{"api_version":"1","generated_at":"2026-06-10T22:25:27+00:00","cve":"CVE-2026-45550","urls":{"html":"https://cve.report/CVE-2026-45550","api":"https://cve.report/api/cve/CVE-2026-45550.json","docs":"https://cve.report/api","cve_org":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-45550","nvd":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45550"},"summary":{"title":"Roxy-WI: IDOR on PUT /smon/check — any user can rewrite any tenant's monitoring URL/IP/body","description":"Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, PUT /smon/check (app/routes/smon/routes.py:117-138) gates only on roxywi_common.check_user_group_for_flask() — which validates that the caller has some group, not that the target check_id belongs to it. The downstream SQL update functions update_smon, update_smonHttp, update_smonTcp, update_smonPing, update_smonDns (app/modules/db/smon.py:515-562) all execute WHERE smon_id = ? with no user_group filter. The DELETE path is correctly filtered (app/modules/db/smon.py:319-327 does WHERE id = ? AND user_group = ?), demonstrating that the maintainers know the right pattern but did not apply it on UPDATE. Therefore any authenticated user can iterate over smon_id values and silently rewrite any other tenant's HTTP / TCP / Ping / DNS monitoring check. 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In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, PUT /smon/check (app/routes/smon/routes.py:117-138) gates only on roxywi_common.check_user_group_for_flask() — which validates that the caller has some group, not that the target check_id belongs to it. The downstream SQL update functions update_smon, update_smonHttp, update_smonTcp, update_smonPing, update_smonDns (app/modules/db/smon.py:515-562) all execute WHERE smon_id = ? with no user_group filter. The DELETE path is correctly filtered (app/modules/db/smon.py:319-327 does WHERE id = ? AND user_group = ?), demonstrating that the maintainers know the right pattern but did not apply it on UPDATE. Therefore any authenticated user can iterate over smon_id values and silently rewrite any other tenant's HTTP / TCP / Ping / DNS monitoring check. At time of publication, there are no publicly available patches.","Type":"Description","Title":"Roxy-WI: IDOR on PUT /smon/check — any user can rewrite any tena"}]}}}