{"api_version":"1","generated_at":"2026-06-03T19:46:48+00:00","cve":"CVE-2026-47065","urls":{"html":"https://cve.report/CVE-2026-47065","api":"https://cve.report/api/cve/CVE-2026-47065.json","docs":"https://cve.report/api","cve_org":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-47065","nvd":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-47065"},"summary":{"title":"Apache MINA: Critical Deserialization Allow-list Bypass via resolveProxyClass - ZDRES-232","description":"ZDRES-232: resolveProxyClass Not Overridden - acceptMatchers Filter Bypass via java.lang.reflect.Proxy\n\n\nAssessment: Fully addressed.\n\n\nWhen the serialised stream contains a TC_PROXYCLASSDESC (the marker \nfor a java.lang.reflect.Proxy ), JDK’s ObjectInputStream.readProxyDesc()\n is\ndispatched. JDK then calls the default \nObjectInputStream.resolveProxyClass(interfaces) implementation, which \nperforms Class.forName(intf, false, latestUserDefinedLoader()) for EACH \ninterface name and constructs the proxy class — bypassing the accepted\n classes list .\n\n\nZDRES-233: Class.forName(name, initialize=true, classLoader) in \nreadClassDescriptor Triggers Static Initialiser of Allow-Listed Classes\n\n\nAssessment: Fully addressed.\n\n\nFor ANY class on the allow-list, deserialising a stream that names it triggers the class’s \n (static initialiser) BEFORE any instance is constructed. This means an \nattacker who supplies a class name on the allow-list (e.g., the \ndeveloper wrote accept(“com.myapp.*\") , attacker supplies \ncom.myapp.SomeClass ) causes <clinit> of SomeClass — and many \nreal-world classes have side-effecting static initialisers\n\n\nBoth issues have been fixed.","state":"PUBLISHED","assigner":"apache","published_at":"2026-06-03 11:16:19","updated_at":"2026-06-03 11:16:19"},"problem_types":["CWE-502","CWE-502 CWE-502 Deserialization of Untrusted Data"],"metrics":[{"version":"3.1","source":"security@apache.org","type":"Secondary","score":"9.8","severity":"CRITICAL","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","data":{"version":"3.1","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","baseScore":9.8,"baseSeverity":"CRITICAL","attackVector":"NETWORK","attackComplexity":"LOW","privilegesRequired":"NONE","userInteraction":"NONE","scope":"UNCHANGED","confidentialityImpact":"HIGH","integrityImpact":"HIGH","availabilityImpact":"HIGH"}},{"version":"3.1","source":"CNA","type":"CVSS","score":"9.8","severity":"CRITICAL","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","data":{"attackComplexity":"LOW","attackVector":"NETWORK","availabilityImpact":"HIGH","baseScore":9.8,"baseSeverity":"CRITICAL","confidentialityImpact":"HIGH","integrityImpact":"HIGH","privilegesRequired":"NONE","scope":"UNCHANGED","userInteraction":"NONE","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","version":"3.1"}}],"references":[{"url":"https://lists.apache.org/thread/y7xj1bl8qo47p9bktb11hg5v6k1d4dyj","name":"https://lists.apache.org/thread/y7xj1bl8qo47p9bktb11hg5v6k1d4dyj","refsource":"security@apache.org","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-47065","name":"CVE Program record","refsource":"CVE.ORG","tags":["canonical"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-47065","name":"NVD vulnerability detail","refsource":"NVD","tags":["canonical","analysis"]}],"affected":[{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Apache Software Foundation","product":"Apache MINA","version":"affected 2.2.0 2.2.8 semver","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Apache Software Foundation","product":"Apache