{"api_version":"1","generated_at":"2026-10-10T15:37:28+00:00","cve":"CVE-2026-19184","urls":{"html":"https://cve.report/CVE-2026-19184","api":"https://cve.report/api/cve/CVE-2026-19184.json","docs":"https://cve.report/api","cve_org":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-19184","nvd":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-19184"},"summary":{"title":"Out-of-bounds write in the NXP GAU ADC driver due to byte-versus-sample buffer size validation mismatch","description":"The NXP GAU ADC driver (drivers/adc/adc_mcux_gau_adc.c) validated the caller-supplied sequence->buffer_size, which is expressed in bytes, against the number of active channels, which is a sample count. It then stored that byte count directly in data->results_length and used it in mcux_gau_adc_read_samples() as the number of uint16_t slots available. Because each conversion result occupies sizeof(uint16_t) bytes, a buffer that was accepted as \"large enough\" could be written with up to twice its size in bytes, so every sample past the buffer's midpoint was written out of bounds.\n\nadc_read() and adc_read_async() are Zephyr system calls. The syscall verifier in drivers/adc/adc_handlers.c only confirms that the caller owns buffer_size writable bytes (K_SYSCALL_MEMORY_WRITE); deciding whether that size is sufficient for the requested channels and extra_samplings is delegated entirely to the driver. On a build with CONFIG_USERSPACE=y, a user-mode thread that has been granted the ADC device object could therefore submit a deliberately half-sized buffer and cause the driver's work-queue handler — which runs in supervisor mode, outside the caller's MPU restrictions — to write ADC conversion results past the end of that buffer, at an address and for a length of the caller's choosing.\n\nThe overrun is bounded by the requested sequence: with sequence->options->extra_samplings set, the sampling loop walks the buffer pointer forward across every sampling, so the total overrun can reach the full size of the supplied buffer (kilobytes for a large extra_samplings). The written words are 16-bit ADC conversion results, so the content is only partially attacker-influenced (via the selected analog input, gain and resolution), but the destination and length are fully controlled — sufficient for kernel memory corruption, a crash, or a userspace-to-kernel privilege escalation. Builds without CONFIG_USERSPACE, or on SoCs other than NXP RW61x with the GAU ADC node enabled, are not exposed to the privilege boundary; there the same defect only causes a silent overflow when the application itself passes an undersized buffer.\n\nThe fix replaces the ad-hoc check with the shared adc_sequence_validate_buffer() helper (validating against num_channels * sizeof(uint16_t)), stores buffer_size / sizeof(uint16_t) in results_length, and corrects the loop bound to a post-decrement so exactly the available number of slots may be written.","state":"PUBLISHED","assigner":"zephyr","published_at":"2026-10-05 09:17:12","updated_at":"2026-10-06 15:27:05"},"problem_types":["CWE-787","CWE-787 bounds"],"metrics":[{"version":"3.1","source":"vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org","type":"Secondary","score":"8.4","severity":"HIGH","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H","data":{"version":"3.1","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H","baseScore":8.4,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","attackVector":"LOCAL","attackComplexity":"LOW","privilegesRequired":"LOW","userInteraction":"NONE","scope":"CHANGED","confidentialityImpact":"NONE","integrityImpact":"HIGH","availabilityImpact":"HIGH"}},{"version":"3.1","source":"CNA","type":"CVSS","score":"8.4","severity":"HIGH","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H","data":{"baseScore":8.4,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H","version":"3.1"}}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-j86w-mfgw-fxj9","name":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-j86w-mfgw-fxj9","refsource":"vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/82b11958065aa85f8644ddc318ff4a328d1443c8","name":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/82b11958065aa85f8644ddc318ff4a328d1443c8","refsource":"vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-19184","name":"CVE Program record","refsource":"CVE.ORG","tags":["canonical"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-19184","name":"NVD