{"api_version":"1","generated_at":"2026-08-06T20:40:41+00:00","cve":"CVE-2026-18108","urls":{"html":"https://cve.report/CVE-2026-18108","api":"https://cve.report/api/cve/CVE-2026-18108.json","docs":"https://cve.report/api","cve_org":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-18108","nvd":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-18108"},"summary":{"title":"Net::SAML2 versions before 0.86 for Perl allow authentication bypass because _verify_encrypted_assertion accepts an EncryptedAssertion whose decrypted content carries no signature","description":"Net::SAML2 versions before 0.86 for Perl allow authentication bypass because _verify_encrypted_assertion accepts an EncryptedAssertion whose decrypted content carries no signature.\n\n_verify_encrypted_assertion decrypts the EncryptedAssertion and returns it as verified when it carries no signature, via \"return $xml unless $xpath->exists('dsig:Signature', $assert);\". The signature check and the trust anchor check that follow run only when a signature is present, so a decrypted assertion with no dsig:Signature element reaches new_from_xml unverified and its NameID and attributes are read into the assertion object. An SP's encryption certificate is published in its SAML metadata so the IdP can encrypt to it, so any party can encrypt an unsigned assertion to that certificate, wrap it in a samlp:Response, and post it to the assertion consumer service.\n\nAny caller that configures a decryption key_file, and so accepts EncryptedAssertions, takes identity fields from an assertion that no trust anchor covers, and an unauthenticated party can authenticate as an arbitrary user. Callers with no key_file configured do not decrypt and are unaffected.","state":"PUBLISHED","assigner":"CPANSec","published_at":"2026-08-03 14:16:25","updated_at":"2026-08-06 18:37:01"},"problem_types":["CWE-347","CWE-347 CWE-347 Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature"],"metrics":[{"version":"3.1","source":"ADP","type":"DECLARED","score":"9.8","severity":"CRITICAL","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","data":{"attackComplexity":"LOW","attackVector":"NETWORK","availabilityImpact":"HIGH","baseScore":9.8,"baseSeverity":"CRITICAL","confidentialityImpact":"HIGH","integrityImpact":"HIGH","privilegesRequired":"NONE","scope":"UNCHANGED","userInteraction":"NONE","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","version":"3.1"}},{"version":"3.1","source":"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0","type":"Secondary","score":"9.8","severity":"CRITICAL","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","data":{"version":"3.1","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","baseScore":9.8,"baseSeverity":"CRITICAL","attackVector":"NETWORK","attackComplexity":"LOW","privilegesRequired":"NONE","userInteraction":"NONE","scope":"UNCHANGED","confidentialityImpact":"HIGH","integrityImpact":"HIGH","availabilityImpact":"HIGH"}}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/perl-net-saml2/perl-Net-SAML2/commit/d916468586404518b8cf3c78dbd001cc1f1046a7.patch","name":"https://github.com/perl-net-saml2/perl-Net-SAML2/commit/d916468586404518b8cf3c78dbd001cc1f1046a7.patch","refsource":"9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e","tags":["Patch"],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://metacpan.org/release/TIMLEGGE/Net-SAML2-0.85/source/lib/Net/SAML2/Protocol/Assertion.pm#L78","name":"https://metacpan.org/release/TIMLEGGE/Net-SAML2-0.85/source/lib/Net/SAML2/Protocol/Assertion.pm#L78","refsource":"9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e","tags":["Product"],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://metacpan.org/release/TIMLEGGE/Net-SAML2-0.86/changes","name":"https://metacpan.org/release/TIMLEGGE/Net-SAML2-0.86/changes","refsource":"9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e","tags":["Release 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consumed.","time":"","lang":"en"}],"exploits":[],"credits":[],"nvd_cpes":[{"cve_year":"2026","cve_id":"18108","vulnerable":"1","versionEndIncluding":"","cpe1":"cpe","cpe2":"2.3","cpe3":"a","cpe4":"timlegge","cpe5":"net\\","cpe6":"\\","cpe7":"saml2","cpe8":"*","cpe9":"*","cpe10":"*","cpe11":"*","cpe12":"*","cpe13":"perl"}],"vendor_comments":[],"enrichments":{"kev":null,"epss":{"cve_year":"2026","cve_id":"18108","cve":"CVE-2026-18108","epss":"0.002200000","percentile":"0.125830000","score_date":"2026-08-05","updated_at":"2026-08-06 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The signature check and the trust anchor check that follow run only when a signature is present, so a decrypted assertion with no dsig:Signature element reaches new_from_xml unverified and its NameID and attributes are read into the assertion object. An SP's encryption certificate is published in its SAML metadata so the IdP can encrypt to it, so any party can encrypt an unsigned assertion to that certificate, wrap it in a samlp:Response, and post it to the assertion consumer service.