{"api_version":"1","generated_at":"2026-07-31T20:52:05+00:00","cve":"CVE-2026-17350","urls":{"html":"https://cve.report/CVE-2026-17350","api":"https://cve.report/api/cve/CVE-2026-17350.json","docs":"https://cve.report/api","cve_org":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-17350","nvd":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-17350"},"summary":{"title":"pgAdmin 4: Tool permission bypass via backend routes and Socket.IO handlers","description":"The per-tool permission system (custom roles / role-based tool permissions, introduced in pgAdmin 4 9.3) did not enforce its permission check consistently. In SERVER mode, pgAdmin 4 gates each tool behind a per-tool Flask-Security permission, but the permission decorator (permissions_required) was applied only to a single \"front door\" route per tool. Every other backend route and Socket.IO handler in that tool's workflow relied solely on pga_login_required/socket_login_required, which check authentication but not the tool permission.\n\nThe reporter verified three cases against a test build: (1) a user without tools_query_tool permission received 403 on the protected sqleditor initialization route, but the same session went on to connect the server, initialize the viewdata backend chain, and retrieve real table row content; (2) a user without tools_grant_wizard received 403 on the protected acl route, but the same session still enumerated grantable objects, generated GRANT SQL, and successfully applied it -- confirmed database-side via has_table_privilege(); (3) a user without tools_schema_diff received 403 on the protected panel route, but the same session initialized schema diff, enumerated and connected databases, and obtained real DDL differences via the compare_database Socket.IO handler. The reporter also confirmed a related but distinct issue: a non-owner triggering /misc/workspace/adhoc_connect_server against an administrator-owned shared server caused pgAdmin to persist a new server row still owned by the administrator (user_id/shared unchanged from the source), even though the connection attempt itself reported failure.\n\nDuring remediation, the same front-door-only permission gap was found to also affect the ERD, PSQL, and Debugger tools, and the Backup, Restore, Maintenance, and Import/Export blueprints, none of which were part of the original report; these were fixed using the same pattern as an extension of the reported defect class.\n\nAn authenticated user who had valid pgAdmin login and a stored, working database connection, but had been explicitly denied a specific tool's permission by an administrator, could therefore still drive that tool end-to-end through its other routes and sockets, including obtaining an interactive psql session over the /pty Socket.IO namespace and invoking backup/restore/maintenance/import-export jobs.\n\nBecause the bypass only restores access to tools operating over the user's own already-authenticated database connection, it does not grant the user any database privilege they did not already hold; it circumvents pgAdmin's own tool-level access-control policy (an organisational segregation-of-duties control, separate from database-level authorization), letting a user reach a pgAdmin feature an administrator intended to withhold from them, using capabilities their existing database role already permits through other means.\n\nSocket.IO event handlers had no permission-aware equivalent of permissions_required; only socket_login_required existed, checking authentication but not the tool permission.\n\nFix adds a socket_permissions_required decorator (mirroring permissions_required, honouring the Administrator bypass, reading permissions via has_permission()) and applies it, alongside permissions_required, as the outermost decorator on every backend route and Socket.IO handler for the affected tools. Regression tests assert 403 on every gated route and socket handler for a permission-less user.\n\nThis issue affects pgAdmin 4 in SERVER mode: from 9.3 before 9.17.","state":"PUBLISHED","assigner":"PostgreSQL","published_at":"2026-07-31 16:16:59","updated_at":"2026-07-31 18:17:11"},"problem_types":["CWE-862","CWE-862 CWE-862 Missing Authorization"],"metrics":[{"version":"4.0","source":"f86ef6dc-4d3a-42ad-8f28-e6d5547a5007","type":"Secondary","score":"5.3","severity":"MEDIUM","vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","data":{"version":"4.0","vectorString":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","baseScore":5.3,"baseSeverity":"MEDIUM","attackVector":"NETWORK","attackComplexity":"LOW","attackRequirements":"NONE","privilegesRequired":"LOW","userInteraction":"NONE","vulnConfidentialityImpact":"LOW","vulnIntegrityImpact":"LOW","vulnAvailabilityImpact":"NONE","subConfidentialityImpact":"NONE","subIntegrityImpact":"NONE","subAvailabilityImpact":"NONE","exploitMaturity":"NOT_DEFINED","confidentialityRequirement":"NOT_DEFINED","integrityRequirement":"NOT_DEFINED","availabilityRequirement":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedAttackVector":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedAttackComplexity":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedAttackRequirements":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedPrivilegesRequired":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedUserInteraction":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedSubIntegrityImpact":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact":"NOT_DEFINED","Safety":"NOT_DEFINED","Automatable":"NOT_DEFINED","Recovery":"NOT_DEFINED","valueDensity":"NOT_DEFINED","vulnerabilityResponseEffort":"NOT_DEFINED","providerUrgency":"NOT_DEFINED"}},{"version":"4.0","source":"CNA","type":"CVSS","score":"5.3","severity":"MEDIUM","vector":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","data":{"baseScore":5.3,"baseSeverity":"MEDIUM","vectorString":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","version":"4.0"}},{"version":"3.1","source":"f86ef6dc-4d3a-42ad-8f28-e6d5547a5007","type":"Secondary","score":"5.4","severity":"MEDIUM","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N","data":{"version":"3.1","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N","baseScore":5.4,"baseSeverity":"MEDIUM","attackVector":"NETWORK","attackComplexity":"LOW","privilegesRequired":"LOW","userInteraction":"NONE","scope":"UNCHANGED","confidentialityImpact":"LOW","integrityImpact":"LOW","availabilityImpact":"NONE"}},{"version":"3.1","source":"CNA","type":"CVSS","score":"5.4","severity":"MEDIUM","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N","data":{"attackComplexity":"LOW","attackVector":"NETWORK","availabilityImpact":"NONE","baseScore":5.4,"baseSeverity":"MEDIUM","confidentialityImpact":"LOW","integrityImpact":"LOW","privilegesRequired":"LOW","scope":"UNCHANGED","userInteraction":"NONE","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N","version":"3.1"}}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/issues/10190","name":"https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/issues/10190","refsource":"f86ef6dc-4d3a-42ad-8f28-e6d5547a5007","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/commit/ba1984718ad703011740ad48cb9b82402b89cc2c","name":"https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/commit/ba1984718ad703011740ad48cb9b82402b89cc2c","refsource":"f86ef6dc-4d3a-42ad-8f28-e6d5547a5007","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/commit/64a9cdbd6a240a962144f84418beaf9e66419779","name":"https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/commit/64a9cdbd6a240a962144f84418beaf9e66419779","refsource":"f86ef6dc-4d3a-42ad-8f28-e6d5547a5007","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/commit/d36bd8dc96812c716664feac533d240544e70adc","name":"https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/commit/d36bd8dc96812c716664feac533d240544e70adc","refsource":"f86ef6dc-4d3a-42ad-8f28-e6d5547a5007","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/commit/461c3afba92baad37c70a6fbd52d205d13a9de53","name":"https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/commit/461c3afba92baad37c70a6fbd52d205d13a9de53","refsource":"f86ef6dc-4d3a-42ad-8f28-e6d5547a5007","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-17350","name":"CVE Program record","refsource":"CVE.ORG","tags":["canonical"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-17350","name":"NVD vulnerability detail","refsource":"NVD","tags":["canonical","analysis"]}],"affected":[{"source":"CNA","vendor":"pgadmin.org","product":"pgAdmin 4","version":"affected 9.3 9.17 custom","platforms":[]}],"timeline":[],"solutions":[],"workarounds":[],"exploits":[],"credits":[{"source":"CNA","value":"LXY (@TA-MU-TA)","lang":"en"},{"source":"CNA","value":"Dave Page <page@pgadmin.org>","lang":"en"},{"source":"CNA","value":"Ashesh Vashi <ashesh.vashi@enterprisedb.com>","lang":"en"},{"source":"CNA","value":"Ashesh Vashi <ashesh.vashi@enterprisedb.com>","lang":"en"},{"source":"CNA","value":"Kundan Sable <kundan.sable@enterprisedb.com>","lang":"en"}],"nvd_cpes":[],"vendor_comments":[],"enrichments":{"kev":null,"epss":null,"legacy_qids":[]},"source_records":{"cve_program":{"containers":{"adp":[{"metrics":[{"other":{"content":{"id":"CVE-2026-17350","options":[{"Exploitation":"none"},{"Automatable":"no"},{"Technical Impact":"partial"}],"role":"CISA Coordinator","timestamp":"2026-07-31T17:01:15.662893Z","version":"2.0.3"},"type":"ssvc"}}],"providerMetadata":{"dateUpdated":"2026-07-31T17:05:44.535Z","orgId":"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0","shortName":"CISA-ADP"},"title":"CISA ADP Vulnrichment"}],"cna":{"affected":[{"defaultStatus":"unaffected","modules":["Query Tool","Grant Wizard","Schema Diff","ERD Tool","PSQL Tool","Debugger","Backup","Restore","Maintenance","Import/Export"],"product":"pgAdmin 