vulnerability detail","refsource":"NVD","tags":["canonical","analysis"]}],"affected":[{"source":"CNA","vendor":"zephyrproject","product":"zephyr","version":"affected 3.7.0 4.5.0 semver","platforms":[]}],"timeline":[],"solutions":[],"workarounds":[],"exploits":[],"credits":[],"nvd_cpes":[],"vendor_comments":[],"enrichments":{"kev":null,"epss":{"cve_year":"2026","cve_id":"19184","cve":"CVE-2026-19184","epss":"0.001030000","percentile":"0.008990000","score_date":"2026-10-06","updated_at":"2026-10-07 00:14:54"},"legacy_qids":[]},"source_records":{"cve_program":{"containers":{"adp":[{"metrics":[{"other":{"content":{"id":"CVE-2026-19184","options":[{"Exploitation":"none"},{"Automatable":"no"},{"Technical Impact":"partial"}],"role":"CISA Coordinator","timestamp":"2026-10-05T13:23:22.615234Z","version":"2.0.3"},"type":"ssvc"}}],"providerMetadata":{"dateUpdated":"2026-10-05T13:23:31.086Z","orgId":"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0","shortName":"CISA-ADP"},"title":"CISA ADP Vulnrichment"}],"cna":{"affected":[{"collectionURL":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr","defaultStatus":"unaffected","packageName":"zephyr","product":"zephyr","programFiles":["drivers/adc/adc_mcux_gau_adc.c"],"programRoutines":[{"name":"mcux_gau_adc_do_read"},{"name":"mcux_gau_adc_read_samples"}],"vendor":"zephyrproject","versions":[{"lessThan":"4.5.0","status":"affected","version":"3.7.0","versionType":"semver"}]}],"descriptions":[{"lang":"en","value":"The NXP GAU ADC driver (drivers/adc/adc_mcux_gau_adc.c) validated the caller-supplied sequence->buffer_size, which is expressed in bytes, against the number of active channels, which is a sample count. It then stored that byte count directly in data->results_length and used it in mcux_gau_adc_read_samples() as the number of uint16_t slots available. Because each conversion result occupies sizeof(uint16_t) bytes, a buffer that was accepted as \"large enough\" could be written with up to twice its size in bytes, so every sample past the buffer's midpoint was written out of bounds.\n\nadc_read() and adc_read_async() are Zephyr system calls. The syscall verifier in drivers/adc/adc_handlers.c only confirms that the caller owns buffer_size writable bytes (K_SYSCALL_MEMORY_WRITE); deciding whether that size is sufficient for the requested channels and extra_samplings is delegated entirely to the driver. On a build with CONFIG_USERSPACE=y, a user-mode thread that has been granted the ADC device object could therefore submit a deliberately half-sized buffer and cause the driver's work-queue handler — which runs in supervisor mode, outside the caller's MPU restrictions — to write ADC conversion results past the end of that buffer, at an address and for a length of the caller's choosing.\n\nThe overrun is bounded by the requested sequence: with sequence->options->extra_samplings set, the sampling loop walks the buffer pointer forward across every sampling, so the total overrun can reach the full size of the supplied buffer (kilobytes for a large extra_samplings). The written words are 16-bit ADC conversion results, so the content is only partially attacker-influenced (via the selected analog input, gain and resolution), but the destination and length are fully controlled — sufficient for kernel memory corruption, a crash, or a userspace-to-kernel privilege escalation. Builds without CONFIG_USERSPACE, or on SoCs other than NXP RW61x with the GAU ADC node enabled, are not exposed to the privilege boundary; there the same defect only causes a silent overflow when the application itself passes an undersized buffer.\n\nThe fix replaces the ad-hoc check with the shared adc_sequence_validate_buffer() helper (validating against num_channels * sizeof(uint16_t)), stores buffer_size / sizeof(uint16_t) in results_length, and corrects the loop bound to a post-decrement so exactly the available number of slots may be written."