{"api_version":"1","generated_at":"2026-10-13T04:02:25+00:00","cve":"CVE-2026-19576","urls":{"html":"https://cve.report/CVE-2026-19576","api":"https://cve.report/api/cve/CVE-2026-19576.json","docs":"https://cve.report/api","cve_org":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-19576","nvd":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-19576"},"summary":{"title":"Stack out-of-bounds write in the Goodix GT911 touch controller driver from an unvalidated device-reported touch point count","description":"The Goodix GT9xx input driver in drivers/input/input_gt911.c reads the touch point count from the controller's status register and masks it with GT911_TOUCH_POINTS_MSK (0x0F), yielding a value of 0..15. In gt911_process() that value is used directly as the loop bound for filling point_reg[], a stack array sized to CONFIG_INPUT_GT911_MAX_TOUCH_POINTS, whose Kconfig range is 1..5 with a default of 1. No other check constrains the count; the driver relied only on a comment asserting that the controller had been programmed at init to report no more points than configured.\n\nEach loop iteration issues an I2C read of eight bytes straight into point_reg[i], so a controller that reports more points than the array holds causes up to 112 bytes of peer-supplied data to be written past the end of the array, over the stack frame of gt911_process() in the system workqueue thread. Two further loops then read out of bounds from the same array. Triggering it requires control of, or the ability to substitute, the I2C touch controller — plausible on the many supported boards where the GT9xx panel is a pluggable display module or shield rather than an on-PCB part; a spoofed device need only answer the init probes with a supported product ID and a checksum-valid config blob. The same overflow can also occur non-adversarially, with a GT9271-class panel that ignores the driver's touch-count programming and reports up to ten points, or with bus corruption of the single status byte.\n\nThe impact is an out-of-bounds stack write with fully attacker-chosen content executing at kernel privilege, i.e. potential control-flow hijack on the host MCU, in addition to out-of-bounds reads and crashes. The attack vector is physical/local hardware access only; there is no network, USB, or syscall path to the defect. The fix clamps the reported count with min() against CONFIG_INPUT_GT911_MAX_TOUCH_POINTS before any array indexing.","state":"PUBLISHED","assigner":"zephyr","published_at":"2026-10-11 18:16:58","updated_at":"2026-10-11 18:16:58"},"problem_types":["CWE-787","CWE-787 bounds"],"metrics":[{"version":"3.1","source":"vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org","type":"Secondary","score":"6.8","severity":"MEDIUM","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","data":{"version":"3.1","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","baseScore":6.8,"baseSeverity":"MEDIUM","attackVector":"PHYSICAL","attackComplexity":"LOW","privilegesRequired":"NONE","userInteraction":"NONE","scope":"UNCHANGED","confidentialityImpact":"HIGH","integrityImpact":"HIGH","availabilityImpact":"HIGH"}},{"version":"3.1","source":"CNA","type":"CVSS","score":"6.8","severity":"MEDIUM","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","data":{"baseScore":6.8,"baseSeverity":"MEDIUM","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","version":"3.1"}}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/42b52d571eb2113012c135276693042fd372fdea","name":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/42b52d571eb2113012c135276693042fd372fdea","refsource":"vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-p7qh-fvwx-f7vr","name":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-p7qh-fvwx-f7vr","refsource":"vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-19576","name":"CVE Program record","refsource":"CVE.ORG","tags":["canonical"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-19576","name":"NVD vulnerability detail","refsource":"NVD","tags":["canonical","analysis"]}],"affected":[{"source":"CNA","vendor":"zephyrproject","product":"zephyr","version":"affected 4.0.0 4.4.2 semver","platforms":[]}],"timeline":[],"solutions":[],"workarounds":[],"exploits":[],"credits":[],"nvd_cpes":[],"vendor_comments":[],"enrichments":{"kev":null,"epss":{"cve_year":"2026","cve_id":"19576","cve":"CVE-2026-19576","epss":"0.001690000","percentile":"0.057530000","score_date":"2026-10-12","updated_at":"2026-10-13 00:11:16"},"legacy_qids":[]},"source_records":{"cve_program":{"containers":{"cna":{"affected":[{"collectionURL":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr","defaultStatus":"unaffected","packageName":"zephyr","product":"zephyr","programFiles":["drivers/input/input_gt911.c"],"programRoutines":[{"name":"gt911_process"}],"vendor":"zephyrproject","versions":[{"lessThanOrEqual":"4.4.2","status":"affected","version":"4.0.0","versionType":"semver"}]}],"descriptions":[{"lang":"en","value":"The Goodix GT9xx input driver in drivers/input/input_gt911.c reads the touch point count from the controller's status register and masks it with GT911_TOUCH_POINTS_MSK (0x0F), yielding a value of 0..15. In gt911_process() that value is used directly as the loop bound for filling point_reg[], a stack array sized to CONFIG_INPUT_GT911_MAX_TOUCH_POINTS, whose Kconfig range is 1..5 with a default of 1. No other check constrains the count; the driver relied only on a comment asserting that the controller had been programmed at init to report no more points than configured.