4","programFiles":["https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/blob/master/web/pgadmin/authenticate/__init__.py","https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/blob/master/web/pgadmin/tools/sqleditor/__init__.py","https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/blob/master/web/pgadmin/tools/grant_wizard/__init__.py","https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/blob/master/web/pgadmin/tools/schema_diff/__init__.py","https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/blob/master/web/pgadmin/tools/erd/__init__.py","https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/blob/master/web/pgadmin/tools/psql/__init__.py","https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/blob/master/web/pgadmin/tools/debugger/__init__.py","https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/blob/master/web/pgadmin/tools/backup/__init__.py","https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/blob/master/web/pgadmin/tools/restore/__init__.py","https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/blob/master/web/pgadmin/tools/maintenance/__init__.py","https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/blob/master/web/pgadmin/tools/import_export/__init__.py"],"repo":"https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4","vendor":"pgadmin.org","versions":[{"lessThan":"9.17","status":"affected","version":"9.3","versionType":"custom"}]}],"credits":[{"lang":"en","type":"finder","value":"LXY (@TA-MU-TA)"},{"lang":"en","type":"remediation developer","value":"Dave Page <page@pgadmin.org>"},{"lang":"en","type":"remediation developer","value":"Ashesh Vashi <ashesh.vashi@enterprisedb.com>"},{"lang":"en","type":"remediation reviewer","value":"Ashesh Vashi <ashesh.vashi@enterprisedb.com>"},{"lang":"en","type":"remediation reviewer","value":"Kundan Sable <kundan.sable@enterprisedb.com>"}],"descriptions":[{"lang":"en","value":"The per-tool permission system (custom roles / role-based tool permissions, introduced in pgAdmin 4 9.3) did not enforce its permission check consistently. In SERVER mode, pgAdmin 4 gates each tool behind a per-tool Flask-Security permission, but the permission decorator (permissions_required) was applied only to a single \"front door\" route per tool. Every other backend route and Socket.IO handler in that tool's workflow relied solely on pga_login_required/socket_login_required, which check authentication but not the tool permission.\n\nThe reporter verified three cases against a test build: (1) a user without tools_query_tool permission received 403 on the protected sqleditor initialization route, but the same session went on to connect the server, initialize the viewdata backend chain, and retrieve real table row content; (2) a user without tools_grant_wizard received 403 on the protected acl route, but the same session still enumerated grantable objects, generated GRANT SQL, and successfully applied it -- confirmed database-side via has_table_privilege(); (3) a user without tools_schema_diff received 403 on the protected panel route, but the same session initialized schema diff, enumerated and connected databases, and obtained real DDL differences via the compare_database Socket.IO handler. The reporter also confirmed a related but distinct issue: a non-owner triggering /misc/workspace/adhoc_connect_server against an administrator-owned shared server caused pgAdmin to persist a new server row still owned by the administrator (user_id/shared unchanged from the source), even though the connection attempt itself reported failure.\n\nDuring remediation, the same front-door-only permission gap was found to also affect the ERD, PSQL, and Debugger tools, and the Backup, Restore, Maintenance, and Import/Export blueprints, none of which were part of the original report; these were fixed using the same pattern as an extension of the reported defect class.\n\nAn authenticated user who had valid pgAdmin login and a stored, working database connection, but had been explicitly denied a specific tool's permission by an administrator, could therefore still drive that tool end-to-end through its other routes and sockets, including obtaining an interactive psql session over the /pty Socket.IO namespace and invoking backup/restore/maintenance/import-export jobs.\n\nBecause the bypass only restores access to tools operating over the user's own already-authenticated database connection, it does not grant the user any database privilege they did not already hold; it circumvents pgAdmin's own tool-level access-control policy (an organisational segregation-of-duties control, separate from database-level authorization), letting a user reach a pgAdmin feature an administrator intended to withhold from them, using capabilities their existing database role already permits through other means.\n\nSocket.IO event handlers had no permission-aware equivalent of permissions_required; only socket_login_required existed, checking authentication but not the tool permission.\n\nFix adds a socket_permissions_required decorator (mirroring permissions_required, honouring the Administrator bypass, reading permissions via has_permission()) and applies it, alongside permissions_required, as the outermost decorator on every backend route and Socket.IO handler for the affected tools. Regression tests assert 403 on every gated route and socket handler for a permission-less user.