{"api_version":"1","generated_at":"2026-09-04T00:17:36+00:00","cve":"CVE-2026-48702","urls":{"html":"https://cve.report/CVE-2026-48702","api":"https://cve.report/api/cve/CVE-2026-48702.json","docs":"https://cve.report/api","cve_org":"https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-48702","nvd":"https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48702"},"summary":{"title":"Rekor has an OOM Condition due to Unbounded gzip Decompression in Alpine APK Parsing Logic","description":"Rekor is a software supply chain transparency log. Starting in version 0.3.0 and prior to version 1.5.2, the `Package.Unmarshal()` function in `pkg/types/alpine/apk.go` decompresses the signature and control gzip members of an APK file into in-memory buffers without bounding the total decompressed size. The existing `max_apk_metadata_size` check (default 1MB) is only applied to individual tar entry header sizes after decompression completes, so it does not prevent a decompression bomb from consuming unbounded heap memory. An attacker can craft a gzip stream that compresses at a ~1000:1 ratio (e.g., 2MB compressed zeros → 2GB decompressed). When submitted as spec.package.content in an Alpine `ProposedEntry`, the server decompresses the full payload into memory during request processing, triggering a fatal Go runtime out-of-memory error or OS OOM-kill that cannot be caught by the server's recover() middleware. This is reachable via two unauthenticated endpoints, `POST /api/v1/log/entries (createLogEntry)` and `POST /api/v1/log/entries/retrieve (searchLogQuery)`. Both invoke `V001Entry.Canonicalize()` → `fetchExternalEntities()` → `apk.Unmarshal(packageData)`, which performs the unbounded decompression. Version 1.5.2 patches the issue. There is no effective workaround. Setting `max_request_body_size` reduces but does not eliminate exposure due to the ~1000:1 compression ratio (a 1MB body limit still allows ~1GB heap allocation). 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This is reachable via two unauthenticated endpoints, `POST /api/v1/log/entries (createLogEntry)` and `POST /api/v1/log/entries/retrieve (searchLogQuery)`. Both invoke `V001Entry.Canonicalize()` → `fetchExternalEntities()` → `apk.Unmarshal(packageData)`, which performs the unbounded decompression. Version 1.5.2 patches the issue. There is no effective workaround. Setting `max_request_body_size` reduces but does not eliminate exposure due to the ~1000:1 compression ratio (a 1MB body limit still allows ~1GB heap allocation). 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Starting in version 0.3.0 and prior to version 1.5.2, the `Package.Unmarshal()` function in `pkg/types/alpine/apk.go` decompresses the signature and control gzip members of an APK file into in-memory buffers without bounding the total decompressed size. The existing `max_apk_metadata_size` check (default 1MB) is only applied to individual tar entry header sizes after decompression completes, so it does not prevent a decompression bomb from consuming unbounded heap memory. An attacker can craft a gzip stream that compresses at a ~1000:1 ratio (e.g., 2MB compressed zeros → 2GB decompressed). When submitted as spec.package.content in an Alpine `ProposedEntry`, the server decompresses the full payload into memory during request processing, triggering a fatal Go runtime out-of-memory error or OS OOM-kill that cannot be caught by the server's recover() middleware. This is reachable via two unauthenticated endpoints, `POST /api/v1/log/entries (createLogEntry)` and `POST /api/v1/log/entries/retrieve (searchLogQuery)`. Both invoke `V001Entry.Canonicalize()` → `fetchExternalEntities()` → `apk.Unmarshal(packageData)`, which performs the unbounded decompression. Version 1.5.2 patches the issue. There is no effective workaround. Setting `max_request_body_size` reduces but does not eliminate exposure due to the ~1000:1 compression ratio (a 1MB body limit still allows ~1GB heap allocation). Setting `max_apk_metadata_size` has no effect on this vulnerability since the check is applied after decompression.","Type":"Description","Title":"Rekor has an OOM Condition due to Unbounded gzip Decompression i"}]}}}