedUserInteraction":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedSubIntegrityImpact":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact":"NOT_DEFINED","Safety":"NOT_DEFINED","Automatable":"NOT_DEFINED","Recovery":"NOT_DEFINED","valueDensity":"NOT_DEFINED","vulnerabilityResponseEffort":"NOT_DEFINED","providerUrgency":"NOT_DEFINED"}},{"version":"4.0","source":"CNA","type":"DECLARED","score":"6.3","severity":"MEDIUM","vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","data":{"baseScore":6.3,"baseSeverity":"MEDIUM","vectorString":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","version":"4.0"}},{"version":"3.1","source":"5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8","type":"Secondary","score":"3.7","severity":"LOW","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N","data":{"version":"3.1","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N","baseScore":3.7,"baseSeverity":"LOW","attackVector":"NETWORK","attackComplexity":"HIGH","privilegesRequired":"NONE","userInteraction":"NONE","scope":"UNCHANGED","confidentialityImpact":"NONE","integrityImpact":"LOW","availabilityImpact":"NONE"}},{"version":"3.1","source":"CNA","type":"CVSS","score":"3.7","severity":"LOW","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N","data":{"baseScore":3.7,"baseSeverity":"LOW","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N","version":"3.1"}}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/eee1f8b67","name":"https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/eee1f8b67","refsource":"5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-133190","name":"CVE Program record","refsource":"CVE.ORG","tags":["canonical"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-133190","name":"NVD vulnerability detail","refsource":"NVD","tags":["canonical","analysis"]}],"affected":[{"source":"CNA","vendor":"misp","product":"misp","version":"affected 2.5.51 semver","platforms":[]}],"timeline":[],"solutions":[{"source":"CNA","title":"","value":"The fix enforces key revocation in signature validation by skipping any key whose revoked flag is set before attempting PGP verification. It corrects the key-sync query to retrieve all stored keys (not just the first), ensures revocations are persisted and never lifted by a subsequent push, properly removes keys absent from the pushed list, and computes a fingerprint for entries that lack one so they match their stored counterpart. A signed protected event with no keys is now refused with a proper error response instead of an unhandled 500.","time":"","lang":"en"}],"workarounds":[],"exploits":[],"credits":[{"source":"CNA","value":"iglocska","lang":"en"},{"source":"CNA","value":"Claude Opus 5.5","lang":"en"},{"source":"CNA","value":"ENISA","lang":"en"},{"source":"CNA","value":"CERT.pl","lang":"en"},{"source":"CNA","value":"Claude Opus 5.5","lang":"en"}],"nvd_cpes":[],"vendor_comments":[],"enrichments":{"kev":null,"epss":null,"legacy_qids":[]},"source_records":{"cve_program":{"containers":{"adp":[{"metrics":[{"other":{"content":{"id":"CVE-2026-133190","options":[{"Exploitation":"none"},{"Automatable":"no"},{"Technical Impact":"partial"}],"role":"CISA Coordinator","timestamp":"2026-11-19T14:52:11.814868Z","version":"2.0.3"},"type":"ssvc"}}],"providerMetadata":{"dateUpdated":"2026-11-19T14:52:25.872Z","orgId":"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0","shortName":"CISA-ADP"},"title":"CISA ADP Vulnrichment"}],"cna":{"affected":[{"cpes":["cpe:2.3:a:misp:misp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"],"modules":["CryptographicKey model (app/Model/CryptographicKey.php)"],"product":"misp","programFiles":["app/Model/CryptographicKey.php"],"repo":"https://github.com/MISP/MISP","vendor":"misp","versions":[{"lessThanOrEqual":"2.5.51","status":"affected","version":"0","versionType":"semver"}]}],"cpeApplicability":[{"nodes":[{"cpeMatch":[{"criteria":"cpe:2.3:a:misp:misp:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","versionEndIncluding":"2.5.51","versionStartIncluding":"0","vulnerable":true}],"negate":false,"operator":"OR"}]}],"credits":[{"lang":"en","type":"remediation developer","value":"iglocska"},{"lang":"en","type":"remediation developer","value":"Claude Opus 5.5"},{"lang":"en","type":"reporter","value":"ENISA"},{"lang":"en","type":"reporter","value":"CERT.pl"},{"lang":"en","type":"tool","value":"Claude Opus 5.5"}],"descriptions":[{"lang":"en","value":"MISP, a threat intelligence sharing platform, contains a vulnerability in its cryptographic key management for protected (PGP-signed) events. Two related defects allow a revoked PGP key to remain effective for signing and validating protected events.