{"api_version":"1","generated_at":"2026-11-20T19:06:12+00:00","cve":"CVE-2026-133652","urls":{"html":"https://cve.report/CVE-2026-133652","api":"https://cve.report/api/cve/CVE-2026-133652.json","docs":"https://cve.report/api","cve_org":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-133652","nvd":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-133652"},"summary":{"title":"Flowintel Session Identifiers Not Bound to Credentials Allow Persistent Access After Password Change","description":"Flowintel , contained a session management vulnerability in its browser authentication mechanism. The session identifier used a bare numeric user ID rather than a credential-bound token, resulting in several related weaknesses:\n\n- Remembered logins (remember-me cookies) remained valid after a user changed their password, allowing an attacker holding a previously issued cookie to retain access indefinitely.\n- Server-side session identifiers were not rotated upon login (local, SSO, or remembered), enabling session fixation.\n- Self-service email and password changes did not require verification of the current password, permitting an attacker with an active session to modify account credentials without knowledge of the existing password.\n- Administrator-initiated password resets did not revoke other browser sessions, invalidate remembered logins, or rotate the affected user's API key.\n\nAn attacker who obtained a valid session or remember-me cookie (e.g., through XSS, network interception, or cookie theft) could maintain unauthorized access even after the legitimate user changed their password. Additionally, an attacker with any valid session could change the account's email address or password without knowing the current credentials, effectively taking over the account.\n\nAffected versions: Flowintel prior to 4.1.0.","state":"PUBLISHED","assigner":"CIRCL","published_at":"2026-11-20 11:18:33","updated_at":"2026-11-20 17:18:19"},"problem_types":["CWE-287","CWE-384","CWE-613","CWE-613 CWE-613 Insufficient Session Expiration","CWE-384 CWE-384 Session Fixation","CWE-287 CWE-287 Improper Authentication"],"metrics":[{"version":"4.0","source":"5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8","type":"Secondary","score":"7.2","severity":"HIGH","vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","data":{"version":"4.0","vectorString":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","baseScore":7.2,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","attackVector":"NETWORK","attackComplexity":"LOW","attackRequirements":"NONE","privilegesRequired":"LOW","userInteraction":"NONE","vulnConfidentialityImpact":"LOW","vulnIntegrityImpact":"HIGH","vulnAvailabilityImpact":"HIGH","subConfidentialityImpact":"NONE","subIntegrityImpact":"NONE","subAvailabilityImpact":"NONE","exploitMaturity":"NOT_DEFINED","confidentialityRequirement":"NOT_DEFINED","integrityRequirement":"NOT_DEFINED","availabilityRequirement":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedAttackVector":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedAttackComplexity":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedAttackRequirements":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedPrivilegesRequired":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedUserInteraction":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedSubIntegrityImpact":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact":"NOT_DEFINED","Safety":"NOT_DEFINED","Automatable":"NOT_DEFINED","Recovery":"NOT_DEFINED","valueDensity":"NOT_DEFINED","vulnerabilityResponseEffort":"NOT_DEFINED","providerUrgency":"NOT_DEFINED"}},{"version":"4.0","source":"CNA","type":"CVSS","score":"7.2","severity":"HIGH","vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","data":{"Automatable":"NOT_DEFINED","Recovery":"NOT_DEFINED","Safety":"NOT_DEFINED","attackComplexity":"LOW","attackRequirements":"NONE","attackVector":"NETWORK","baseScore":7.2,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","privilegesRequired":"LOW","providerUrgency":"NOT_DEFINED","subAvailabilityImpact":"NONE","subConfidentialityImpact":"NONE","subIntegrityImpact":"NONE","userInteraction":"NONE","valueDensity":"NOT_DEFINED","vectorString":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","version":"4.0","vulnAvailabilityImpact":"HIGH","vulnConfidentialityImpact":"LOW","vulnIntegrityImpact":"HIGH","vulnerabilityResponseEffort":"NOT_DEFINED"}}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/a7f025ecfdf60dc0ea3438c79b21a8edc2449836","name":"https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/a7f025ecfdf60dc0ea3438c79b21a8edc2449836","refsource":"5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-133652","name":"CVE Program