\n\nEach loop iteration issues an I2C read of eight bytes straight into point_reg[i], so a controller that reports more points than the array holds causes up to 112 bytes of peer-supplied data to be written past the end of the array, over the stack frame of gt911_process() in the system workqueue thread. Two further loops then read out of bounds from the same array. Triggering it requires control of, or the ability to substitute, the I2C touch controller — plausible on the many supported boards where the GT9xx panel is a pluggable display module or shield rather than an on-PCB part; a spoofed device need only answer the init probes with a supported product ID and a checksum-valid config blob. The same overflow can also occur non-adversarially, with a GT9271-class panel that ignores the driver's touch-count programming and reports up to ten points, or with bus corruption of the single status byte.\n\nThe impact is an out-of-bounds stack write with fully attacker-chosen content executing at kernel privilege, i.e. potential control-flow hijack on the host MCU, in addition to out-of-bounds reads and crashes. The attack vector is physical/local hardware access only; there is no network, USB, or syscall path to the defect. The fix clamps the reported count with min() against CONFIG_INPUT_GT911_MAX_TOUCH_POINTS before any array indexing."}],"metrics":[{"cvssV3_1":{"baseScore":6.8,"baseSeverity":"MEDIUM","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","version":"3.1"},"format":"CVSS"}],"problemTypes":[{"descriptions":[{"cweId":"CWE-787","description":"bounds","lang":"en","type":"CWE"}]}],"providerMetadata":{"dateUpdated":"2026-10-11T17:14:53.339Z","orgId":"e2e69745-5e70-4e92-8431-deb5529a81ad","shortName":"zephyr"},"references":[{"name":"Fix commit","tags":["patch"],"url":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/42b52d571eb2113012c135276693042fd372fdea"},{"name":"GHSA-p7qh-fvwx-f7vr","url":"https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-p7qh-fvwx-f7vr"}],"title":"Stack out-of-bounds write in the Goodix GT911 touch controller driver from an unvalidated device-reported touch point count","x_generator":{"engine":"cvelib 1.8.0"}}},"cveMetadata":{"assignerOrgId":"e2e69745-5e70-4e92-8431-deb5529a81ad","assignerShortName":"zephyr","cveId":"CVE-2026-19576","datePublished":"2026-10-11T17:14:53.339Z","dateReserved":"2026-08-11T19:56:48.396Z","dateUpdated":"2026-10-11T17:14:53.339Z","state":"PUBLISHED"},"dataType":"CVE_RECORD","dataVersion":"5.2"},"nvd":{"publishedDate":"2026-10-11 18:16:58","lastModifiedDate":"2026-10-11 18:16:58","problem_types":["CWE-787","CWE-787 bounds"],"metrics":{"cvssMetricV31":[{"source":"vulnerabilities@zephyrproject.org","type":"Secondary","cvssData":{"version":"3.1","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","baseScore":6.8,"baseSeverity":"MEDIUM","attackVector":"PHYSICAL","attackComplexity":"LOW","privilegesRequired":"NONE","userInteraction":"NONE","scope":"UNCHANGED","confidentialityImpact":"HIGH","integrityImpact":"HIGH","availabilityImpact":"HIGH"},"exploitabilityScore":0.9,"impactScore":5.9}]},"configurations":[]},"legacy_mitre":{"record":{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"19576","Ordinal":"1","Title":"Stack out-of-bounds write in the Goodix GT911 touch controller d","CVE":"CVE-2026-19576","Year":"2026"},"notes":[{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"19576","Ordinal":"1","NoteData":"The Goodix GT9xx input driver in drivers/input/input_gt911.c reads the touch point count from the controller's status register and masks it with GT911_TOUCH_POINTS_MSK (0x0F), yielding a value of 0..15. In gt911_process() that value is used directly as the loop bound for filling point_reg[], a stack array sized to CONFIG_INPUT_GT911_MAX_TOUCH_POINTS, whose Kconfig range is 1..5 with a default of 1. No other check constrains the count; the driver relied only on a comment asserting that the controller had been programmed at init to report no more points than configured.\n\nEach loop iteration issues an I2C read of eight bytes straight into point_reg[i], so a controller that reports more points than the array holds causes up to 112 bytes of peer-supplied data to be written past the end of the array, over the stack frame of gt911_process() in the system workqueue thread. Two further loops then read out of bounds from the same array. Triggering it requires control of, or the ability to substitute, the I2C touch controller — plausible on the many supported boards where the GT9xx panel is a pluggable display module or shield rather than an on-PCB part; a spoofed device need only answer the init probes with a supported product ID and a checksum-valid config blob. The same overflow can also occur non-adversarially, with a GT9271-class panel that ignores the driver's touch-count programming and reports up to ten points, or with bus corruption of the single status byte.\n\nThe impact is an out-of-bounds stack write with fully attacker-chosen content executing at kernel privilege, i.e. potential control-flow hijack on the host MCU, in addition to out-of-bounds reads and crashes. The attack vector is physical/local hardware access only; there is no network, USB, or syscall path to the defect. The fix clamps the reported count with min() against CONFIG_INPUT_GT911_MAX_TOUCH_POINTS before any array indexing.","Type":"Description","Title":"Stack out-of-bounds write in the Goodix GT911 touch controller d"}]}}}