{"api_version":"1","generated_at":"2026-08-05T20:40:40+00:00","cve":"CVE-2026-48168","urls":{"html":"https://cve.report/CVE-2026-48168","api":"https://cve.report/api/cve/CVE-2026-48168.json","docs":"https://cve.report/api","cve_org":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-48168","nvd":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48168"},"summary":{"title":"PraisonAI: GitHub Actions Claude workflow command injection via unquoted PR branch name","description":"PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. In versions prior to 4.6.40, the bundled Claude GitHub Actions workflow is vulnerable to command injection because it embeds an attacker-controlled pull request branch name into a Bash run: block without quoting or validation. Additionally, the workflow allows any @claude comment to trigger the job regardless of whether the commenter is a trusted collaborator. An outside contributor can open a pull request from a fork whose branch name contains shell metacharacters and comment @claude, causing Bash to execute arbitrary shell code in the GitHub Actions runner. Because these commands run in a job holding a GitHub App token with write permissions, OIDC access, and gh/git access, the injection can be chained through $GITHUB_PATH to compromise later privileged steps, enabling repository writes, pull request and issue manipulation, or OIDC-token abuse. This issue has been fixed in version 4.6.40.","state":"PUBLISHED","assigner":"GitHub_M","published_at":"2026-08-05 19:17:31","updated_at":"2026-08-05 20:17:09"},"problem_types":["CWE-862","CWE-862 CWE-862: Missing Authorization"],"metrics":[{"version":"3.1","source":"security-advisories@github.com","type":"Secondary","score":"10","severity":"CRITICAL","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","data":{"version":"3.1","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","baseScore":10,"baseSeverity":"CRITICAL","attackVector":"NETWORK","attackComplexity":"LOW","privilegesRequired":"NONE","userInteraction":"NONE","scope":"CHANGED","confidentialityImpact":"HIGH","integrityImpact":"HIGH","availabilityImpact":"HIGH"}},{"version":"3.1","source":"CNA","type":"DECLARED","score":"10","severity":"CRITICAL","vector":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","data":{"attackComplexity":"LOW","attackVector":"NETWORK","availabilityImpact":"HIGH","baseScore":10,"baseSeverity":"CRITICAL","confidentialityImpact":"HIGH","integrityImpact":"HIGH","privilegesRequired":"NONE","scope":"CHANGED","userInteraction":"NONE","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","version":"3.1"}}],"references":[{"url":"https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-xp85-6wwf-r67c","name":"https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-xp85-6wwf-r67c","refsource":"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/commit/179cab02dbec0c1e9b601507a659","name":"https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/commit/179cab02dbec0c1e9b601507a659","refsource":"security-advisories@github.com","tags":[],"title":"","mime":"","httpstatus":"","archivestatus":"0"},{"url":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-48168","name":"CVE Program record","refsource":"CVE.ORG","tags":["canonical"]},{"url":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48168","name":"NVD vulnerability detail","refsource":"NVD","tags":["canonical","analysis"]}],"affected":[{"source":"CNA","vendor":"MervinPraison","product":"PraisonAI","version":"affected < 4.6.40","platforms":[]}],"timeline":[],"solutions":[],"workarounds":[],"exploits":[],"credits":[],"nvd_cpes":[],"vendor_comments":[],"enrichments":{"kev":null,"epss":null,"legacy_qids":[]},"source_records":{"cve_program":{"containers":{"adp":[{"metrics":[{"other":{"content":{"id":"CVE-2026-48168","options":[{"Exploitation":"poc"},{"Automatable":"yes"},{"Technical Impact":"total"}],"role":"CISA Coordinator","timestamp":"2026-08-05T19:23:57.492283Z","version":"2.0.3"},"type":"ssvc"}}],"providerMetadata":{"dateUpdated":"2026-08-05T19:24:05.128Z","orgId":"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0","shortName":"CISA-ADP"},"references":[{"tags":["exploit"],"url":"https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-xp85-6wwf-r67c"}],"title":"CISA ADP Vulnrichment"}],"cna":{"affected":[{"product":"PraisonAI","vendor":"MervinPraison","versions":[{"status":"affected","version":"< 4.6.40"}]}],"descriptions":[{"lang":"en","value":"PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. In versions prior to 4.6.40, the bundled Claude GitHub Actions workflow is vulnerable to command injection because it embeds an