\n\nThis issue affects pgAdmin 4 in SERVER mode: from 9.3 before 9.17."}],"metrics":[{"cvssV3_1":{"attackComplexity":"LOW","attackVector":"NETWORK","availabilityImpact":"NONE","baseScore":5.4,"baseSeverity":"MEDIUM","confidentialityImpact":"LOW","integrityImpact":"LOW","privilegesRequired":"LOW","scope":"UNCHANGED","userInteraction":"NONE","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N","version":"3.1"},"format":"CVSS","scenarios":[{"lang":"en","value":"Threat model: an authenticated SERVER-mode pgAdmin user, who already has a stored working database connection, has been explicitly denied one or more tool permissions by an administrator as an in-app segregation-of-duties policy. By calling the tool's non-entry-point backend routes or Socket.IO handlers directly (bypassing the UI, which only surfaces the gated entry point), the user regains functional access to the tool. Scope is Unchanged: the bypass stays entirely within pgAdmin's own authorization model and the database connection the user already legitimately holds -- it does not grant any new database privilege, only pgAdmin's own UI/feature access that an administrator intended to withhold. Confidentiality/Integrity impact is capped at Low because the marginal capability gained beyond the user's own pre-existing database role is bounded (an alternate in-app SQL client / GRANT-issuing UI / interactive psql session against a database they can already reach); Availability is None since none of the bypassed routes on their own cause denial of service."}]},{"cvssV4_0":{"baseScore":5.3,"baseSeverity":"MEDIUM","vectorString":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","version":"4.0"},"format":"CVSS","scenarios":[{"lang":"en","value":"Same reasoning as the CVSS 3.1 entry: an authenticated, permission-denied user drives ungated backend routes/sockets to use a tool they were blocked from, but the marginal capability gained is bounded by the database privileges the user already legitimately holds. VC:L/VI:L reflect that bounded marginal gain; VA:N since none of the bypassed routes independently cause denial of service. No subsequent system beyond pgAdmin's own authorization scope is affected, so SC:N/SI:N/SA:N."}]}],"problemTypes":[{"descriptions":[{"cweId":"CWE-862","description":"CWE-862 Missing Authorization","lang":"en","type":"CWE"}]}],"providerMetadata":{"dateUpdated":"2026-07-31T16:00:03.744Z","orgId":"f86ef6dc-4d3a-42ad-8f28-e6d5547a5007","shortName":"PostgreSQL"},"references":[{"tags":["issue-tracking"],"url":"https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/issues/10190"},{"tags":["patch"],"url":"https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/commit/461c3afba92baad37c70a6fbd52d205d13a9de53"},{"tags":["patch"],"url":"https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/commit/d36bd8dc96812c716664feac533d240544e70adc"},{"tags":["patch"],"url":"https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/commit/ba1984718ad703011740ad48cb9b82402b89cc2c"},{"tags":["patch"],"url":"https://github.com/pgadmin-org/pgadmin4/commit/64a9cdbd6a240a962144f84418beaf9e66419779"}],"source":{"discovery":"EXTERNAL"},"title":"pgAdmin 4: Tool permission bypass via backend routes and Socket.IO handlers"}},"cveMetadata":{"assignerOrgId":"f86ef6dc-4d3a-42ad-8f28-e6d5547a5007","assignerShortName":"PostgreSQL","cveId":"CVE-2026-17350","datePublished":"2026-07-31T16:00:03.744Z","dateReserved":"2026-07-25T02:52:56.800Z","dateUpdated":"2026-07-31T17:05:44.535Z","state":"PUBLISHED"},"dataType":"CVE_RECORD","dataVersion":"5.2"},"nvd":{"publishedDate":"2026-07-31 16:16:59","lastModifiedDate":"2026-07-31 18:17:11","problem_types":["CWE-862","CWE-862 CWE-862 Missing Authorization"],"metrics":{"cvssMetricV40":[{"source":"f86ef6dc-4d3a-42ad-8f28-e6d5547a5007","type":"Secondary","cvssData":{"version":"4.0","vectorString":"CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X","baseScore":5.3,"baseSeverity":"MEDIUM","attackVector":"NETWORK","attackComplexity":"LOW","attackRequirements":"NONE","privilegesRequired":"LOW","userInteraction":"NONE","vulnConfidentialityImpact":"LOW","vulnIntegrityImpact":"LOW","vulnAvailabilityImpact":"NONE","subConfidentialityImpact":"NONE","subIntegrityImpact":"NONE","subAvailabilityImpact":"NONE","exploitMaturity":"NOT_DEFINED","confidentialityRequirement":"NOT_DEFINED","integrityRequirement":"NOT_DEFINED","availabilityRequirement":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedAttackVector":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedAttackComplexity":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedAttackRequirements":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedPrivilegesRequired":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedUserInteraction":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedSubIntegrityImpact":"NOT_DEFINED","modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact":"NOT_DEFINED","Safety":"NOT_DEFINED","Automatable":"NOT_DEFINED","Recovery":"NOT_DEFINED","valueDensity":"NOT_DEFINED","vulnerabilityResponseEffort":"NOT_DEFINED","providerUrgency":"NOT_DEFINED"}}],"cvssMetricV31":[{"source":"f86ef6dc-4d3a-42ad-8f28-e6d5547a5007","type":"Secondary","cvssData":{"version":"3.1","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N","baseScore":5.4,"baseSeverity":"MEDIUM","attackVector":"NETWORK","attackComplexity":"LOW","privilegesRequired":"LOW","userInteraction":"NONE","scope":"UNCHANGED","confidentialityImpact":"LOW","integrityImpact":"LOW","availabilityImpact":"NONE"},"exploitabilityScore":2.8,"impactScore":2.5}],"ssvcV203":[{"source":"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0","ssvcData":{"timestamp":"2026-07-31T17:01:15.662893Z","id":"CVE-2026-17350","options":[{"exploitation":"none"},{"automatable":"no"},{"technicalImpact":"partial"}],"role":"CISA Coordinator","version":"2.0.3"}}]},"configurations":[]},"legacy_mitre":{"record":{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"17350","Ordinal":"1","Title":"pgAdmin 4: Tool permission bypass via backend routes and Socket.","CVE":"CVE-2026-17350","Year":"2026"},"notes":[{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"17350","Ordinal":"1","NoteData":"The per-tool permission system (custom roles / role-based tool permissions, introduced in pgAdmin 4 9.3) did not enforce its permission check consistently. In SERVER mode, pgAdmin 4 gates each tool behind a per-tool Flask-Security permission, but the permission decorator (permissions_required) was applied only to a single \"front door\" route per tool. Every other backend route and Socket.IO handler in that tool's workflow relied solely on pga_login_required/socket_login_required, which check authentication but not the tool permission.\n\nThe reporter verified three cases against a test build: (1) a user without tools_query_tool permission received 403 on the protected sqleditor initialization route, but the same session went on to connect the server, initialize the viewdata backend chain, and retrieve real table row content; (2) a user without tools_grant_wizard received 403 on the protected acl route, but the same session still enumerated grantable objects, generated GRANT SQL, and successfully applied it -- confirmed database-side via has_table_privilege(); (3) a user without tools_schema_diff received 403 on the protected panel route, but the same session initialized schema diff, enumerated and connected databases, and obtained real DDL differences via the compare_database Socket.IO handler. The reporter also confirmed a related but distinct issue: a non-owner triggering /misc/workspace/adhoc_connect_server against an administrator-owned shared server caused pgAdmin to persist a new server row still owned by the administrator (user_id/shared unchanged from the source), even though the connection attempt itself reported failure.\n\nDuring remediation, the same front-door-only permission gap was found to also affect the ERD, PSQL, and Debugger tools, and the Backup, Restore, Maintenance, and Import/Export blueprints, none of which were part of the original report; these were fixed using the same pattern as an extension of the reported defect class.\n\nAn authenticated user who had valid pgAdmin login and a stored, working database connection, but had been explicitly denied a specific tool's permission by an administrator, could therefore still drive that tool end-to-end through its other routes and sockets, including obtaining an interactive psql session over the /pty Socket.IO namespace and invoking backup/restore/maintenance/import-export jobs.\n\nBecause the bypass only restores access to tools operating over the user's own already-authenticated database connection, it does not grant the user any database privilege they did not already hold; it circumvents pgAdmin's own tool-level access-control policy (an organisational segregation-of-duties control, separate from database-level authorization), letting a user reach a pgAdmin feature an administrator intended to withhold from them, using capabilities their existing database role already permits through other means.\n\nSocket.IO event handlers had no permission-aware equivalent of permissions_required; only socket_login_required existed, checking authentication but not the tool permission.\n\nFix adds a socket_permissions_required decorator (mirroring permissions_required, honouring the Administrator bypass, reading permissions via has_permission()) and applies it, alongside permissions_required, as the outermost decorator on every backend route and Socket.IO handler for the affected tools. Regression tests assert 403 on every gated route and socket handler for a permission-less user.\n\nThis issue affects pgAdmin 4 in SERVER mode: from 9.3 before 9.17.","Type":"Description","Title":"pgAdmin 4: Tool permission bypass via backend routes and Socket."}]}}}