MINA","version":"affected 2.1.0 2.1.13 semver","platforms":[]},{"source":"CNA","vendor":"Apache Software Foundation","product":"Apache MINA","version":"affected 2.0.0 2.0.29 semver","platforms":[]}],"timeline":[],"solutions":[],"workarounds":[],"exploits":[],"credits":[{"source":"CNA","value":"Venkatraman Kumar, SecureIn","lang":"en"}],"nvd_cpes":[],"vendor_comments":[],"enrichments":{"kev":null,"epss":null,"legacy_qids":[]},"source_records":{"cve_program":{"containers":{"cna":{"affected":[{"collectionURL":"https://repo.maven.apache.org/maven2/org/apache/mina","defaultStatus":"unaffected","packageName":"org.apache.mina:mina-core","product":"Apache MINA","vendor":"Apache Software Foundation","versions":[{"lessThan":"2.2.8","status":"affected","version":"2.2.0","versionType":"semver"},{"lessThan":"2.1.13","status":"affected","version":"2.1.0","versionType":"semver"},{"lessThan":"2.0.29","status":"affected","version":"2.0.0","versionType":"semver"}]}],"credits":[{"lang":"en","type":"reporter","value":"Venkatraman Kumar, SecureIn"}],"descriptions":[{"lang":"en","supportingMedia":[{"base64":false,"type":"text/html","value":"<p>ZDRES-232: resolveProxyClass Not Overridden - acceptMatchers Filter Bypass via java.lang.reflect.Proxy</p>\n<p>Assessment: Fully addressed.</p>\n<p>When the serialised stream contains a TC_PROXYCLASSDESC (the marker \nfor a java.lang.reflect.Proxy ), JDK’s ObjectInputStream.readProxyDesc()\n is\ndispatched. JDK then calls the default \nObjectInputStream.resolveProxyClass(interfaces) implementation, which \nperforms Class.forName(intf, false, latestUserDefinedLoader()) for EACH \ninterface name and constructs the proxy class — bypassing the accepted\n classes list .</p>\n<p>ZDRES-233: Class.forName(name, initialize=true, classLoader) in \nreadClassDescriptor Triggers Static Initialiser of Allow-Listed Classes</p>\n<p>Assessment: Fully addressed.</p>\n<p>For ANY class on the allow-list, deserialising a stream that names it triggers the class’s \n (static initialiser) BEFORE any instance is constructed. This means an \nattacker who supplies a class name on the allow-list (e.g., the \ndeveloper wrote accept(“com.myapp.*\") , attacker supplies \ncom.myapp.SomeClass ) causes &lt;clinit&gt; of SomeClass — and many \nreal-world classes have side-effecting static initialisers</p>\n<p>Both issues have been fixed.</p><br>"}],"value":"ZDRES-232: resolveProxyClass Not Overridden - acceptMatchers Filter Bypass via java.lang.reflect.Proxy\n\n\nAssessment: Fully addressed.\n\n\nWhen the serialised stream contains a TC_PROXYCLASSDESC (the marker \nfor a java.lang.reflect.Proxy ), JDK’s ObjectInputStream.readProxyDesc()\n is\ndispatched. JDK then calls the default \nObjectInputStream.resolveProxyClass(interfaces) implementation, which \nperforms Class.forName(intf, false, latestUserDefinedLoader()) for EACH \ninterface name and constructs the proxy class — bypassing the accepted\n classes list .\n\n\nZDRES-233: Class.forName(name, initialize=true, classLoader) in \nreadClassDescriptor Triggers Static Initialiser of Allow-Listed Classes\n\n\nAssessment: Fully addressed.\n\n\nFor ANY class on the allow-list, deserialising a stream that names it triggers the class’s \n (static initialiser) BEFORE any instance is constructed. This means an \nattacker who supplies a class name on the allow-list (e.g., the \ndeveloper wrote accept(“com.myapp.*\") , attacker supplies \ncom.myapp.SomeClass ) causes <clinit> of SomeClass — and many \nreal-world classes have side-effecting static initialisers\n\n\nBoth issues have been fixed."