\n\nFirst, the validateProtectedEvent() method in the CryptographicKey model iterates over the event's stored cryptographic keys to verify a PGP signature but does not check the revoked flag on each key. A key explicitly marked as revoked is still used to validate signatures, meaning an entity whose key has been revoked can continue to sign protected events and have them accepted by the MISP instance.\n\nSecond, the captureCryptographicKeyUpdate() method, responsible for synchronizing the key list when a sync user edits a protected event, contained a query bug (find('first') instead of find('all')) that caused only the first stored key to be considered. As a result, revocations of additional keys were never persisted, keys absent from the pushed list were not removed, and entries lacking an explicit fingerprint were mismatched and incorrectly deleted. Additionally, the revocation logic did not enforce the invariant that a revocation, once stored, is never lifted by subsequent pushes.\n\nA third minor issue: a signed protected event submitted without any cryptographic keys triggered an unhandled 500 error rather than a proper rejection response.\n\nPreconditions: the attacker must be an authenticated sync user with permission to add or edit protected events on the MISP instance. The impact is that revoked keys retain signing authority, key revocations propagated by sync partners are silently dropped, and the integrity of the protected-event trust chain is compromised. In a multi-instance MISP deployment, events signed by revoked keys can propagate to other instances, extending the integrity impact across the sync network."}],"impacts":[{"capecId":"CAPEC-124","descriptions":[{"lang":"en","value":"CAPEC-124 Exploiting Incorrectly Handled Exceptional Conditions"}]},{"capecId":"CAPEC-100","descriptions":[{"lang":"en","value":"CAPEC-100 Parameter Tampering"}]}],"metrics":[{"cvssV3_1":{"baseScore":3.7,"baseSeverity":"LOW","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N","version":"3.1"},"format":"CVSS","scenarios":[{"lang":"en","value":"GENERAL"}]},{"format":"SSVC","other":{"content":{"options":[{"Exploitation":"none"},{"Automatable":"yes"},{"Technical Impact":"partial"}],"role":"Supplier","timestamp":"2026-11-19T14:35:26Z","version":"2.0.3"},"type":"SSVC"},"scenarios":[{"lang":"en","value":"GENERAL"}]},{"cvssV4_0":{"baseScore":6.3,"baseSeverity":"MEDIUM","vectorString":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","version":"4.0"}}],"problemTypes":[{"descriptions":[{"cweId":"CWE-345","description":"CWE-345 Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity","lang":"en","type":"CWE"}]},{"descriptions":[{"cweId":"CWE-287","description":"CWE-287 Improper Authentication","lang":"en","type":"CWE"}]}],"providerMetadata":{"dateUpdated":"2026-11-19T14:44:46.132Z","orgId":"5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8","shortName":"CIRCL"},"references":[{"name":"Security patch","tags":["patch"],"url":"https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/eee1f8b67"}],"solutions":[{"lang":"en","value":"The fix enforces key revocation in signature validation by skipping any key whose revoked flag is set before attempting PGP verification. It corrects the key-sync query to retrieve all stored keys (not just the first), ensures revocations are persisted and never lifted by a subsequent push, properly removes keys absent from the pushed list, and computes a fingerprint for entries that lack one so they match their stored counterpart. A signed protected event with no keys is now refused with a proper error response instead of an unhandled 500."