{"api_version":"1","generated_at":"2026-10-22T01:15:59+00:00","cve":"CVE-2026-18418","urls":{"html":"https://cve.report/CVE-2026-18418","api":"https://cve.report/api/cve/CVE-2026-18418.json","docs":"https://cve.report/api","cve_org":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-18418","nvd":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-18418"},"summary":{"title":"Out-of-bounds read when the zbus proxy agent IPC backend logs a rejected peer frame's channel name","description":"The zbus proxy agent IPC backend in subsys/zbus/proxy_agent/zbus_proxy_agent_ipc.c logged the channel name of a rejected inter-domain frame with a plain %s conversion. The frame type struct zbus_proxy_msg carries a fixed-size channel_name[] array as its last member, and nothing in the transport guarantees the array is NUL-terminated. The only code that verifies termination is zbus_proxy_agent_receive_cb() in subsys/zbus/proxy_agent/zbus_proxy_agent.c, which rejects the frame in precisely those cases — so the warning printed a non-terminated buffer exactly on the error paths where the name had been found invalid (or, for an invalid message_size, had not been inspected at all).\n\nAny peer domain able to place a frame of sizeof(struct zbus_proxy_msg) bytes on the bound ipc_service endpoint can trigger it, by sending a frame with an out-of-range message_size or with channel_name[] containing no NUL byte. Reaching the code requires CONFIG_ZBUS_PROXY_AGENT_IPC and logging built at warning level or above (the default), and requires control over the firmware of the peer domain — typically a second core on the same SoC.\n\nThe resulting strlen() inside the log packager walks past the end of the frame object until it finds a zero byte. With the icmsg backend the frame lives in a stack buffer of the IPC work-queue thread, so bytes of that thread's stack are rendered into the log message; with the rpmsg backends the scan continues through the shared vring memory. Impact is bounded to disclosure of a small amount of adjacent memory into the receiving domain's log sink, plus a possible fatal fault if the scan leaves a mapped region; the log packager's own -ENOSPC bound prevents the overrun from becoming a write. The fix bounds the conversion with %.*s and MIN(msg->channel_name_len, sizeof(msg->channel_name)).","state":"PUBLISHED","assigner":"zephyr","published_at":"2026-10-11 18:16:58","updated_at":"2026-10-15 19:17:36"},"problem_types":["CWE-125","CWE-125 bounds"],"metrics":[{"version":"3.1","source":"vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org","type":"Secondary","score":"3.4","severity":"LOW","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:L","data":{"version":"3.1","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:L","baseScore":3.4,"baseSeverity":"LOW","attackVector":"LOCAL","attackComplexity":"LOW","privilegesRequired":"HIGH","userInteraction":"NONE","scope":"UNCHANGED","confidentialityImpact":"LOW","integrityImpact":"NONE","availabilityImpact":"LOW"}},{"version":"3.1","source":"CNA","type":"CVSS","score":"3.4","severity":"LOW","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:L","data":{"baseScore":3.4,"baseSeverity":"LOW","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:L","version":"3.1"}}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/fc065f79a568a6c6cc14b89795bd60e5eabd6f02","name":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/fc065f79a568a6c6cc14b89795bd60e5eabd6f02","refsource":"vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-48w8-fjhj-r9w8","name":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-48w8-fjhj-r9w8","refsource":"vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-18418","name":"CVE Program record","refsource":"CVE.ORG","tags":["canonical"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-18418","name":"NVD vulnerability detail","refsource":"NVD","tags":["canonical","analysis"]}],"affected":[{"source":"CNA","vendor":"zephyrproject","product":"zephyr","version":"affected 4.4.0 4.4.2 semver","platforms":[]}],"timeline":[],"solutions":[],"workarounds":[],"exploits":[],"credits":[],"nvd_cpes":[],"vendor_comments":[],"enrichments":{"kev":null,"epss":{"cve_year":"2026","cve_id":"18418","cve":"CVE-2026-18418","epss":"0.001090000","percentile":"0.011430000","score_date":"2026-10-12","updated_at":"2026-10-13 00:11:16"},"legacy_qids":[]},"source_records":{"cve_program":{"containers":{"adp":[{"metrics":[{"other":{"content":{"id":"CVE-2026-18418","options":[{"Exploitation":"none"},{"Automatable":"no"},{"Technical Impact":"partial"}],"role":"CISA Coordinator","timestamp":"2026-10-15T17:51:25.324466Z","version":"2.0.3"},"type":"ssvc"}}],"providerMetadata":{"dateUpdated":"2026-10-15T18:09:08.898Z","orgId":"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0","shortName":"CISA-ADP"},"title":"CISA ADP Vulnrichment"}],"cna":{"affected":[{"collectionURL":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr","defaultStatus":"unaffected","packageName":"zephyr","product":"zephyr","programFiles":["subsys/zbus/proxy_agent/zbus_proxy_agent_ipc.c"],"programRoutines":[{"name":"zbus_proxy_agent_ipc_recv_callback"}],"vendor":"zephyrproject","versions":[{"lessThan":"4.4.2","status":"affected","version":"4.4.0","versionType":"semver"}]}],"descriptions":[{"lang":"en","value":"The zbus proxy agent IPC backend in subsys/zbus/proxy_agent/zbus_proxy_agent_ipc.c logged the channel name of a rejected inter-domain frame with a plain %s conversion. The frame type struct zbus_proxy_msg carries a fixed-size channel_name[] array as its last member, and nothing in the transport guarantees the array is NUL-terminated. The only code that verifies termination is zbus_proxy_agent_receive_cb() in subsys/zbus/proxy_agent/zbus_proxy_agent.c, which rejects the frame in precisely those cases — so the warning printed a non-terminated buffer exactly on the error paths where the name had been found invalid (or, for an invalid message_size, had not been inspected at all).