record","refsource":"CVE.ORG","tags":["canonical"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-133652","name":"NVD vulnerability detail","refsource":"NVD","tags":["canonical","analysis"]}],"affected":[{"source":"CNA","vendor":"flowintel","product":"flowintel","version":"affected 4.1.0 semver","platforms":[]}],"timeline":[],"solutions":[{"source":"CNA","title":"","value":"The fix binds browser session identifiers to the account's current credentials using an HMAC-SHA256 token derived from the user ID, auth provider, creation date, and password hash. All login paths (local, SSO, remembered) now rotate the server-side session ID. Self-service email and password changes require the current password. A self-service password change refreshes the owner's session while revoking all other browser sessions and remembered logins. Administrator password resets additionally rotate the user's API key. Legacy bare-ID session identifiers are rejected by the user loader, and session housekeeping code is updated to parse the new format safely.","time":"","lang":"en"}],"workarounds":[],"exploits":[],"credits":[{"source":"CNA","value":"elhoim","lang":"en"},{"source":"CNA","value":"David Cruciani","lang":"en"}],"nvd_cpes":[],"vendor_comments":[],"enrichments":{"kev":null,"epss":null,"legacy_qids":[]},"source_records":{"cve_program":{"containers":{"adp":[{"metrics":[{"other":{"content":{"id":"CVE-2026-133652","options":[{"Exploitation":"none"},{"Automatable":"no"},{"Technical Impact":"partial"}],"role":"CISA Coordinator","timestamp":"2026-11-20T16:23:44.790740Z","version":"2.0.3"},"type":"ssvc"}}],"providerMetadata":{"dateUpdated":"2026-11-20T16:39:25.381Z","orgId":"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0","shortName":"CISA-ADP"},"title":"CISA ADP Vulnrichment"}],"cna":{"affected":[{"cpes":["cpe:2.3:a:flowintel:flowintel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"],"modules":["app/account/account.py","app/account/form.py","app/admin/admin_core.py","app/db_class/db.py","app/chatbot/chatbot_core.py"],"product":"flowintel","programFiles":[],"repo":"https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel","vendor":"flowintel","versions":[{"lessThan":"4.1.0","status":"affected","version":"0","versionType":"semver"}]}],"cpeApplicability":[{"nodes":[{"cpeMatch":[{"criteria":"cpe:2.3:a:flowintel:flowintel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","vulnerable":true}],"negate":false,"operator":"OR"}]}],"credits":[{"lang":"en","type":"reporter","value":"elhoim"},{"lang":"en","type":"remediation developer","value":"David Cruciani"}],"descriptions":[{"lang":"en","value":"Flowintel , contained a session management vulnerability in its browser authentication mechanism. The session identifier used a bare numeric user ID rather than a credential-bound token, resulting in several related weaknesses:\n\n- Remembered logins (remember-me cookies) remained valid after a user changed their password, allowing an attacker holding a previously issued cookie to retain access indefinitely.\n- Server-side session identifiers were not rotated upon login (local, SSO, or remembered), enabling session fixation.\n- Self-service email and password changes did not require verification of the current password, permitting an attacker with an active session to modify account credentials without knowledge of the existing password.\n- Administrator-initiated password resets did not revoke other browser sessions, invalidate remembered logins, or rotate the affected user's API key.\n\nAn attacker who obtained a valid session or remember-me cookie (e.g., through XSS, network interception, or cookie theft) could maintain unauthorized access even after the legitimate user changed their password. Additionally, an attacker with any valid session could change the account's email address or password without knowing the current credentials, effectively taking over the account.\n\nAffected versions: Flowintel prior to 4.1.0."}],"impacts":[{"capecId":"CAPEC-18","descriptions":[{"lang":"en","value":"CAPEC-18 Session Prediction"}]},{"capecId":"CAPEC-60","descriptions":[{"lang":"en","value":"CAPEC-60 Session Hijacking"}]}],"metrics":[{"cvssV4_0":{"Automatable":"NOT_DEFINED","Recovery":"NOT_DEFINED","Safety":"NOT_DEFINED","attackComplexity":"LOW","attackRequirements":"NONE","attackVector":"NETWORK","baseScore":7.2,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","privilegesRequired":"LOW","providerUrgency":"NOT_DEFINED","subAvailabilityImpact":"NONE","subConfidentialityImpact":"NONE","subIntegrityImpact":"NONE","userInteraction":"NONE","valueDensity":"NOT_DEFINED","vectorString":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","version":"4.0","vulnAvailabilityImpact":"HIGH","vulnConfidentialityImpact":"LOW","vulnIntegrityImpact":"HIGH","vulnerabilityResponseEffort":"NOT_DEFINED"},"format":"CVSS","scenarios":[{"lang":"en","value":"GENERAL"}]},{"format":"SSVC","other":{"content":{"options":[{"Exploitation":"none"},{"Automatable":"yes"},{"Technical