}],"title":"MISP CryptographicKey: Revoked PGP Keys Still Validate Protected Event Signatures and Key Revocation Sync Is Ineffective","x_gcve":[{"extensions":{"bcp-05-x-01":{"ai_annotations":[{"ai_level":"generated","description":"Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.","gna_source":1,"models":[{"gna_source":1,"identifier":"qwen3.8:27b","name":"qwen3.8:27b","source":"ollama"}],"review_status":"full","scope":"record","tags":["ai-computer-assisted:llm-generated","ai-computer-assisted:classification"]}]},"bcp-05-x-02":{"x_patch2vuln":{"assumptions":["The affected MISP version range is not specified in the patch; all versions prior to this commit are assumed affected.","The attacker is assumed to be an authenticated sync user with permission to add or edit protected events; unauthenticated exploitation is not evidenced.","The secondary integrity impact (SI:H) assumes a multi-instance MISP sync deployment; in a single-instance deployment the secondary impact may be lower.","CAPEC-124 is selected as the closest available pattern; no CAPEC specifically covers cryptographic key revocation bypass, so the mapping is approximate.","The Co-Authored-By line for Claude Opus 5.5 is treated as a tool credit; it is unclear whether this represents AI-assisted development or a placeholder.","The 500-error issue (signed event without keys) is treated as a minor robustness defect subsumed under the primary revocation-bypass vulnerability rather than a separate issue.","CVSS AT:N is used because the only options are N or P; the attacker does perform active interaction (submitting a signed event), but no special passive observation position is required."],"capecRationale":[{"capecId":"CAPEC-124","rationale":"The revoked-key state is an exceptional condition in the key lifecycle that the application failed to handle correctly during signature validation and key synchronization. The attacker exploits the system's failure to treat a revoked key as an exceptional (invalid) state. This is the closest CAPEC pattern; a more specific 'key revocation bypass' pattern does not exist in the CAPEC catalog, so CAPEC-124 is the best available match."},{"capecId":"CAPEC-100","rationale":"The key-sync path is vulnerable to manipulation of the pushed key list: by omitting keys or crafting entries without fingerprints, an attacker can prevent revocations from being applied or cause valid keys to be removed. This is a secondary attack vector enabled by the same code defects. The mapping is approximate because the primary issue is a logic flaw rather than direct parameter injection."}],"commit":"eee1f8b675c5c472fa73b41982824c0c17dd639e","confidence":"medium","credits":[{"lang":"en","type":"reporter","value":"ENISA and CERT.pl"},{"lang":"en","type":"remediation developer","value":"iglocska"},{"lang":"en","type":"remediation developer","value":"Claude Opus 5.5"},{"lang":"en","type":"reporter","value":"ENISA"},{"lang":"en","type":"reporter","value":"CERT.pl"},{"lang":"en","type":"tool","value":"Claude Opus 5.5"}],"cvssRationale":"AV:N: MISP is a network-accessible web application; the attacker interacts via the HTTP API. AC:L: exploitation requires only signing an event with a revoked key and submitting it; no race conditions or special timing. AT:N: no special targeting beyond network reachability to the MISP instance. PR:L: the attacker must be an authenticated sync user with permission to add/edit protected events. UI:N: no victim interaction is required. VC:N: no confidentiality impact is evident. VI:H: integrity is significantly impacted because revoked keys retain signing authority and revocations are not applied, undermining the trust chain for protected events. VA:N: the 500-error issue is minor and does not constitute a meaningful availability impact. SC:N: no secondary confidentiality impact. SI:H: in a multi-instance MISP sync network, events signed by revoked keys can propagate to peer instances, extending the integrity compromise. SA:N: no secondary availability impact.","draft":false,"fixSummary":"The fix enforces key revocation in signature validation by skipping any key whose revoked flag is set before attempting PGP verification. It corrects the key-sync query to retrieve all stored keys (not just the first), ensures revocations are persisted and never lifted by a subsequent push, properly removes keys absent from the pushed list, and computes a fingerprint for entries that lack one so they match their stored counterpart. A signed protected event with no keys is now refused with a proper error response instead of an unhandled 500.","generatedAt":"2026-11-19T14:35:26.990914Z","generator":"patch2vuln.py","model":"qwen3.8:27b","modelComparison":{"potentialErrors":[],"rankings":[{"agreementScore":11,"assumptionCount":7,"confidence":"medium","model":"qwen3.8:27b","score":5}],"selectedModel":"qwen3.8:27b","selectionMethod":"deterministic-consensus-v1","selectionNotice":"The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required."