attacker-controlled pull request branch name into a Bash run: block without quoting or validation. Additionally, the workflow allows any @claude comment to trigger the job regardless of whether the commenter is a trusted collaborator. An outside contributor can open a pull request from a fork whose branch name contains shell metacharacters and comment @claude, causing Bash to execute arbitrary shell code in the GitHub Actions runner. Because these commands run in a job holding a GitHub App token with write permissions, OIDC access, and gh/git access, the injection can be chained through $GITHUB_PATH to compromise later privileged steps, enabling repository writes, pull request and issue manipulation, or OIDC-token abuse. This issue has been fixed in version 4.6.40."}],"metrics":[{"cvssV3_1":{"attackComplexity":"LOW","attackVector":"NETWORK","availabilityImpact":"HIGH","baseScore":10,"baseSeverity":"CRITICAL","confidentialityImpact":"HIGH","integrityImpact":"HIGH","privilegesRequired":"NONE","scope":"CHANGED","userInteraction":"NONE","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","version":"3.1"}}],"problemTypes":[{"descriptions":[{"cweId":"CWE-862","description":"CWE-862: Missing Authorization","lang":"en","type":"CWE"}]}],"providerMetadata":{"dateUpdated":"2026-08-05T18:29:38.632Z","orgId":"a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa","shortName":"GitHub_M"},"references":[{"name":"https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-xp85-6wwf-r67c","tags":["x_refsource_CONFIRM"],"url":"https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-xp85-6wwf-r67c"},{"name":"https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/commit/179cab02dbec0c1e9b601507a659","tags":["x_refsource_MISC"],"url":"https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/commit/179cab02dbec0c1e9b601507a659"}],"source":{"advisory":"GHSA-xp85-6wwf-r67c","discovery":"UNKNOWN"},"title":"PraisonAI: GitHub Actions Claude workflow command injection via unquoted PR branch name"}},"cveMetadata":{"assignerOrgId":"a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa","assignerShortName":"GitHub_M","cveId":"CVE-2026-48168","datePublished":"2026-08-05T18:29:38.632Z","dateReserved":"2026-05-20T23:12:43.032Z","dateUpdated":"2026-08-05T19:24:05.128Z","state":"PUBLISHED"},"dataType":"CVE_RECORD","dataVersion":"5.2"},"nvd":{"publishedDate":"2026-08-05 19:17:31","lastModifiedDate":"2026-08-05 20:17:09","problem_types":["CWE-862","CWE-862 CWE-862: Missing Authorization"],"metrics":{"cvssMetricV31":[{"source":"security-advisories@github.com","type":"Secondary","cvssData":{"version":"3.1","vectorString":"CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H","baseScore":10,"baseSeverity":"CRITICAL","attackVector":"NETWORK","attackComplexity":"LOW","privilegesRequired":"NONE","userInteraction":"NONE","scope":"CHANGED","confidentialityImpact":"HIGH","integrityImpact":"HIGH","availabilityImpact":"HIGH"},"exploitabilityScore":3.9,"impactScore":6}],"ssvcV203":[{"source":"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0","ssvcData":{"timestamp":"2026-08-05T19:23:57.492283Z","id":"CVE-2026-48168","options":[{"exploitation":"poc"},{"automatable":"yes"},{"technicalImpact":"total"}],"role":"CISA Coordinator","version":"2.0.3"}}]},"configurations":[]},"legacy_mitre":{"record":{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"48168","Ordinal":"1","Title":"PraisonAI: GitHub Actions Claude workflow command injection via ","CVE":"CVE-2026-48168","Year":"2026"},"notes":[{"CveYear":"2026","CveId":"48168","Ordinal":"1","NoteData":"PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. In versions prior to 4.6.40, the bundled Claude GitHub Actions workflow is vulnerable to command injection because it embeds an attacker-controlled pull request branch name into a Bash run: block without quoting or validation. Additionally, the workflow allows any @claude comment to trigger the job regardless of whether the commenter is a trusted collaborator. An outside contributor can open a pull request from a fork whose branch name contains shell metacharacters and comment @claude, causing Bash to execute arbitrary shell code in the GitHub Actions runner. Because these commands run in a job holding a GitHub App token with write permissions, OIDC access, and gh/git access, the injection can be chained through $GITHUB_PATH to compromise later privileged steps, enabling repository writes, pull request and issue manipulation, or OIDC-token abuse. This issue has been fixed in version 4.6.40.","Type":"Description","Title":"PraisonAI: GitHub Actions Claude workflow command injection via "}]}}}