}],"metrics":[{"cvssV3_1":{"attackComplexity":"LOW","attackVector":"NETWORK","availabilityImpact":"HIGH","baseScore":9.8,"baseSeverity":"CRITICAL","confidentialityImpact":"HIGH","integrityImpact":"HIGH","privilegesRequired":"NONE","scope":"UNCHANGED","userInteraction":"NONE","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","version":"3.1"},"format":"CVSS","scenarios":[{"lang":"en","value":"GENERAL"}]}],"problemTypes":[{"descriptions":[{"cweId":"CWE-502","description":"CWE-502 Deserialization of Untrusted Data","lang":"en","type":"CWE"}]}],"providerMetadata":{"dateUpdated":"2026-06-03T09:39:41.629Z","orgId":"f0158376-9dc2-43b6-827c-5f631a4d8d09","shortName":"apache"},"references":[{"tags":["vendor-advisory"],"url":"https://lists.apache.org/thread/y7xj1bl8qo47p9bktb11hg5v6k1d4dyj"}],"source":{"discovery":"UNKNOWN"},"title":"Apache MINA: Critical Deserialization Allow-list Bypass via resolveProxyClass - ZDRES-232","x_generator":{"engine":"Vulnogram 0.2.0"}}},"cveMetadata":{"assignerOrgId":"f0158376-9dc2-43b6-827c-5f631a4d8d09","assignerShortName":"apache","cveId":"CVE-2026-47065","datePublished":"2026-06-03T09:39:41.629Z","dateReserved":"2026-05-18T16:53:39.555Z","dateUpdated":"2026-06-03T09:39:41.629Z","state":"PUBLISHED"},"dataType":"CVE_RECORD","dataVersion":"5.2"},"nvd":{"publishedDate":"2026-06-03 11:16:19","lastModifiedDate":"2026-06-03 11:16:19","problem_types":["CWE-502","CWE-502 CWE-502 Deserialization of Untrusted Data"],"metrics":{"cvssMetricV31":[{"source":"security@apache.org","type":"Secondary","cvssData":{"version":"3.1","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H","baseScore":9.8,"baseSeverity":"CRITICAL","attackVector":"NETWORK","attackComplexity":"LOW","privilegesRequired":"NONE","userInteraction":"NONE","scope":"UNCHANGED","confidentialityImpact":"HIGH","integrityImpact":"HIGH","availabilityImpact":"HIGH"},"exploitabilityScore":3.9,"impactScore":5.9}]},"configurations":[]},"legacy_mitre":{"record":{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"47065","Ordinal":"1","Title":"Apache MINA: Critical Deserialization Allow-list Bypass via reso","CVE":"CVE-2026-47065","Year":"2026"},"notes":[{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"47065","Ordinal":"1","NoteData":"ZDRES-232: resolveProxyClass Not Overridden - acceptMatchers Filter Bypass via java.lang.reflect.Proxy\n\n\nAssessment: Fully addressed.\n\n\nWhen the serialised stream contains a TC_PROXYCLASSDESC (the marker \nfor a java.lang.reflect.Proxy ), JDK’s ObjectInputStream.readProxyDesc()\n is\ndispatched. JDK then calls the default \nObjectInputStream.resolveProxyClass(interfaces) implementation, which \nperforms Class.forName(intf, false, latestUserDefinedLoader()) for EACH \ninterface name and constructs the proxy class — bypassing the accepted\n classes list .\n\n\nZDRES-233: Class.forName(name, initialize=true, classLoader) in \nreadClassDescriptor Triggers Static Initialiser of Allow-Listed Classes\n\n\nAssessment: Fully addressed.\n\n\nFor ANY class on the allow-list, deserialising a stream that names it triggers the class’s \n (static initialiser) BEFORE any instance is constructed. This means an \nattacker who supplies a class name on the allow-list (e.g., the \ndeveloper wrote accept(“com.myapp.*\") , attacker supplies \ncom.myapp.SomeClass ) causes <clinit> of SomeClass — and many \nreal-world classes have side-effecting static initialisers\n\n\nBoth issues have been fixed.","Type":"Description","Title":"Apache MINA: Critical Deserialization Allow-list Bypass via reso"}]}}}