},"patchSha256":"ad525a5a81462a3936cd6ad7cb153b93b23ec465ba010b8634cee54bcb6c7d87","patchSummary":"In CryptographicKey.php: (1) validateProtectedEvent() now checks $supplied_key['revoked'] and continues (skips) if set, before calling verifySignature(). (2) captureCryptographicKeyUpdate() changes find('first') to find('all') so all stored keys are considered. (3) A pre-loop computes a fingerprint via extractKeyData() for pushed entries that lack one. (4) The revocation branch is restructured: it now saves only the revoked flag (id + revoked=1) and the condition uses !empty() checks to ensure a revocation is never lifted. (5) The $existingKey array access is flattened (removing the nested 'CryptographicKey' key). (6) deleteAll() is guarded with an empty check on $toRemove. (7) The no-keys error message includes the event UUID and the log entry uses event ID 0. In tests/testregressions.py: a new ProtectedEventKeyRevocation test class adds nine regression tests covering revoked-key rejection, unrevoked-key acceptance, revocation persistence, non-lifting of revocations, key removal, fingerprint-less entry match","patchTruncated":false,"patches":[{"commit":"eee1f8b675c5c472fa73b41982824c0c17dd639e","date":"Sat, 14 Nov 2026 12:53:39 +0100","patchSha256":"ad525a5a81462a3936cd6ad7cb153b93b23ec465ba010b8634cee54bcb6c7d87","retrievedAt":"2026-11-19T14:34:41.330303Z","source":"https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/eee1f8b67.patch","sourceUrl":"https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/eee1f8b67.patch","subject":"fix: [security] Revoked keys no longer sign protected events,"}],"source":"https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/eee1f8b67.patch","ssvc":{"options":[{"Exploitation":"none"},{"Automatable":"yes"},{"Technical Impact":"partial"}],"role":"Supplier","timestamp":"2026-11-19T14:35:26Z","version":"2.0.3"},"subject":"fix: [security] Revoked keys no longer sign protected events,","weaknessRationale":[{"cweId":"CWE-345","rationale":"The signature verification routine validated the cryptographic signature but failed to verify the authenticity/validity of the signing key by checking its revocation status. A revoked key was treated as a valid signing authority, which is a failure to fully verify data authenticity."},{"cweId":"CWE-287","rationale":"The system accepted a revoked key as a valid credential for signing protected events, effectively failing to authenticate the signer's current authorization status. The key revocation mechanism was bypassed."}]}},"bcp-05-x-03":{"x_timeline":{"events":[{"description":"Corrective change authored (eee1f8b675c5c472fa73b41982824c0c17dd639e): fix: [security] Revoked keys no longer sign protected events,","id":"evt-fix-developed-1","references":["https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/eee1f8b67.patch"],"timestamp":"2026-11-14T11:53:39Z","type":"fix-developed"},{"description":"Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time.","id":"evt-fix-available-1","references":["https://github.com/MISP/MISP/commit/eee1f8b67.patch"],"timestamp":"2026-11-19T14:34:41.330303Z","type":"fix-available"}]}}},"recordType":"advisory","vulnId":"gcve-1-2026-20236"}]}},"cveMetadata":{"assignerOrgId":"5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8","assignerShortName":"CIRCL","cveId":"CVE-2026-133190","datePublished":"2026-11-19T14:44:46.132Z","dateReserved":"2026-11-19T14:44:40.990Z","dateUpdated":"2026-11-19T14:52:25.872Z","state":"PUBLISHED"},"dataType":"CVE_RECORD","dataVersion":"5.2"},"nvd":{"publishedDate":"2026-11-19 15:17:39","lastModifiedDate":"2026-11-19 15:17:40","problem_types":["CWE-287","CWE-345","CWE-345 CWE-345 Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity","CWE-287 CWE-287 Improper