{"api_version":"1","generated_at":"2026-04-24T08:11:08+00:00","cve":"CVE-2026-41318","urls":{"html":"https://cve.report/CVE-2026-41318","api":"https://cve.report/api/cve/CVE-2026-41318.json","docs":"https://cve.report/api","cve_org":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-41318","nvd":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41318"},"summary":{"title":"AnythingLLM vulnerable to stored DOM XSS in chart caption renderer - LLM-driven prompt injection produces executable HTML via unsanitized renderMarkdown(content.caption) in Chartable component","description":"AnythingLLM is an application that turns pieces of content into context that any LLM can use as references during chatting. Prior to version 1.12.1, AnythingLLM's in-chat markdown renderer has an unsafe custom rule for images that interpolates the markdown image's `alt` text into an HTML `alt=\"...\"` attribute without any HTML encoding. Every call-site in the app wraps `renderMarkdown(...)` with `DOMPurify.sanitize(...)` as defense-in-depth — except the `Chartable` component, which renders chart captions with no sanitization. The chart caption is the natural-language text the LLM emits around a `create-chart` tool call, so any attacker who can influence the LLM's output — most cheaply via indirect prompt injection in a shared workspace document, or directly if they can create a chart record in a multi-user workspace — can trigger stored DOM-level XSS in every other user's browser when they open that conversation. AnythingLLM chat history is loaded server-side via `GET /api/workspace/:slug/chats` and rendered directly into the chat UI. Version 1.12.1 contains a patch for this issue.","state":"PUBLISHED","assigner":"GitHub_M","published_at":"2026-04-24 04:16:20","updated_at":"2026-04-24 04:16:20"},"problem_types":["CWE-79","CWE-116","CWE-1336","CWE-79 CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')","CWE-116 CWE-116: Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output","CWE-1336 CWE-1336: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements Used in a Template Engine"],"metrics":[{"version":"3.1","source":"security-advisories@github.com","type":"Secondary","score":"5.4","severity":"MEDIUM","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N","data":{"version":"3.1","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N","baseScore":5.4,"baseSeverity":"MEDIUM","attackVector":"NETWORK","attackComplexity":"HIGH","privilegesRequired":"LOW","userInteraction":"REQUIRED","scope":"UNCHANGED","confidentialityImpact":"HIGH","integrityImpact":"LOW","availabilityImpact":"NONE"}},{"version":"3.1","source":"CNA","type":"DECLARED","score":"5.4","severity":"MEDIUM","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N","data":{"attackComplexity":"HIGH","attackVector":"NETWORK","availabilityImpact":"NONE","baseScore":5.4,"baseSeverity":"MEDIUM","confidentialityImpact":"HIGH","integrityImpact":"LOW","privilegesRequired":"LOW","scope":"UNCHANGED","userInteraction":"REQUIRED","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N","version":"3.1"}}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/Mintplex-Labs/anything-llm/commit/f5fa03f4728e483949f6360093bc3ea1ef555535","name":"https://github.com/Mintplex-Labs/anything-llm/commit/f5fa03f4728e483949f6360093bc3ea1ef555535","refsource":"security-advisories@github.com","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://github.com/Mintplex-Labs/anything-llm/security/advisories/GHSA-4q6m-qh3w-9gf5","name":"https://github.com/Mintplex-Labs/anything-llm/security/advisories/GHSA-4q6m-qh3w-9gf5","refsource":"security-advisories@github.com","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-41318","name":"CVE Program record","refsource":"CVE.ORG","tags":["canonical"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41318","name":"NVD vulnerability detail","refsource":"NVD","tags":["canonical","analysis"]}],"affected":[{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Mintplex-Labs","product":"anything-llm","version":"affected < 1.12.1","platforms":[]}],"timeline":[],"solutions":[],"workarounds":[],"exploits":[],"credits":[],"nvd_cpes":[],"vendor_comments":[],"enrichments":{"kev":null,"epss":null,"legacy_qids":[]},"source_records":{"cve_program":{"containers":{"cna":{"affected":[{"product":"anything-llm","vendor":"Mintplex-Labs","versions":[{"status":"affected","version":"< 1.12.1"}]}],"descriptions":[{"lang":"en","value":"AnythingLLM is an application that turns pieces of content into context that any LLM can use as references during chatting. 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Prior to version 1.12.1, AnythingLLM's in-chat markdown renderer has an unsafe custom rule for images that interpolates the markdown image's `alt` text into an HTML `alt=\"...\"` attribute without any HTML encoding. Every call-site in the app wraps `renderMarkdown(...)` with `DOMPurify.sanitize(...)` as defense-in-depth — except the `Chartable` component, which renders chart captions with no sanitization. The chart caption is the natural-language text the LLM emits around a `create-chart` tool call, so any attacker who can influence the LLM's output — most cheaply via indirect prompt injection in a shared workspace document, or directly if they can create a chart record in a multi-user workspace — can trigger stored DOM-level XSS in every other user's browser when they open that conversation. AnythingLLM chat history is loaded server-side via `GET /api/workspace/:slug/chats` and rendered directly into the chat UI. Version 1.12.1 contains a patch for this issue.","Type":"Description","Title":"AnythingLLM vulnerable to stored DOM XSS in chart caption render"}]}}}