\n\nAny peer domain able to place a frame of sizeof(struct zbus_proxy_msg) bytes on the bound ipc_service endpoint can trigger it, by sending a frame with an out-of-range message_size or with channel_name[] containing no NUL byte. Reaching the code requires CONFIG_ZBUS_PROXY_AGENT_IPC and logging built at warning level or above (the default), and requires control over the firmware of the peer domain — typically a second core on the same SoC.\n\nThe resulting strlen() inside the log packager walks past the end of the frame object until it finds a zero byte. With the icmsg backend the frame lives in a stack buffer of the IPC work-queue thread, so bytes of that thread's stack are rendered into the log message; with the rpmsg backends the scan continues through the shared vring memory. Impact is bounded to disclosure of a small amount of adjacent memory into the receiving domain's log sink, plus a possible fatal fault if the scan leaves a mapped region; the log packager's own -ENOSPC bound prevents the overrun from becoming a write. The fix bounds the conversion with %.*s and MIN(msg->channel_name_len, sizeof(msg->channel_name))."}],"metrics":[{"cvssV3_1":{"baseScore":3.4,"baseSeverity":"LOW","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:L","version":"3.1"},"format":"CVSS"}],"problemTypes":[{"descriptions":[{"cweId":"CWE-125","description":"bounds","lang":"en","type":"CWE"}]}],"providerMetadata":{"dateUpdated":"2026-10-11T17:15:00.221Z","orgId":"e2e69745-5e70-4e92-8431-deb5529a81ad","shortName":"zephyr"},"references":[{"name":"Fix commit","tags":["patch"],"url":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/fc065f79a568a6c6cc14b89795bd60e5eabd6f02"},{"name":"GHSA-48w8-fjhj-r9w8","url":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-48w8-fjhj-r9w8"}],"title":"Out-of-bounds read when the zbus proxy agent IPC backend logs a rejected peer frame's channel name","x_generator":{"engine":"cvelib 1.8.0"}}},"cveMetadata":{"assignerOrgId":"e2e69745-5e70-4e92-8431-deb5529a81ad","assignerShortName":"zephyr","cveId":"CVE-2026-18418","datePublished":"2026-10-11T17:15:00.221Z","dateReserved":"2026-07-30T17:54:15.055Z","dateUpdated":"2026-10-15T18:09:08.898Z","state":"PUBLISHED"},"dataType":"CVE_RECORD","dataVersion":"5.2"},"nvd":{"publishedDate":"2026-10-11 18:16:58","lastModifiedDate":"2026-10-15 19:17:36","problem_types":["CWE-125","CWE-125 bounds"],"metrics":{"cvssMetricV31":[{"source":"vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org","type":"Secondary","cvssData":{"version":"3.1","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:L","baseScore":3.4,"baseSeverity":"LOW","attackVector":"LOCAL","attackComplexity":"LOW","privilegesRequired":"HIGH","userInteraction":"NONE","scope":"UNCHANGED","confidentialityImpact":"LOW","integrityImpact":"NONE","availabilityImpact":"LOW"},"exploitabilityScore":0.8,"impactScore":2.5}],"ssvcV203":[{"source":"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0","ssvcData":{"timestamp":"2026-10-15T17:51:25.324466Z","id":"CVE-2026-18418","options":[{"exploitation":"none"},{"automatable":"no"},{"technicalImpact":"partial"}],"role":"CISA Coordinator","version":"2.0.3"}}]},"configurations":[]},"legacy_mitre":{"record":{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"18418","Ordinal":"1","Title":"Out-of-bounds read when the zbus proxy agent IPC backend logs a ","CVE":"CVE-2026-18418","Year":"2026"},"notes":[{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"18418","Ordinal":"1","NoteData":"The zbus proxy agent IPC backend in subsys/zbus/proxy_agent/zbus_proxy_agent_ipc.c logged the channel name of a rejected inter-domain frame with a plain %s conversion. The frame type struct zbus_proxy_msg carries a fixed-size channel_name[] array as its last member, and nothing in the transport guarantees the array is NUL-terminated. The only code that verifies termination is zbus_proxy_agent_receive_cb() in subsys/zbus/proxy_agent/zbus_proxy_agent.c, which rejects the frame in precisely those cases — so the warning printed a non-terminated buffer exactly on the error paths where the name had been found invalid (or, for an invalid message_size, had not been inspected at all).\n\nAny peer domain able to place a frame of sizeof(struct zbus_proxy_msg) bytes on the bound ipc_service endpoint can trigger it, by sending a frame with an out-of-range message_size or with channel_name[] containing no NUL byte. Reaching the code requires CONFIG_ZBUS_PROXY_AGENT_IPC and logging built at warning level or above (the default), and requires control over the firmware of the peer domain — typically a second core on the same SoC.\n\nThe resulting strlen() inside the log packager walks past the end of the frame object until it finds a zero byte. With the icmsg backend the frame lives in a stack buffer of the IPC work-queue thread, so bytes of that thread's stack are rendered into the log message; with the rpmsg backends the scan continues through the shared vring memory. Impact is bounded to disclosure of a small amount of adjacent memory into the receiving domain's log sink, plus a possible fatal fault if the scan leaves a mapped region; the log packager's own -ENOSPC bound prevents the overrun from becoming a write. The fix bounds the conversion with %.*s and MIN(msg->channel_name_len, sizeof(msg->channel_name)).","Type":"Description","Title":"Out-of-bounds read when the zbus proxy agent IPC backend logs a "}]}}}