Authentication"],"metrics":{"cvssMetricV40":[{"source":"5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8","type":"Secondary","cvssData":{"version":"4.0","vectorString":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","baseScore":6.3,"baseSeverity":"MEDIUM","attackVector":"NETWORK","attackComplexity":"HIGH","attackRequirements":"NONE","privilegesRequired":"NONE","userInteraction":"NONE","vulnConfidentialityImpact":"NONE","vulnIntegrityImpact":"LOW","vulnAvailabilityImpact":"NONE","subConfidentialityImpact":"NONE","subIntegrityImpact":"NONE","subAvailabilityImpact":"NONE","exploitMaturity":"NOT_DEFINED","confidentialityRequirement":"NOT_DEFINED","integrityRequirement":"NOT_DEFINED","availabilityRequirement":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedAttackVector":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedAttackComplexity":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedAttackRequirements":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedPrivilegesRequired":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedUserInteraction":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedSubIntegrityImpact":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact":"NOT_DEFINED","Safety":"NOT_DEFINED","Automatable":"NOT_DEFINED","Recovery":"NOT_DEFINED","valueDensity":"NOT_DEFINED","vulnerabilityResponseEffort":"NOT_DEFINED","providerUrgency":"NOT_DEFINED"}}],"cvssMetricV31":[{"source":"5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8","type":"Secondary","cvssData":{"version":"3.1","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N","baseScore":3.7,"baseSeverity":"LOW","attackVector":"NETWORK","attackComplexity":"HIGH","privilegesRequired":"NONE","userInteraction":"NONE","scope":"UNCHANGED","confidentialityImpact":"NONE","integrityImpact":"LOW","availabilityImpact":"NONE"},"exploitabilityScore":2.2,"impactScore":1.4}],"ssvcV203":[{"source":"5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8","ssvcData":{"timestamp":"2026-11-19T14:35:26Z","options":[{"exploitation":"none"},{"automatable":"yes"},{"technicalImpact":"partial"}],"role":"Supplier","version":"2.0.3"}},{"source":"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0","ssvcData":{"timestamp":"2026-11-19T14:52:11.814868Z","id":"CVE-2026-133190","options":[{"exploitation":"none"},{"automatable":"no"},{"technicalImpact":"partial"}],"role":"CISA Coordinator","version":"2.0.3"}}]},"configurations":[]},"legacy_mitre":{"record":{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"133190","Ordinal":"1","Title":"MISP CryptographicKey: Revoked PGP Keys Still Validate Protected","CVE":"CVE-2026-133190","Year":"2026"},"notes":[{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"133190","Ordinal":"1","NoteData":"MISP, a threat intelligence sharing platform, contains a vulnerability in its cryptographic key management for protected (PGP-signed) events. Two related defects allow a revoked PGP key to remain effective for signing and validating protected events.\n\nFirst, the validateProtectedEvent() method in the CryptographicKey model iterates over the event's stored cryptographic keys to verify a PGP signature but does not check the revoked flag on each key. A key explicitly marked as revoked is still used to validate signatures, meaning an entity whose key has been revoked can continue to sign protected events and have them accepted by the MISP instance.\n\nSecond, the captureCryptographicKeyUpdate() method, responsible for synchronizing the key list when a sync user edits a protected event, contained a query bug (find('first') instead of find('all')) that caused only the first stored key to be considered. As a result, revocations of additional keys were never persisted, keys absent from the pushed list were not removed, and entries lacking an explicit fingerprint were mismatched and incorrectly deleted. Additionally, the revocation logic did not enforce the invariant that a revocation, once stored, is never lifted by subsequent pushes.\n\nA third minor issue: a signed protected event submitted without any cryptographic keys triggered an unhandled 500 error rather than a proper rejection response.\n\nPreconditions: the attacker must be an authenticated sync user with permission to add or edit protected events on the MISP instance. The impact is that revoked keys retain signing authority, key revocations propagated by sync partners are silently dropped, and the integrity of the protected-event trust chain is compromised. In a multi-instance MISP deployment, events signed by revoked keys can propagate to other instances, extending the integrity impact across the sync network.","Type":"Description","Title":"MISP CryptographicKey: Revoked PGP Keys Still Validate Protected"}]}}}