Impact":"total"}],"role":"Supplier","timestamp":"2026-11-20T10:20:10Z","version":"2.0.3"},"type":"SSVC"},"scenarios":[{"lang":"en","value":"GENERAL"}]}],"problemTypes":[{"descriptions":[{"cweId":"CWE-613","description":"CWE-613 Insufficient Session Expiration","lang":"en","type":"CWE"}]},{"descriptions":[{"cweId":"CWE-384","description":"CWE-384 Session Fixation","lang":"en","type":"CWE"}]},{"descriptions":[{"cweId":"CWE-287","description":"CWE-287 Improper Authentication","lang":"en","type":"CWE"}]}],"providerMetadata":{"dateUpdated":"2026-11-20T10:24:38.906Z","orgId":"5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8","shortName":"CIRCL"},"references":[{"name":"Security patch","tags":["patch"],"url":"https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/a7f025ecfdf60dc0ea3438c79b21a8edc2449836"}],"solutions":[{"lang":"en","value":"The fix binds browser session identifiers to the account's current credentials using an HMAC-SHA256 token derived from the user ID, auth provider, creation date, and password hash. All login paths (local, SSO, remembered) now rotate the server-side session ID. Self-service email and password changes require the current password. A self-service password change refreshes the owner's session while revoking all other browser sessions and remembered logins. Administrator password resets additionally rotate the user's API key. Legacy bare-ID session identifiers are rejected by the user loader, and session housekeeping code is updated to parse the new format safely."}],"title":"Flowintel Session Identifiers Not Bound to Credentials Allow Persistent Access After Password Change","x_gcve":[{"extensions":{"bcp-05-x-01":{"ai_annotations":[{"ai_level":"generated","description":"Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.","gna_source":1,"models":[{"gna_source":1,"identifier":"qwen3.8:27b","name":"qwen3.8:27b","source":"ollama"}],"review_status":"full","scope":"record","tags":["ai-computer-assisted:llm-generated","ai-computer-assisted:classification"]}]},"bcp-05-x-02":{"x_patch2vuln":{"assumptions":["The affected version range is inferred from the explicit context (affected_version '0', fixed_version '4.1.0'); the patch itself does not enumerate specific prior versions.","CVSS PR:L assumes the attacker already holds a valid session or remember-me cookie; if the attacker must first obtain one via a separate vulnerability, the effective privilege requirement may be higher.","CVSS VC:L is assigned because a persistent session grants data access, but the primary impact is integrity (account takeover) rather than direct data exfiltration.","CAPEC-18 (Session Prediction) is selected as the closest match because the bare user ID is the root cause of the predictability; however, the patch's primary remediation is credential binding and session rotation rather than increasing token entropy, so the mapping is approximate.","The patch does not specify whether the vulnerability was reported through a coordinated disclosure process or a public channel; elhoim is credited as reporter based solely on the commit message.","The SSVC 'automatable: yes' assessment assumes the attacker can script session reuse or credential modification via HTTP requests; no evidence of an existing automated exploit is present."],"capecRationale":[{"capecId":"CAPEC-18","rationale":"The session identifier was a bare sequential user ID, making it trivially predictable. An attacker who knew or guessed a user's ID could construct a valid session identifier without any cryptographic secret. This is the closest CAPEC to the root cause: the session token lacked unpredictability and was not bound to any secret. The uncertainty is that the patch's primary fix is credential binding and session rotation rather than increasing token entropy, but the predictability of the bare ID is the enabling condition for the session persistence and fixation issues."},{"capecId":"CAPEC-60","rationale":"An attacker who obtained a valid session or remember-me cookie (via XSS, network sniffing, or other means) could maintain access after the legitimate user changed their password, effectively hijacking the session indefinitely. The lack of session revocation on credential change and the absence of session ID rotation made this hijack persistent. This is a secondary mapping; CAPEC-18 is preferred as the root cause, but CAPEC-60 better describes the attacker's end-to-end goal."