\n\nAny caller that configures a decryption key_file, and so accepts EncryptedAssertions, takes identity fields from an assertion that no trust anchor covers, and an unauthenticated party can authenticate as an arbitrary user. Callers with no key_file configured do not decrypt and are unaffected."}],"impacts":[{"capecId":"CAPEC-115","descriptions":[{"lang":"en","value":"CAPEC-115 Authentication Bypass"}]}],"problemTypes":[{"descriptions":[{"cweId":"CWE-347","description":"CWE-347 Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature","lang":"en","type":"CWE"}]}],"providerMetadata":{"dateUpdated":"2026-08-03T13:00:23.347Z","orgId":"9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e","shortName":"CPANSec"},"references":[{"tags":["patch"],"url":"https://github.com/perl-net-saml2/perl-Net-SAML2/commit/d916468586404518b8cf3c78dbd001cc1f1046a7.patch"},{"tags":["release-notes"],"url":"https://metacpan.org/release/TIMLEGGE/Net-SAML2-0.86/changes"},{"url":"https://metacpan.org/release/TIMLEGGE/Net-SAML2-0.85/source/lib/Net/SAML2/Protocol/Assertion.pm#L78"}],"solutions":[{"lang":"en","value":"Upgrade to Net::SAML2 0.86 or later, which refuses to extract assertion content unless a signature covering the assertion chains to the configured trust anchor."}],"source":{"discovery":"UNKNOWN"},"title":"Net::SAML2 versions before 0.86 for Perl allow authentication bypass because _verify_encrypted_assertion accepts an EncryptedAssertion whose decrypted content carries no signature","workarounds":[{"lang":"en","value":"For deployments that cannot upgrade to 0.86, do not configure a decryption key_file, so EncryptedAssertions are never decrypted and consumed."}],"x_generator":{"engine":"cpansec-cna-tool 0.1"}}},"cveMetadata":{"assignerOrgId":"9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e","assignerShortName":"CPANSec","cveId":"CVE-2026-18108","datePublished":"2026-08-03T13:00:23.347Z","dateReserved":"2026-07-28T17:55:20.903Z","dateUpdated":"2026-08-03T19:57:38.266Z","state":"PUBLISHED"},"dataType":"CVE_RECORD","dataVersion":"5.2"},"nvd":{"publishedDate":"2026-08-03 14:16:25","lastModifiedDate":"2026-08-06 18:37:01","problem_types":["CWE-347","CWE-347 CWE-347 Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature"],"metrics":{"cvssMetricV31":[{"source":"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0","type":"Secondary","cvssData":{"version":"3.1","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","baseScore":9.8,"baseSeverity":"CRITICAL","attackVector":"NETWORK","attackComplexity":"LOW","privilegesRequired":"NONE","userInteraction":"NONE","scope":"UNCHANGED","confidentialityImpact":"HIGH","integrityImpact":"HIGH","availabilityImpact":"HIGH"},"exploitabilityScore":3.9,"impactScore":5.9}],"ssvcV203":[{"source":"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0","ssvcData":{"timestamp":"2026-08-03T19:57:16.653167Z","id":"CVE-2026-18108","options":[{"exploitation":"none"},{"automatable":"yes"},{"technicalImpact":"total"}],"role":"CISA Coordinator","version":"2.0.3"}}]},"configurations":[{"nodes":[{"operator":"OR","negate":false,"cpeMatch":[{"vulnerable":true,"criteria":"cpe:2.3:a:timlegge:net\\:\\:saml2:*:*:*:*:*:perl:*:*","versionEndExcluding":"0.86","matchCriteriaId":"69FF1709-62F7-4E8C-B90D-ABFA96B07FF1"}]}]}]},"legacy_mitre":{"record":{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"18108","Ordinal":"1","Title":"Net::SAML2 versions before 0.86 for Perl allow authentication by","CVE":"CVE-2026-18108","Year":"2026"},"notes":[{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"18108","Ordinal":"1","NoteData":"Net::SAML2 versions before 0.86 for Perl allow authentication bypass because _verify_encrypted_assertion accepts an EncryptedAssertion whose decrypted content carries no signature.\n\n_verify_encrypted_assertion decrypts the EncryptedAssertion and returns it as verified when it carries no signature, via \"return $xml unless $xpath->exists('dsig:Signature', $assert);\". The signature check and the trust anchor check that follow run only when a signature is present, so a decrypted assertion with no dsig:Signature element reaches new_from_xml unverified and its NameID and attributes are read into the assertion object. An SP's encryption certificate is published in its SAML metadata so the IdP can encrypt to it, so any party can encrypt an unsigned assertion to that certificate, wrap it in a samlp:Response, and post it to the assertion consumer service.\n\nAny caller that configures a decryption key_file, and so accepts EncryptedAssertions, takes identity fields from an assertion that no trust anchor covers, and an unauthenticated party can authenticate as an arbitrary user. Callers with no key_file configured do not decrypt and are unaffected.","Type":"Description","Title":"Net::SAML2 versions before 0.86 for Perl allow authentication by"}]}}}