}],"metrics":[{"cvssV3_1":{"baseScore":8.4,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H","version":"3.1"},"format":"CVSS"}],"problemTypes":[{"descriptions":[{"cweId":"CWE-787","description":"bounds","lang":"en","type":"CWE"}]}],"providerMetadata":{"dateUpdated":"2026-10-05T08:06:22.681Z","orgId":"e2e69745-5e70-4e92-8431-deb5529a81ad","shortName":"zephyr"},"references":[{"name":"Fix commit","tags":["patch"],"url":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/82b11958065aa85f8644ddc318ff4a328d1443c8"},{"name":"GHSA-j86w-mfgw-fxj9","url":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-j86w-mfgw-fxj9"}],"title":"Out-of-bounds write in the NXP GAU ADC driver due to byte-versus-sample buffer size validation mismatch","x_generator":{"engine":"cvelib 1.8.0"}}},"cveMetadata":{"assignerOrgId":"e2e69745-5e70-4e92-8431-deb5529a81ad","assignerShortName":"zephyr","cveId":"CVE-2026-19184","datePublished":"2026-10-05T08:06:22.681Z","dateReserved":"2026-08-06T18:36:10.589Z","dateUpdated":"2026-10-05T13:23:31.086Z","state":"PUBLISHED"},"dataType":"CVE_RECORD","dataVersion":"5.2"},"nvd":{"publishedDate":"2026-10-05 09:17:12","lastModifiedDate":"2026-10-06 15:27:05","problem_types":["CWE-787","CWE-787 bounds"],"metrics":{"cvssMetricV31":[{"source":"vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org","type":"Secondary","cvssData":{"version":"3.1","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H","baseScore":8.4,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","attackVector":"LOCAL","attackComplexity":"LOW","privilegesRequired":"LOW","userInteraction":"NONE","scope":"CHANGED","confidentialityImpact":"NONE","integrityImpact":"HIGH","availabilityImpact":"HIGH"},"exploitabilityScore":2,"impactScore":5.8}],"ssvcV203":[{"source":"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0","ssvcData":{"timestamp":"2026-10-05T13:23:22.615234Z","id":"CVE-2026-19184","options":[{"exploitation":"none"},{"automatable":"no"},{"technicalImpact":"partial"}],"role":"CISA Coordinator","version":"2.0.3"}}]},"configurations":[]},"legacy_mitre":{"record":{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"19184","Ordinal":"1","Title":"Out-of-bounds write in the NXP GAU ADC driver due to byte-versus","CVE":"CVE-2026-19184","Year":"2026"},"notes":[{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"19184","Ordinal":"1","NoteData":"The NXP GAU ADC driver (drivers/adc/adc_mcux_gau_adc.c) validated the caller-supplied sequence->buffer_size, which is expressed in bytes, against the number of active channels, which is a sample count. It then stored that byte count directly in data->results_length and used it in mcux_gau_adc_read_samples() as the number of uint16_t slots available. Because each conversion result occupies sizeof(uint16_t) bytes, a buffer that was accepted as \"large enough\" could be written with up to twice its size in bytes, so every sample past the buffer's midpoint was written out of bounds.\n\nadc_read() and adc_read_async() are Zephyr system calls. The syscall verifier in drivers/adc/adc_handlers.c only confirms that the caller owns buffer_size writable bytes (K_SYSCALL_MEMORY_WRITE); deciding whether that size is sufficient for the requested channels and extra_samplings is delegated entirely to the driver. On a build with CONFIG_USERSPACE=y, a user-mode thread that has been granted the ADC device object could therefore submit a deliberately half-sized buffer and cause the driver's work-queue handler — which runs in supervisor mode, outside the caller's MPU restrictions — to write ADC conversion results past the end of that buffer, at an address and for a length of the caller's choosing.\n\nThe overrun is bounded by the requested sequence: with sequence->options->extra_samplings set, the sampling loop walks the buffer pointer forward across every sampling, so the total overrun can reach the full size of the supplied buffer (kilobytes for a large extra_samplings). The written words are 16-bit ADC conversion results, so the content is only partially attacker-influenced (via the selected analog input, gain and resolution), but the destination and length are fully controlled — sufficient for kernel memory corruption, a crash, or a userspace-to-kernel privilege escalation. Builds without CONFIG_USERSPACE, or on SoCs other than NXP RW61x with the GAU ADC node enabled, are not exposed to the privilege boundary; there the same defect only causes a silent overflow when the application itself passes an undersized buffer.\n\nThe fix replaces the ad-hoc check with the shared adc_sequence_validate_buffer() helper (validating against num_channels * sizeof(uint16_t)), stores buffer_size / sizeof(uint16_t) in results_length, and corrects the loop bound to a post-decrement so exactly the available number of slots may be written.","Type":"Description","Title":"Out-of-bounds write in the NXP GAU ADC driver due to byte-versus"}]}}}