}],"commit":"a7f025ecfdf60dc0ea3438c79b21a8edc2449836","confidence":"medium","credits":[{"lang":"en","type":"reporter","value":"elhoim"},{"lang":"en","type":"remediation developer","value":"David Cruciani"}],"cvssRationale":"AV:N: The vulnerability is in a web application accessible over the network. AC:L: Exploitation requires only a valid session or remember-me cookie and knowledge of the user ID (often sequential); no special race conditions or complex timing are needed. AT:N: No manipulation of the attack target is required. PR:L: The attacker needs a low-privilege valid session (any authenticated user) or a stolen remember-me cookie; no administrative access is required. UI:N: The session persists without any further user interaction; the victim does not need to perform any action for the attacker to retain access. VC:L: An attacker with a persistent session can view data accessible to the compromised account, but this is a secondary effect. VI:H: The attacker can change the account's email and password without knowing the current password, resulting in full account takeover and persistent unauthorized access. VA:H: The legitimate user's access is undermined by the attacker's persistent session, and the attacker can maintain indefinite access. SC/SI/SA:N: The impact is confined to the Flowintel application itself; no other components are directly affected.","fixSummary":"The fix binds browser session identifiers to the account's current credentials using an HMAC-SHA256 token derived from the user ID, auth provider, creation date, and password hash. All login paths (local, SSO, remembered) now rotate the server-side session ID. Self-service email and password changes require the current password. A self-service password change refreshes the owner's session while revoking all other browser sessions and remembered logins. Administrator password resets additionally rotate the user's API key. Legacy bare-ID session identifiers are rejected by the user loader, and session housekeeping code is updated to parse the new format safely.","generatedAt":"2026-11-20T10:20:10.629438Z","generator":"patch2vuln.py","model":"qwen3.8:27b","modelComparison":{"potentialErrors":[],"rankings":[{"agreementScore":11,"assumptionCount":6,"confidence":"medium","model":"qwen3.8:27b","score":6}],"selectedModel":"qwen3.8:27b","selectionMethod":"deterministic-consensus-v1","selectionNotice":"The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required."},"patchSha256":"cc71c944b258cbbb2691a3c344be8ab238c168c273adbfd4caa4f051a1bf0315","patchSummary":"Added a session_token() method to the User model that computes an HMAC-SHA256 over the user ID, auth provider, creation date, and password hash; get_id() now returns a composite identifier of the form 'id:token'. The load_user callback validates the new format and rejects legacy bare IDs using constant-time comparison. A _start_user_session() helper clears the session, logs out, logs in, and regenerates the session ID; it replaces all prior login_user() call sites across local, Entra ID, Keycloak, and SimpleSAML login flows. A user_loaded_from_cookie signal handler triggers session ID rotation on remembered-login restoration. A current_password field and validator were added to the EditUserForm, requiring the existing password for email or password changes on local accounts. The admin_edit_user_core function now regenerates the API key on password reset. The _invalidate_user_sessions and list_active_user_sessions helpers were updated to parse the new identifier format via a session_user_id() helper. 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The session identifier (a bare user ID) did not incorporate any credential state, so sessions outlived password changes and could be restored after deletion. This is a textbook insufficient session expiration issue."},{"cweId":"CWE-384","rationale":"Server-side session IDs were not rotated upon any login event (local, SSO, or remembered). An attacker could fix a known session ID before the victim authenticated and retain access afterward. The patch adds session ID regeneration on all authentication transitions."},{"cweId":"CWE-287","rationale":"The session identifier was a bare, predictable numeric user ID with no cryptographic binding to the account's credentials. This allowed session identifiers to be trivially guessed or forged by anyone who knew a user's ID, constituting improper authentication. The uncertainty is that the primary impact is session persistence rather than direct forgery, but the root cause is the lack of credential binding in the authentication token."}]}},"bcp-05-x-03":{"x_timeline":{"events":[{"description":"Corrective change authored (a7f025ecfdf60dc0ea3438c79b21a8edc2449836): fix: [security] Revoke browser sessions when credentials","id":"evt-fix-developed-1","references":["https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/a7f025ecfdf60dc0ea3438c79b21a8edc2449836.patch"],"timestamp":"2026-11-02T13:43:10Z","type":"fix-developed"},{"description":"Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time.","id":"evt-fix-available-1","references":["https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/a7f025ecfdf60dc0ea3438c79b21a8edc2449836.patch"],"timestamp":"2026-11-20T10:19:26.228826Z","type":"fix-available"}]}}},"recordType":"advisory","vulnId":"GCVE-1-2026-20365"}]}},"cveMetadata":{"assignerOrgId":"5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8","assignerShortName":"CIRCL","cveId":"CVE-2026-133652","datePublished":"2026-11-20T10:24:38.906Z","dateReserved":"2026-11-20T10:24:36.475Z","dateUpdated":"2026-11-20T16:39:25.381Z","state":"PUBLISHED"},"dataType":"CVE_RECORD","dataVersion":"5.2"},"nvd":{"publishedDate":"2026-11-20 11:18:33","lastModifiedDate":"2026-11-20 17:18:19","problem_types":["CWE-287","CWE-384","CWE-613","CWE-613 CWE-613 Insufficient Session Expiration","CWE-384 CWE-384 Session Fixation","CWE-287 CWE-287 Improper Authentication"],"metrics":{"cvssMetricV40":[{"source":"5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8","type":"Secondary","cvssData":{"version":"4.0","vectorString":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","baseScore":7.2,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","attackVector":"NETWORK","attackComplexity":"LOW","attackRequirements":"NONE","privilegesRequired":"LOW","userInteraction":"NONE","vulnConfidentialityImpact":"LOW","vulnIntegrityImpact":"HIGH","vulnAvailabilityImpact":"HIGH","subConfidentialityImpact":"NONE","subIntegrityImpact":"NONE","subAvailabilityImpact":"NONE","exploitMaturity":"NOT_DEFINED","confidentialityRequirement":"NOT_DEFINED","integrityRequirement":"NOT_DEFINED","availabilityRequirement":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedAttackVector":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedAttackComplexity":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedAttackRequirements":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedPrivilegesRequired":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedUserInteraction":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedSubIntegrityImpact":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact":"NOT_DEFINED","Safety":"NOT_DEFINED","Automatable":"NOT_DEFINED","Recovery":"NOT_DEFINED","valueDensity":"NOT_DEFINED","vulnerabilityResponseEffort":"NOT_DEFINED","providerUrgency":"NOT_DEFINED"}}],"ssvcV203":[{"source":"5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8","ssvcData":{"timestamp":"2026-11-20T10:20:10Z","options":[{"exploitation":"none"},{"automatable":"yes"},{"technicalImpact":"total"}],"role":"Supplier","version":"2.0.3"}},{"source":"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0","ssvcData":{"timestamp":"2026-11-20T16:23:44.790740Z","id":"CVE-2026-133652","options":[{"exploitation":"none"},{"automatable":"no"},{"technicalImpact":"partial"}],"role":"CISA Coordinator","version":"2.0.3"}}]},"configurations":[]},"legacy_mitre":{"record":{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"133652","Ordinal":"1","Title":"Flowintel Session Identifiers Not Bound to Credentials Allow Per","CVE":"CVE-2026-133652","Year":"2026"},"notes":[{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"133652","Ordinal":"1","NoteData":"Flowintel , contained a session management vulnerability in its browser authentication mechanism. The session identifier used a bare numeric user ID rather than a credential-bound token, resulting in several related weaknesses:\n\n- Remembered logins (remember-me cookies) remained valid after a user changed their password, allowing an attacker holding a previously issued cookie to retain access indefinitely.\n- Server-side session identifiers were not rotated upon login (local, SSO, or remembered), enabling session fixation.\n- Self-service email and password changes did not require verification of the current password, permitting an attacker with an active session to modify account credentials without knowledge of the existing password.\n- Administrator-initiated password resets did not revoke other browser sessions, invalidate remembered logins, or rotate the affected user's API key.\n\nAn attacker who obtained a valid session or remember-me cookie (e.g., through XSS, network interception, or cookie theft) could maintain unauthorized access even after the legitimate user changed their password. Additionally, an attacker with any valid session could change the account's email address or password without knowing the current credentials, effectively taking over the account.\n\nAffected versions: Flowintel prior to 4.1.0.","Type":"Description","Title":"Flowintel Session Identifiers Not Bound to Credentials Allow Per"}]}}}